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i » 


A '!& V- 



Volume XXIV] [Number 3 





Sfno Dork 


LoiTDON ; P. S. Kmo & Son 

1 90S 





Volume XXiV] 

[Number 3 






, — / 

'^■/■l -y 

3Sm Dork 


London : P. S. King & Son 



Nicholas Mnrray Bntler, LL.D., President. J. W. Burgesa, LL.D., Professor 
of Political Science and Constitutional Law. Utinroe Smith, J.U.D., Pro fe ssor of 
Roman Law and GmiparatiTe Jurisprudence. F. J. Goodnow, LL.D.9 Professor 
of Administrative Law and Municipal Science. E. ft. A. Seligouui, Ph.D., Profes- 
sor of Political Economy and Fmance. H. L. Ofgood, Ph.D., Professor of History. 
Wm. A. Dnnningy Ph.D., Professor of History and Political Philosophy. J. B. Moon, 
LL.D.y Professor of International Law. F. H. OiddingSy LL.D., Professor 
of Sociology. J. B. Clark, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy. J. H. 
Robiiiaoii|Ph.D., Professor of History. W. M. Sloaiie9L.H.D., Professor of History. 
H. R. Seager, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy. H. L. Moore, Ph.D., Ad- 
junct Professor of Political Economy. W. R. Shepherd, Ph.D., Adjunct Profes- 
sor of History. J. X. Shotwell, Ph.D.y Adjunct Professor of History. O. W. 
Botsford, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor of History. V. G. Simkhoyitch, Ph.D., 
Adjunct Professor of Economic History. E. X. Devine, LL.D., Professor of Social 
Economy. A. S. Johnaon, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor of Economics. C. A. Beard, 
Ph.D., Lecturer in History. G. J.'Baylea, Ph.D., Lecturer in SodoLogy. 


Subject A. Ancient and Oriental History, nine courses. 
Subject B. Mediaeral History, six courses. 
Subject C. Modem European History, seven courses. 
Subject D. American History, eleven courses. 
Subject E. Political Philosophy, three courses. 


Subject A. Constitutional Law, four courses. 

Subject B. International Law, four courses. 

Subject C Administrative Law, seven courses. 

Subject D. Roman Law and Comparative Jurisprudence, seven conrseii 


Subject A. Political Economy and Finance, twenty courses. 
Subject B. Sociology and Statistics, seven courses. 
Subject C. Social Economy, seven courses. 

Most of Uie courses consist chiefly of lectures ; a smaller number take the form of 
research under the direction of a professor. In each subject is held at least one seminar 
for the training of candidates for the higher degrees. The degrees of A.M. and 
Ph.D. are given to students who fulfil the requirements prescribed by the University 
CounciL (For particulars, see Columbia University Bulletins of Information, Faculty 
of Political Science.) Any person not a candidate for a degree may attend any of 
the courses at any time by payment of a proportional fee. Four or five University 
fellowship! o( I650 each, the Schiff fellowship of |6oo, the Curtis fellowship 
of |6oo, the Garth fellowehip in Political Economy of ^50, an^ University 
•choUinhipeof ^150 each are awarded to applicants who give evidence of special 
fitness to pursue advanced studies. Several prises of from ^50 to #250 are awarded. 
The library contains about 560^)00 volumes and students have access to other 
great collections in the city. 






Volume XXIV] [Numbers 




" ICtm fiork 





I , 

i' to 







Japan, an Asiatic nation, which, until forty years ago, 
maintained for more than two centuries a policy of strict 
seclusion, is to-day not only admitted into the comity of 
civilized nations, but has, in matters concerning the Far 
East, come to play a part as important as that of any of the 
great powers of the West. The Island Empire, which ten 
years ago achieved an unbroken victory in a struggle with 
an eastern nation of four hundred million people, lately 
drifted into war with one of the strongest powers of Europe 
and has again won an '' unbroken victory on land and sea." 
Does the " marvelous and swift progress " of modem Japan 
tend to become a "peril" to western civilization? Or does 
it contribute to the great work of the world's civilization? 
Will Japan use her power in obtaining exclusive privileges^ 
or in leading toward the light her sister nations of Asia? 
Is she persona grata or persona non grata to the nations en- 
gaged in world-intercourse? Strongly believing that what 
has been accomplished by Japan in the interest of civiliza- 
tion is an earnest of what will be done hereafter, I have 
endeavored by careful research to trace Japan's historic 
policy in dealing with foreign nations. Incidentally fre- 
quent references have been made to the diplomatic and com- 
mercial history of Europe and America, to the principles of 
international and other public law, as well as to phases of 
private law, and to economics and sociology, in order to 
elucidate with scientific precision the relations between the 
East and the West. 

8 PREFACE [240 

I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the members 
of the Faculty of Political Science in Columbia University, 
and especially to Professor John Bassett Moore, under 
whose supervision this work was undertaken. 

Seiji G. Hishida. 

New York City, September, 1905. 





Page 10, second line, read for " 1863," " 1868." 

Page 22, footnote, read for "The Prince;* "II Principer 

Page 50, ninth Hne, read for " Tong," " Tang.' 

Page 57, eleventh line, read for '* Heiau," " Heian.' 

Page 83, twenty-sixth line, read for " Koyoshima,'' " Kagoshima.' 

Page 90, fourth line in footnote, read for " 562," " 502." 

Page 91, twelfth line, read for " 1554," ** 1564." 

Page 128, fourth line in footnote, for " S. Hozumi, op, cit.*' substitute 

** N. Hozumi, Ancestor Worship" 
Page 148, first and third lines, read for "five," "eight." 
Page 152, tenth line in footnotes, read for " 1889," " 1886." 
Pages 165 and 188, read for " Tai-won-Kun," " Tai-Om-Kun." 
Page 167, footnote 2 refers to the words " coup tT itat " in the twenty- 
first Nne. 
Page 168, twenty-second line, read for " in April," " on April 18." 
Page 169, sixth line in footnotes, read for "rice," "grain." 
Page 210, sixth line, read for " Chili," " Pechili." 
Page 224, sixteenth line, add the words "and Korea" after the word 

" Manchuria." 
Page 230, fourth line, read for " Ta-tung-kou," "Antung." 
Page 285, seventh line, read for " Bcneditti," " Bcnedetti." 
Page 285, twenty-first Kne, read for " New York, 1902," " 2 vols. Lon- 
don, 1883." 
Page 285, thirty-fourth line, read for " Forster," " Foster." 
Page 286, fifteenth and sixteenth lines, read for " Hall, W. A.," " Hall, 

W. R" 
Page 286, nineteenth Hne, for "Harisse" read "Harrissc." 
Page 287, ninth and tenth lines, add " J." after " T." 
Page 289, sixth line, read for "Treaties" "Treaty" 





1. International Society and its Characteristics 13 

2. International Politics in Europe— The Balance of Power ... 16 

3. International Politics in America— The Monroe Doctrine ... 33 

4. Issue of International Politics in the Far East 38 



5. The Early Intercourse of Japan with the Korean Kingdoms and 

China 40 

6. Political Relations of Japan with the Korean Kingdoms and 

China 44 

7. Internal Affairs of Ancient Japan 53 



8. The Activity of the Mongol Tartar 58 

9. The Result of the Mongol Invasion — Period of Piracy .... 67 
10. The Attempts of Taiko the Great to Subjugate China and Korea. 70 




xz. With the Portuguese and the Spaniards 79 

12. With the Dutch and the English 88 

13. Diplomacy of the Tokugawa Shogunate 96 

241] 9 




14. Attempts to Reopen the Empire by European Powers .... 104 

15. American Mission to Reopen Japan, and Treaty Relations with 

Occidental States xo6 

16. Restoration of the Imperial Sovereignty 1x8 


japan's BNTKY into THB COMITY OF NATIONS, 1868-1899 

17. Consular Jurisdiction and Tariff Questions under the Old 

Treaties . 132 

18. Revision of the Treaties and Present Treaty Relations .... 137 




19. The First Treaty with China 153 

10. The Formosan Question (1874) 155 

31. The Loochoo Complication 159 

33. Japan's Policy to Open Korea to the World 163 

33. The Chinese-Japanese War 170 

34. The Peace of Shimonoseki and the New Commercial Treaty 

with China 176 

35. Treaty Relations with Siam 183 



36. Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Korea 185 

37. Struggles of the Great Powers in China— Spheres of Interest . 194 



38. The Boxer Troubles of 1900 310 

* 39. The Manchurian Question 317 

30. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 333 

31. The Russo-Japanese Difference 337 



33. The Peace of Portsmouth 239 

33. The Status of Manchuria and Korea 244 



34. Resume 251 

35. The Mission of Japan 258 


A. The Treaty of Portsmouth 274 

B. The Renewed Anglo- Japanese Alliance 282 




International Society and its Characteristics. — Although 
nations are, from the ethnographical, geographical and 
political viewpoints, divergently distributed over the earth, 
they yet have intercourse and compacts with one another. 
The intercourse of nations may be manifested in the 
establishment of diplomatic relations; in the pursuit of 
commerce, industry and navigation; in the cultivation of 
science, art and religion; in immigration, travel, intermar- 
riage and social pleasures; in brief, in all the forms of 
activity which are necessary to satisfy the wants of man- 
kind. In the conduct of intercourse a group of different 
nations exhibits " purposes of common concern," or, " con- 
sciousness of kind," and, therefore, forms a society,* just 
as individuals create a private society, or citizens and ruler 
organize a municipal community or a national state. The 
society composed of different nations, or states, has been 
called international society, the society of states, or the 
" family of nations," in which the associating members are 
bound together. The binding power of international so- 
ciety, even though it has a " common civilization," is neces- 
sarily weaker and looser than' that of the municipal society, 
in so far as the former consists of members having con- 
flicting traditions and histories differing in their details. 
The " consciousness of kind " in international society is im- 

1 As to the conception of a society, see Giddings, The Principles of 
Sociology, pp. 3-S and 17-18. 

345] 13 


perfect. The perfection of international life still belongs 
to the future of civilization. Compared with the individ- 
ual society, like the club or the union, international so- 
ciety, however, is more exclusive and indispensable. No 
nation is permitted to remain in isolation,^ while a dis- 
gruntled member may voluntarily withdraw from his club 
or a recalcitrant member may be compulsorily expelled. 
The western nations, by the exercise and the display of 
force, established diplomatic and commercial relations with 
China and Japan in the middle of the last century. In 1876 
Japan took the initiative in opening the *^ Hermit King- 
dom " of Korea, not by the exercise of direct force, but 
by a show of naval power. 

Ubi societas ibi jus est As the national state adminis- 
ters its justice and peace by municipal law, so international 
society r^^ates its intercourse according to international 
law. Society, whether national or international, must have 
power to enforce the law, for without it social order would 
be replaced by anarchy on land and by piracy on the high 
seas. The power to compel obedience and punish disobedi- 
ence is, or originates in, sovereignty. The object of sov- 
ereignty is identical both in the national and in international 
society. Its application is, however, somewhat different. 
Sovereignty, from the standpoint of constitutional law, is 
original, unlimited, universal power over the subject mem- 
bers of the state.' In the sense of international law, sover- 
eignty is the independent power of each state in the manage- 
ment of its foreign intercourse, as opposed to the will of all 
other states, i. e. it consists in the independence of one 

^ Westlake, International Law, pp. 6-7. 

'Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 
vol. i, p. 52. Hozumi, Ken-po-Tai {Outline of the Japanese Constitu- 
tion), pp. 3, II. Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs (tdkiott 
of 1902), p. 13. 


member in relation to the other members/ The modern 
inlemational society, consisting of independent nations, does 
not recognize any universal and absolute power, like the 
universal rule of Rome. Modem international law is not 
a universal law under a common superior, like the ;W 
gentium * of Rome, but is a system of rules for the guidance 
of independent states in their mutual intercourse. It de- 
clares that every independent state has the right to do what* 
ever is necessary for its existence and welfare by all legiti- 
mate means, '' such as the pacific acquisition of new terri- 
tory, the discovery and settlement of new countries, the 
extension of its navigation and fisheries, the improvement 
pf its revenues, arts, agriculture and commerce, the in- 
crease of its military and naval force.'^ ' On the other 
hand, an independent state is bound to respect these rights 
in other states.^ All sovereign states are, in the eye of 
international law, equally entitled to claim such rights and 
equally bound to perform such duties. 

Speaking historically, the principle of the equality of sov- 
ereign states has not been fully enforced in cases where 
an aggressive state infringed the sovereign rights of a 
fed>le state. International society, composed of independ- 
ent sovereign states, could not establish a '^ common su- 
perior" or universal sovereign which might theoretically 
administer international justice. On the contrary, it has 
been left to independent states to interpret and execute in- 

^ As to the distinction between intenuil and external sovereignty, sec 
Wlieston, Elements of International Law, part i, diap. ii, par. 5. Heff- 
«er, Vdlkerrecht (6th edition), p. 40. Meyer, Deutsches Staatsrecht 
(edition of 1878), p. 10. Holkuic^ Jutisprudence (pth edition), p. 47. 

*The "ins gentium was not law international, but law universal." 
Walker, The Science of International Law, p. 62. 

* Wheaton, Elements of International Law, part ii, chap, i, par. 4. 

* Hall, International Law (4th edition), p. 45. 


tcraational law by themselves, separately or corporately. 
Under such circumstances, an aggressive state would assert 
its selfishness at the expense of a weaker state. The mem- 
bers of the international society, however, have not been so 
indulgent as to give a free hand to the aggressor. When 
the occasion arises, certain states, called the "great 
powers," ^ exercise their influence in international politics 
for the general interests of international society without 
violating the l^al equality of the weaker states. They have 
not hesitated even to undertake intervention in affairs be- 
longing purely to a third state. The exercise of influence 
by a single power is the system that now prevails on the 
American continents under the name of the " Monroe doc- 
trine; " but combined interference has been the system of 
Europe, and it is to-day the characteristic of the conduct 
of the powers interested in the Far East, its predominating 
feature being the maintenance of the " balance of power." 

International Politics in Europe — The ''Balance of Power.'* 
— To understand concretely modern international life, it 
is not without profit to recur to the political relations of 
ancient Greece. Each commonwealth (ttSXic) of ancient 
Greece, though it may have occupied but a little island, 
valley, town or peninsula, possessed an independent power 
(ain-mn/da), with the right of making war and peace, as does 
the modern independent state. In their international life 

1 For the influence of the great powers, see Lawrence, Essays on 
Some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law, essay v, 
" Primacy of the Great Powers." Westlake, International Law, p. ga 
et seq, "The Political Inequality of States and the Great Powers of 
Europe." Rivier, Principes du droit des gens, vol. i, pp. 125-126. 
See also "The Primacy of the United States ia America," Lawrence, 
International Law, par. 136. The German authorities, Liszt and Zom, 
say Japan entered the ranks of the great powers in 1894. See Volker- 
recht, p. 54; GrundsUge des Volkerrechts, p. 21. 


these petty Hellenic city-states had a very simple and im- 
perfect body of rules developed from their philosophy, re- 
ligion and custom/ Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Macedon 
assumed leadership (^e^w/o) in the political struggle — in 
commercial, territorial and colonial development — as do the 
modem great powers. The principle of the balance of 
power against an aggressive member or foreigfn foe was in- 
telligently applied for their self-preservation/ Neverthe- 
less, the Gredcs, as the result of their strong but narrow 
communal spirit,* in time became weak against external at- 
tack, and the possibility of their higher development in 
international life was destroyed in 338 b. c, when they 
were overwhelmed by the universal empire of Alexander 
the Great. 

The primitive conception of the Roman state — ^kingdom 
or republic — was, like the Greek, that of a city-state 
(civitas). Though the Roman city-states each maintained 
an independent existence, there was less trace of true inter- 
national law.* This was, doubtless, owing to the political 
genius of the Romans, which was not based upon the 
principle of mutual respect among different nations, but 
sought to organize all mankind as the unit of state.** Rome, 
under the Caesars, struggled for universal empire over her 
fellow states and foreign nations. The national code 
{jus cvuUe) was supplemented by the jus gentium — ^univer- 
sal code; and the Roman imperium became imperium 

* For the law of peace and war of ancient Greece, see Walker's His- 
tory of the Law of Nations, pp. 37-43. 

2 See "Theory of the Balance of Power among the Ancient Nations," 
Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, p. 16 et seq. 

• Burgess, Comparative Constitutional Law, vol. i, p. 31. 

^ An account of the early international usages of the Romans may be 
found in Walker, History of the Law of Nations, pp. 44 et seq. 

8 Burgess, op. cit., vol. i, p. 35. The political genius of the Roman. 


mundi^ Under the Roman regime, the socalled interna- 
tional law, which regulated intercourse among different 
nations, was positive law in the strict Austinian sense, for 
it was based upon the command of a common superior. The 
universal sovereignty of a world dominion would have 
solved, at least temporarily, the question of world politics — 
the conflict between nations. 

But European nations had not as yet sufficiently devel- 
oped to be ready for government by Roman universalism. 
Nations must have universal customs, a world language, 
i. e. universal consciousness of right and wrong, before the 
establishment of universal empire can take place ; otherwise 
universalism checks the freedom of the individual, sup- 
presses local autonomy, national traditions and patriotism; 
and the reaction against it destroys the stability of the uni- 
versal empire.* It is no wonder, then, that the Roman 
empire was at last destroyed, in 476 a. d., by those Teutonic 
tribes whose political psychology involved national free- 
dom,* and that the latter constructed their states out of 
Roman provinces. 

In the course of time, however, Teutonic rulers, combin- 
ing with Roman bishops, founded a universal dominion, 
after the Roman fashion, and called it the " Holy Roman 
Empire." It was first established by the Prankish monarch, 
Charlemagne, in 800, and, after the coronation of Otto I, 
at Rome, in 962, Romano-German emperors claimed the 
powers of the Empire.* The universalism of the Middle 
Ages was based upon the politico-religious principle. AH 
nations were regarded as " one religfious and political 

1 Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, p. 38. 

2 As to the vices of universalism, see Burgess, op. cit., vol. i, p. 36. 

• For the political genius of the Teutonic race, cf. ibid., pp. 37-39. 

* Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chaps, iv, v, viii. 


brotherhood, of which the Roman bishop was the spiritual 
head, and of which the Emperor was the secular chief." 
Emperor and Pope again made a mistake in their concep- 
tion of universal peace. They saw only superficially the 
human race as a unit, but did not seriously consider that, 
in spite of this general unity, nations are individually dif- 
ferent at heart. 

While Emperor and Pope claimed world-wide dominion, 
the Teutonic race, which already had scattered all over 
Europe, was restlessly pursuing its political mission — to 
establish "states upon the principle of national union and 
indq)endence." Though the kings of England, Denmark 
and Spain formally acknowledged the supreme power of the 
Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne, theirs were in fact 
independent states. Since the treaty of Verdun (834), the 
Prankish Empire had broken into a number of kingdoms. 
France also broke away from the Empire in 888. The 
Holy Roman Empire was restored by Otto the Great in 
962, but it covered only the German-Italian nations. In 
the great struggle between the Emperor and the P(q)e in 
the eleventh century, the former was gradually stripped of 
his power. The feudal barons and free cities, taking ad- 
vantage of the struggle, became more and more independent. 
After the proclamation of the constitution by the electoral 
diet at Frankfort in 1338, the imperial office existed only 
at the pleasure of the feudal barons. 

The power of the Pope, on the other hand, increased in 
proportion to the decline of the imperial power. The Pope 
came to claim the right " to give and take away empires, 
kingdoms, princedoms, marquisates, duchies, countships, 
and the possessions of all men." ^ The mighty effort of the 

1 Cf, Gregory VII's letter to Emperor Henry IV in Bryce's Holy 
Roman Empire, chap, x, p. 161. 


church to unite all Christendom against the Saracens in the 
Crusades, increased the papal power and influence. In the 
latter part of the Middle Ages his influence was universally 
recognized, and the Pope often acted as arbitrator between 
Catholic nations.* A Papal Bull fixed the boundary line in 
the Portuguese-Spanish dispute in the fifteenth century. 

As the universalism of the Emperor and the Pope de- 
clined, and nationalism, or the territorial sovereignty of 
independent states, increased in proportion, a marked change 
took place in the affairs of Europe. The Houses of Haps- 
burg of Austria, and of Valois of France, grew up gradu- 
ally to be powerful dynasties. German and Italian prin- 
cipalities lying between them were exposed to the dynastic 
ambition of two great powers. Charles VIII of France, in 
1495, invaded Naples and set up the power of France in 
Italy. His conquest created general alarm in Europe. 
Spain, the Emperor of Germany, the Pope, Milan and 
Venice, on March 31, formed a league^ to compel Charles 
to abandon Naples. The league was renewed in the fol- 
lowing year with the fundamental aim of the mutual pre- 
servation of the several states against the aggressive de- 
signs of any state. The modem European concert, or 
balance of power, may be traced back to this league, so far 
as combined interference against an aggressive state is 

The House of Hapsburg had, however, since the begin- 
ning of the sixteenth century, begun to threaten the rest of 
Europe. Charles I of Spain, the grandson of Maximilian 
of Austria, was elected to the German imperial throne in 
1 5 19, as Charles V. This accession united the Austrian 

1 Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. v, pp. 4825 et seq, 

2 For the account of the invasion and the league, see Dyer, History of 
Modern Europe, pp. 212-219. 

* Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, p. 80. 


dominions, the German Empire and all the Spanish posses- 
sions, including the vast colonial empire in America, so that 
Charles was the most powerful ruler in Christendom. 
Francis I of France, the rival of the Hapsburgs for su- 
premacy in European politics, professed, of course, an open 
opposition to Charles. England entered into the vortex of 
continental politics under Henry VIII, who was intelligently 
guided by the famous Wolsey. Both Charles and Francis 
sought the alliance of England. When Francis threatened 
the Italian states, a defensive league* was concluded against 
him by Charles V, England, the Pope and the ItaKan lords ; 
but, when Francis had been restrained and Charles became 
aggressive, England, the Pope, Francis and the Italian prin- 
cipalities formed the Holy League of Cognac against 
Charles.^ The d)mastic struggles between the two great 
powers during the sixteenth century were much complicated 
by the Reformation. France, in spite of her cruel perse- 
cution of Protestants in her own dominions, endeavored to 
form an alliance with the Protestant states of Germany, 
with Sweden and Denmark, and even with heathen Turkey, 
against Charles V. After the death of Charles his domin- 
ions were divided between Philip II of Spain and Ferdinand 
of Austria. Both these successors of Charles were con- 
stantly engaged in religious and political activities. Philip 
soon dismembered Portugal, made the Netherlands his 
battle-ground for tyrannical oppression, and threatened the 
reduction of England to a Spanish province. But the 
Armada was destroyed, while the Hapsburg power in the 
Spanish dominions was broken by the resistance of the 
Dutch, assisted by Henry IV of France. In the beginning 

1 For the league against Francis, see Johnson, Europe in the Sixteenth 
Century, p. 164. 

^ For the league against Charles, see ibid., p. 184. 


of the seventeenth century the religious aggressions of the 
Austrian Hapsburg kindled a general alarm in the Protes- 
tant states. Then it was that the king of France, guided by 
the celebrated Richelieu, and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, 
combined with the Protestant states of Germany and en- 
tered into the prolonged struggle against Ferdinand of 

The old notion of universalism, or of a common superior 
— Pope and Emperor — gradually disappeared and finally re- 
ceived its death-blow through the Reformation and through 
the development of the idea of territorial sovereignty, which 
was derived from the feudal regime. The theory of na- 
tionalism was inculcated in Europe by Machiavelli.^ The 
bloody struggle of the Thirty Years* War was nothing but 
the effort of the individual state to maintain its sovereign 
rights against the religious and political interference of the 
Catholic rulers. From that time on the national state in 
Europe became predominant. The b^inning of the era 
of independent states marks the beginning of that inter- 
national society, the members of which are bound by ties 
of mutual respect. Had the individual states been left to 
themselves without the restraint of law — ^positive or custom- 
ary — the world would have been controlled by military 
anarchy. Shocked by the brutal struggles of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and especially by the horrible ex- 
cesses of the Thirty Years' War, Grotius,^ the great Dutch 
jurist, propounded the theory that the intercourse of inde- 
pendent states should be regulated on the basis of absolute 
legal equality without the intervention of any common su- 
perior. Weary of the anarchical struggle of the Thirty 

1 The Prince, published in 1522. 

* His celebrated book De Jure Belli ac Pacis was published in 1625. 
For his influence upon the evolution of international law, see Lawrence, 
Essay on Modem International Law, essay iv. 


Years' War, European nations eagerly accepted the doctrine 
of Grotius. The Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648 at 
Miinster and Osnabruck, was the immediate fruit of the 
work of this great jurist. It recognized the indq)endence 
of each separate state, even within the boundaries of the 
Holy Roman Empire/ The principle of territorial sover- 
eignty and the right of intercourse with any and every na- 
tion were generally and formally asserted by every inde- 
pendent state, both Catholic and Protestant, both great and 
small. The custom of maintaining permanent embassies; 
which had prevailed among the Italian states since the 
thirteenth century,* now became the general practice of 
independent states. Thus the " family of nations " and in- 
ternational law came into existence in their more definite 

The doctrine of Grotius — ^the principle of the legal equal- 
ity of sovereign states — was enlarged and emphasized by his 
followers. International transactions, however, in some 
cases, could not be settled on the basis of the legal equality 
of the parties concerned, since a strong state, having more 
power and influence than a weak one, naturally would be 
disposed to claim more than its due. Under the regime of 
that international law which recognizes no common su- 
perior, there was no remedy in such cases other than the 
" league," " alliance " " coalition " or " co-operation " of a 
number of states against the aggressive power. The system 
of the " balance of power," which had been initiated in the 
dark ages, was still useful, and indeed necessary, even in the 
enlightened era of international society. 

* Professor Wcstlake treats the effects of the Peace of Westphalia in 
the most accurate manner, in his International Law, chap. iv. 

' For the historical development of permanent embassies, see Nys, Les 
Origines du droit international, chap, xiv, pp. 297 et seq. Cf, Westlake, 
International Law, p. 59. 


By the remarkable success of her diplomacy at the Peace 
of Westphalia and the Peace of the Pyrenees, France put an 
end to the Spanish supremacy and secured for herself the 
highest position in Europe. Louis XIV, during the half 
century preceding 171 3, was the object of general fear 
throughout Europe. Against the undue claims of Louis 
upon the Low Countries, claims which threatened the ex- 
istence of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the 
" Triple League " * of the United Provinces, England and 
Sweden was formed in 1668. The crafty Louis cleverly 
broke down the Triple Alliance and secured the secret as- 
sistance of England, which was then carrying on hostilities 
against the Dutch in a struggle for commercial supremacy. 
The Dutch, being now at enmity with two great maritime 
powers, formed a new league ^ with Spain and Austria in 
1673 against Louis, and barely escaped dismemberment. 
As the result of the marriage of William of Orange 
and Princess Mary of York, in 1677, England and the 
United Provinces formed a personal alliance ag^ainst 
France. Louis, notwithstanding the persecution of his 
Protestant subjects at home, provoked the Protestants 
of Hungary against the emperor of Austria, and, as 
Francis I had done, allied himself even with heathen 
Turkey to gratify his political ambition. In conse- 
quence, in 1686 the " great League of Augsburg " * was 
directed against him. Louis once more attempted the dis- 
memberment of the Netherlands, but was thwarted by the 
" Grand Alliance " * and compelled to agree to the Peace 

1 General Collection of Treaties (2d edition, London, 1712), vol. i, 
pp. 136-145. 

* Dyer, History of Modern Europe, vol. iii, p. 369. 

* Ibid., vol. iii, p. 419. 

* Originally an offensive and defensive alliance between Holland and 
Austria, into which England entered in December, 1689. General Col- 
lection of Treaties, vol. i, pp. 275-280. 


of Ryswick in 1697. When Charles II of Spain died with- 
out issue, Louis claimed the Spanish succession for his 
grandson, Philip, by virtue of the will left by the king. 
To unite the Spanish dominions, which were still extensive, 
with France, would have destroyed the balance of the 
European system. Therefore, the second " Grand Alli- 
ance " * between England, Austria and the Netherlands, was 
formed in 1701 against Lx>uis. The so-called war of the 
Spanish succession went on until the Peace of Utrecht was 
concluded in 171 3-14. In spite of the aggressive efforts of 
Louis XIV, France made little change in the system founded 
by the Peace of Westphalia, other than slight territorial 
adjustments of the frontiers. Her recompense was, on the 
other hand, " the disturbance of her finances, the exhaus- 
tion of her population and loss of her colonies abroad." 

In the eighteenth century Sweden, which had since the 
time of Gustavus Adolphus signally exerted its influence 
upon the balance of power of Europe, and the Spanish 
monarchy, which had been a terrifying object for centuries, 
were reduced to the position of second-rate powers. Two 
new powers came to play an active part in European politics. 
Russia, gradually becoming a great power, began to ex- 
pand at the expense of her neighbors. The second power 
was Prussia. The artificial expansion of its boundary to- 
wards Austria and Poland formed the main parts of its his- 
tory in the eighteenth century. Having, destroyed the mari- 
time supremacy of Spain and France, England had become 
the dominating power in matters of colonial and commer- 
cial policy. But, although neither Russia nor Prussia nor 
Elngland could rival the predominance held by Spain in the 
sixteenth century and by France in the seventeenth, the 
check-mate of the " league " was often invoked for the pre- 

1 General Collection of Treaties, vol. i, pp. 415-421. 


servation of the status quo of the European system. The 
Triple Alliance between England, France and the Nether- 
lands was formed in 1717, partly against the aggressive 
activity of Russia, under Peter the Great, toward the Baltic 
Sea.^ This alliance, joined in the following year by Aus- 
tria, was applied to the south of Europe when Philip V of 
Spain conquered Sardinia and was about to invade Sicily.* 
The Peace of Utrecht by confirming England's possession 
of Gibraltar as well as by the advantages which she had 
wrested from France and Spain in the New World, gfreatly 
strengthened her position as a commercial and colonizing 
power. Her maritime supremacy, however, called forth 
the bitter opposition of France and Spain. The coalition 
of these Latin powers against England was the natural 
result. This Anglo-Latin struggle became entangled with 
the affairs of Austria and Prussia in the wars which 
then raged in continental Europe. When Frederick 
the Great made an undue claim upon Silesia and war broke 
out in 1745 between Austria and Prussia, England together 
with the Netherlands and Sardinia helped Maria Theresa 
while France and Spain supported her enemy.' Although 
peace was nominally concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, 
another war broke out again between Prussia and Austria 
in 1756, involving most of the European powers. Now 
things turned about. France took the side of Austria, 
with Russia; and .even "Sweden, Denmark and Saxony 
were to be induced to join the alliance." * These contin- 
ental powers were so jealous of the ascendency of Freder- 
ick that they suggested the dismemberment of Prussia. 
England under Pitt, however, joined Prussia, by paying a 

1 Hassall, The Balance of Power (1715-1789), pp. 42, 46. 

* Ibid., p. 54. • Freeman, General Sketch of History, p. 307. 

* Hassall, The Balance of Power, pp. 243-245. 


subsidy of £670,000 a year to the king of the isolated 
power.* Spain at first maintained neutrality, but in 1761 
entered into hostilities against the Anglo-Prussian alliance 
by the pacte de famille,^ an alliance with France. Hostili- 
ties were carried on on both sides of the Atlantic until 
peace was concluded at Paris and Hubertsburg in 1763. 
But the Anglo-Latin colonial struggle did not cease with 
the Seven Years' War, for France and Spain had lost ex- 
tensive possessions in the New World by the Treaty of 
Paris. When the war broke out between Great Britain 
and her American colonies, France entered into a coalition • 
with the latter, and still later Spain took part in the war 
against Great Britain. The British colonies secured their 
independence, but France and Spain, although they were to 
a certain extent victorious, were unable to recover their 
ancient prestige. 

Russia under Catherine II revived her expansionist move- 
ment, in the course of which Poland, Turkey and Sweden 
were the natural sufferers. As to Poland, Catherine stepped 
in as early as 1764 to interfere in its political affairs, taking 
advantage of the existing political corruption. Russian 
activity in Poland produced fear and jealousy in Prussia and 
Austria. Frederick the Great, a military diplomat, seeing 
the danger of the absorption of Poland by a single power, 
persuaded Austria to secure a part of the spoils and sug- 
gested the partition to Russia in order to maintain the 
balance among them. By the partitions of 1772 and 1793, 
Poland was finally dismembered. Hitherto the system of 
the balance of power had been applied for the preservation 
of states. This was the first example of the misapplication 

1 Hassall, The Balance of Power, pp. 252-253. « Ibid.^ p. 272. 

» Moore, A Hundred Years of American Diplomacy (American Bar 
Association Report of 1900), p. 331. See foot-note for the treaty of 
alliance of the United States with France. 


of the system by the continental powers, to the destruction 
of an independent state. ^ 

Catherine II perceived the difficulties arising out of the 
Russian eruption into the Baltic Sea, as shown by the 
prompt coalition of northern Europe under the lead of 
Great Britain, and inaugurated strenuous efforts to obtain 
an outlet on the Mediterranean through the Balkan pen- 
insula. Russia had already established her influence on the 
northern coast of the Black Sea by the famous treaty of 
Kainardji with Turkey in 1774, and Catherine was project- 
ing a further expansion when she made her celebrated 
journey into the Crimea. Joseph II of Austria foresaw 
that Catherine's activity in the peninsula would take the 
form of an attempt to absorb the Ottoman Empire, and 
suggested the partition of that empire. In 1787 Turkey 
entered into war with Russia and Austria. As soon as 
the existence of the empire was threatened, Pitt of England 
formed a triple alliance of England, Prussia and Holland 
against the aggressive designs of Russia and Austria.^ In 
the following year this alliance was also applied to north- 
em Europe, when Russia attempted to annihilate Sweden 
with the assistance of Denmark.^ 

During the eighteenth century the sovereign rights of in- 
dependent states were so little respected by aggressive pow- 
ers that the dismemberment of weak states was attempted 
from time to time. But the latter were wisely relieved by 
the alliance headed by England. There was no significant 
change in the political system of Europe which had been 
arranged by the Peace of Westphalia, except the pwirtition 

^ Wheaton condemns this misapplication of the system of the balance 
of power which resulted in the dismemberment of an independent state. 
Cf, History of the Law of Nations, p. 280. 

2 Hassall, The Balance of Power ^ pp. 385-6. » Ibid., p. 384. 


of Poland. However, the selfish colonial policy of George 
III caused England to lose the vast dominion which was env 
braced in the United States. 

At the end of the eighteenth century the French revolu- 
tion broke out. Almost all the European states were in- 
volved in it ; and the balance of power in Europe was again 
upset. Against the revolutionary and military aggressions 
of the revolutionary government of France, England formed 
a coalition * with Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sardinia, Spain, 
Portugal and various minor states in 1793. When 
Napoleon became the subject of universal alarm in Europe, 
Pitt again formed in 1805 a coalition* composed of England, 
Russia, Austria and Sweden. Cleverly breaking into the 
English league. Napoleon established the " continental sys- 
tem," * by which all continental states were to be brought 
under his influence and by which England was to be ex- 
cluded commercially from the continent. But the exclus- 
ions and restrictions of continentalism eventually intensi- 
fied the feeling against Napoleon on the continent. Russia 
first abandoned the policy, and other powers assumed one 
by one an attitude of hostility to the universalism of 
Napoleon. Finally, a coalition of the continental states, 
headed by Great Britain, overthrew Napoleon at Waterloo. 
The state system of Europe which was disturbed by revolu- 
tionary France and Napoleon, was restored by the Con- 
gresses of Paris and Vienna.* 

European nations, warned by the world-wide wars of the 

* Burrows, The History of the Foreign Policy of Great Britain, p. 187. 
' Ihid., p. 236. 

* Ibid.y pp. 260 et seq. For a comprehensive treatment of the oonti- 
neotal system, see Moore, International Arbitrations, pp. 4447 et seq. 

*For the Treaties of Paris and Vienna (1814-1815) -which restore<l 
the European system, see Hertslct, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. i, 
pp. I et seq. and 60-295. 


seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and of the Napoleonic 
era, now sought universal peace. The so-called " concert 
of Europe"^ was established. Its principal (Aject is to 
place certain questions of international concern under the 
superintendence of the great powers. It was the general 
interest of Europe to avoid the recurrence of universal war. 
The concert of Europe differed, however, from the so- 
called " Holy Alliance," which contemplated interference 
with the internal constitutions of independent states. As 
a matter of fact, the continental powers tried to attach the 
system of internal intervention to the concert of Europe, 
but in this they were thwarted by Great Britain.* The 
members of the concert were Great Britain, France, Prussia, 
Austria and Russia, and later Italy, which was invited to 
join it in 1867. Th^ establishment of the independent 
states of Greece and Belgium; the erection of Eg)rpt into 
a semi-sovereign state under the sovereignty of the Porte; 
the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey ; the permanent 
neutralization of Switzerland, Belgium and Luxemburg, and 
the Suez Canal, have been the principal achievements of 
the great powers forming the concert of Europe. 

The concert of Europe, however, is not applied to inter- 
national affairs between the great powers themselves. 
None of the other great powers ventured to interfere in 
the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 or in the Franco- 
Prussian War of 1870; matters were left entirely to the 
parties themselves.* Under such a regime, there is no 
guarantee for the avoidance of international conflicts 
among the great powers. But Prince Bismarck inaugurated 
the new plan for peace among the great powers in his doo- 

^ Lawrence, Essay on Modem International Law, pp. 210-216. 
» Ibid,, pp. 217-223. 
* Ibid,, p. 229. 


trine of " armed peace " with defensive alliance and pro- 
gressive armament. Russia, in return for her benevolent 
neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War, expected Ger- 
many to support her views on the Eastern question. Russia 
had in fact taken advantage of the war to send a circular 
note to the great powers declaring herself to be no longer 
bound by the Black Sea clause of the Treaty of Paris of 
1856, which limited her armaments on the Black Sea. The 
Russian claim, though it was seriously condemned by Eng- 
land, was recognized in the London conference of 1871 
through the valuable assistance of Bismarck.^ Seven years 
later, however, Bismarck refused to countenance the ag- 
gressive intent of the Treaty of San Stefano, and by the 
Berlin Congress in 1878 Russia was deprived of the fruits 
of her victory over Turkey.* Russia then began to look 
for a new alliance. As Bismarck was much concerned over 
the possible alliance of Russia and France, who were both 
longing for an opportunity to revenge themselves upon Ger- 
many, he formed a defensive alliance with Austria in 1879 
in order to provide for the emergency. • In 1882 the alli- 
ance was joined by Italy, as the latter nation was threatened 
by the colonial activity of France in Northern Africa.* In 
1883 the Triple Alliance was formally constituted, its funda- 
mental object being to insure the maintenance of the peace 

1 Beneditti, Studies in Diplomacy, p. 96. See also Duggan, The East- 
em Question, p. 129. 

' For the attitude of Bismarck toward Russia, see his Memoirs, 
chap, xxviii. 

• The text of the treaty is found in British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. 73, p. 270. See also Beneditti, Studies in Diplomacy, pp. 120-121, 
and Defbidour, Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe, vol. ii, condusion i. 

* Beneditti, ibid., p. 135. Debidour says the Italian king Humbert 
had interviews with the German emperor and the Austro-Hungarian 
sovereign in 1882, and in the following year the Italian government 
formally entered into the Austro-German alliance. See vol. ii, p. 543. 


of Europe. It must not be forgotten that Bismarck, after 
the formation of the Triple Alliance, made a secret treaty 
with Russia in order to keep " open the way to an entente 
cordiale " with that country, and to keep France isolated as 
far as possible. It remained nominally in force until Bis- 
marck went out of office in 1890.* 

Though Bismarck so successfully tried to prevent Russia 
from joining with France, these countries came gradually 
to r^;ard their alliance as a necessity to their interests in 
European politics.* In July, 1890, a visit of the French 
fleet to Cronstadt gave to the world the first proof of the 
Dual Alliance. In October, 1893, the appearance of the 
Russian fleet at Toulon demonstrated the existence of the 
alliance; the exchange of visits of president and czar dur- 
ing 1896 furnished a cordial sign of its continuance. 

With the retirement of Beaconsfield from the British 
cabinet in 1880, the foreign policy of Great Britain was 
somewhat changed by the peaceful Gladstone, who paid 
much attention to the Irish question and who endeavored to 
establish a good understanding with Russia and France.* 
Ever since, the avoidance of continental entanglements has 
been the policy of England, although the Anglo-Russian 
friction on the Indian frontier, Anglo-French differences in 
Egypt and the Anglo-Italian understanding in the Medi- 
terranean, have at cme time and another caused or in- 
dicated a favorable disposition on the part of Great 
Britain toward the Triple Alliance.* Thus two alli- 
ances are now maintaining the balance of power among 
the great powers. The " concert of Europe " and the 
" armed peace " of the great powers are to-day insuring the 

» Phillips, Modem Europe, p. 533. 

* Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de f Europe, vol ii, conclusion viL 

* Ihid.^ vol ii, conclusion ii. ^ Ihid., vol. ii, p. 559. 


peace of Europe. Except in minor matters, European ques- 
tions are not at the moment occupying diplomatists. At the 
end of the nineteenth century, as the result of commercial 
and colonial expansion, the centre of the world-politics of 
Europe has shifted to the Far East. 

International Politics in America — The Monroe Doctrine. 
— ^The character of American international politics is differ- 
ent from that of Europe. The balance of power, the 
concert of Europe, and the counterpoise of Triple and 
Dual alliances, represent principles almost unknown in the 
affairs of the western hemisphere. The thirteen American 
colonies secured their independence a century and a quarter 
ago by the aid of an alliance with France, and entered into 
the " family of nations." But their statesmen soon adopted 
the policy of " non-intervention " and " neutrality," in order 
to keep the New World out of Europe's " real or imaginary 
balances of power," and to prevent it from becoming mt- 
plicated " by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
politics." ^ The United States was, therefore, wisely con- 
ducted through the critical period of the general wars of 
Europe, growing out of the French Revolution, without be- 
ing directly involved in them. After the Peace of Vienna 
of 181 5, the United States was for a while exempt from 
European menaces, but in the course of time new questions 
arose, which threatened to draw the American government 
into complications with Europe. 

The czar of Russia, by a ukase issued in 1821, claimed 

* For the policies of non-intervention and neutrality, see Professor J. 
B. Moore, A Hundred Years of American Diploinacy (Reports of 
American Bar Association, 1900), pp. 329, 334. Washington's neutral- 
ity proclamation of April 22, 1793, is found in Moore, International 
Arbitrations, vol iv, p. 3968. See also the Farewell Address of Wash- 
ington and statements of John Adams and Jefferson in Wharton's In- 
ternational Law Digest, vol. i, pp. 172-173. 


exclusive sovereignty over the northwest coast of America 
from Bering's Straits down to the fifty-first degree of north 
latitude, and assumed to prohibit foreigners from carrying 
on commerce, navigation and fishery within a hundred 
Italian miles of the shore,^ While the United States was 
negotiating relative to the Russian claim, the " Holy Alli- 
ance " was contemplating the taking of steps to overthrow 
the republican governments of the Spanish-American states, 
whose independence had been duly recognized by the United 
States, and to restore them to their former position of 
Spanish dependencies. * In order to defeat this aggressive 
design of the European powers, President Monroe declared 
in his message to Congress in 1823, that any attempt on their 
part " to extend their system to any portion of this hemis- 
phere " would be " dangerous to our peace and safety." 
Referring to the Russian claim, he said : " The American 
continents, by the free and independent condition which they 
have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be con- 
sidered as subjects for future colonization by any European 
powers." These declarations constitute what has since been 
described as the " Monroe doctrine," which has became 
" a cardinal principle of American diplc»nacy." In its ori- 
gin it was a defensive measure. Its principal objects were, 
first, to prevent the threatened intervention of the combined 
powers of Europe " for the purpose of reducing independent 
American states to subjugation to a European power " or 
destroying their republican institutions; second, to prevent 
European powers from founding colonies in the territory of 

* Snow, Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy, p. 271. Sec 
also Moore, "The Monroe Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
xi, pp. 3-4- 

* Moore, ibid., p. 11. George Canning, the British foreign secretary 
communicated the intention of the " Holy Alliance " to Mr. Rush, the 
American minister in London. 


those states/ The upholding of these principles by the 
United States, on behalf of other American nations, is not 
a legal obligation, either in the sense of municipal law or in 
that of international law. The principle, as it was an- 
nounced, did not call for legislative sanction, nor was. the 
United States boimd to maintain it by alliances, or to become 
the protector of any other nation by treaty stipulations. On 
the contrary, the people of the United States were " left 
free to act, in any crisis, in such a manner as their feelings of 
friendship toward these republics and as their own honor 
and policy may at the time dictate." The Monroe doctrine 
is but a national policy of the United States — a conscious 
aspiration of her people. 

The Monroe doctrine has been applied in various ways, 
and has been somewhat enlarged in its scope in later years. 
President Polk, during his administration, invoked the doc- 
trine with reference to the possible intervention of European 
powers in consequence of the annexation of Texas, the 
Or^on boundary question, and the proposed military occu- 
pation of Yucatan by the United States.* He also expanded 
the doctrine, maintaining that a European power should 
not be permitted to acquire any new possession in the west- 
em hemisphere either by "purchase or conquest," which 
went beyond the original idea of Monroe. • By the Clayton- 
Bulwer treaty of 1850, the United States secured from and 
gave to Great Britain a pledge not to " occupy, or fortify, 
or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over 
Nicaraugua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of 

* Moore, " Tihe Monroe Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, rod. 
xi, p. 22. 

* See the messages of President Polk to Congress, 1845 and 1848. 

» Moore, ibid., p. 17. Professor Moore calls it the Polk doctrine in- 
stead of the Monroe doctrine. 


Central America." ^ The most striking application of the 
doctrine is to be found in the attitude of the United States 
towards the French occupation of Mexico with the design of 
replacing the native republican govemment with the mon- 
archy of the European Maximilian. In this case Mr. Se- 
ward, who was then secretary of state, did not mention the 
Monroe doctrine by name, but it was in consequence of his 
representations, which were within the letter as well as the 
spirit of that doctrine, that France withdrew her troops 
from Mexico.* When Venezuela was involved with Great 
Britain in the dispute as to the boundary of British Guiana, 
President Cleveland and Secretary Olney opposed the 
British territorial claim with the Monroe doctrine, and in- 
sisted upon Great Britain's recognizing it as a rule of Ameri- 
can policy. Undoubtedly, the disputed boundary of an 
American nation with an adjacent European colony was not 
prima facie within the scope of the principle announced by 
Monroe, nor was his doctrine claimed by him to be a part 
of international law.* The question as to the boundary of 
British Guiana was, however, subject to certain restric- 
tions, eventually submitted to arbitration. When Venezuela 
was again menaced on account of debts and claims by certain 
European powers in 1901, President Roosevelt availed him- 
self of the opportunity to set forth his views with regard 
to the Monroe doctrine. He clearly distinguished territorial 
from commercial questions. As to the former, he declared 
that " there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any 
non- American power at the expense of any American power 
on American soil." He added : 

1 Article i of the Clayton-Bulwcr treaty. 

* HeiKierson, American Diplomatic Questions, p. 405. 

* Professor Burgess points out tiie dangerous extension given to die 
Monroe <kx:trine by President Cleveland and Secretary Olney, in his 
article, "The Recent Pseudo-Monroeism," Political Science Quarterly, 
vol. xi. 


This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations 
of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of 
them to form such as it desires. . . . We do not guarantee 
any state against punis'hment if it misconducts itself, provided 
that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of 
territory by any non- American power.* 

In announcing his doctrine. President Monroe disclaimed 
any disposition on the part of the United States to interfere 
with the " existing colonies or dependencies of any Euro- 
pean power;" his doctrine therefore was not designed to be 
inimical to the retention by European powers of their exist- 
ing possessions in America.^ Nor was there any manifesta- 
tion of a purpose to deny to the Latin-American states the 
right to settle questions among themselves.* It seemed at 
one time as if the United States might intervene in the war 
between Qiili and Peru, but those powers were eventually 
permitted to make peace without interference, as they did 
by the treaty of 1883. The boundary quarrel between Chili 
and the Argentine Republic was finally settled by arbitration, 
and the two powers agreed to reduce their naval forces.* 

The question of the Isthmian canal, which was in contro- 
versy between the United States and Great Britain for a half- 
century, has been definitely settled by the Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty concluded in 1901. By this treaty the permanent 
neutralization of the route is secured to all nations, as in the 
case of the Suez canal, while the United States possesses the 
right to construct the canal and to police it." The Cuban 

^ President's Message, Dec, 1901. 

* Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, p. 215. • Ibid, 

^ See agreement between Chili and the Argentine Republic, concluded 
May 28, 1902. Foreign Relations of the United States, J902, pp. 18 
€t seq, 

* The text of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty may be found iWd., pp. 518 
ei seq. See also Professor Moore's article upon the canal question. New 
York Times, March 4, igoo. 


question, which, by reason of unsettled conditions in the 
island, disturbed- the United States for many years, was 
finally settled by the Spanish- American war of 1898. 

Whatever the divergences of opinion as to particular appli- 
cations of the Monroe doctrine may have been, the United 
States has, during the past century, exercised, in the general 
interest of the New World, a powerful influence against 
European interference in the politics of the American con- 
tinents; and the United States will continue to fulfill this 
mission with self-confidence and with the assent of the 
civilized world/ President Roosevelt declared in his mes- 
sage to the Congress of 1901, that the Monroe doctrine 
is " simply a step, and a long step, toward assuring the uni- 
versal peace of the world by securing the possibility of 
permanent peace on this hemisphere." 

The peace of the western hemisphere is promoted by the 
leadership of the United States, and practically no im- 
portant international question is raised by such leadership. 
But through her possession of the Philippine Islands and 
the enormous growth of her Asiatic commerce, the United 
States has been confronted, since the Spanish war, with the 
Far Elastern question. 

Issi^e of International Politics in the Far East. — ^Asiatic 
nations, though they had, for many centuries, formed " a 
family of nations " with their own civilization, did not enter 
into treaty and diplomatic relations with Christian nations 
until the middle of the nineteenth century and did not be- 
come involved in the turmoil of world-politics with western 
powers until the Chino- Japanese War of 1894-95 was over. 

1 The Ha^e Conference unanimously assented to the reservation by 
^e deleg^ates of the United States o<f " its traditional policy." Germany 
and Great Britain have ever since explicitly recognized the principle. 
See Moore, "Non-Intervention and the Monroe Doctrine," Harper's 
Monthly Magasine, Nov., 1904, pp. 867-868 awi 869. See also Holls, 
The Peace Conference at the Hague, pp. 269 et seq. 


This war demonstrated to the world that China was corrupt 
and, left to herself, utterly defenceless. The great nations 
of the world, which had hitherto looked upon the immense 
population and the inexhaustible resources of China with 
something of awe, now became interested in the Celestial 
Empire, because of the apparent opportunity in that quarter 
for political and commercial expansion. The balance of 
power, the concert of the great powers, the " armed peace," 
and the Monroe doctrine secure the peace of Europe and 
America. Even in Africa and in Australasia the territorial 
and commercial situation has been practically settled. Asia 
is the only place in the world which is still at stake in inter- 
national politics. The Far East becomes to-day the center 
of world-politics, in which Germany, Great Britain, France, 
Japan, Russia and the United States are concerned. The 
destinies of China and Korea, the peace of the Far East, and 
through that the peace of the world, depend upon decisions 
reached in Berlin, London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Tokio and 
Washington. As Japan is the only representative of the 
Asiatic races among these great powers, and as she has 
assimilated more of the western civilization than any other 
Asiatic race, her position in the future politics of the Far 
East will be of considerable importance and she cannot rid 
herself of the responsibility which this entails. What Japan 
has done in her dealings with other nations, is suggestive 
and instructive in judging whether she can effectively fulfill 
her responsibilities and whether she will be able to act con- 
scientiously and harmoniously with the great powers of the 
West for the perfection of that international society which 
is as yet composed of conflicting members — for the advance- 
ment of the world's civilization, not by monopolistic meas- 
ures primarily designed for the aggrandizement of a single 
empire, but by active co-operation with all nations fitted for 
the civilizing mission. 

International Society of Ancient Asia, 660 b. c. — 

930 A. D. 

The Early Intercourse of Japan with the Korean King- 
doms and China. — In primitive times there was no inter- 
national society or association of the different races as such. 
In the Orient as well as in the Occident the society of 
nations is the product of historic development. The original 
society of human beings was the family, or horde, from 
which an international society was ultimately developed 
through tribe, folk and national state. ^ Passing over the 
development of Asiatic nations from the ethnological or 
sociological viewpoint, we find that the historians of China 
maintain that Chinese national life began with Fou Hi, their 
first great emperor, who established his dynasty in 2953 
B. c.^ The Korean mythology holds that the existence of 
that nation dates from the time when Tan-gun, or Wang- 
gun, was, in the latter part of the reign of the Emperor 
Yao of China (b. c. 2357-2255), crowned by his father, 
Whan-ung, said to be a son of God (Whan-in).* The 
Chinese and Koreans claim, like the Jews and the ancient 
Egyptians, to be able to trace their national existence back 
to a period centuries before Solomon erected his Temple at 
Jerusalem. Without entering into the myths and legends of 
Japan, it may be said that her national history commenced 

1 Gid<lings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 157-169. 
« Mailla, Histoire ginirale de la Chine, vol. i, p. 5. 
» Korean Review, History of Korea, vol. for 1901, pp. 33 et seq. 
40 [272 


when the Emperor Jinmu, the first Mikado, after the sub- 
jugation of the tribes on the mainland, established a capital 
at Kashiwabara in Yamato, 660 b. c/ 

Intercourse among these Asiatic nations must have ex- 
isted from an immemorial time, for China and Korea are 
situated in the same continent, and a Japanese junk can easily 
in one day's sail reach the Korean coast. Although Japan 
is much farther away from the Chinese coast, the Kuro-shio, 
or black current, which flows from the Indian Ocean along 
the Chinese coast and washes all the southern coast of Japan, 
has often brought the wrecks of Chinese ships to the island 
empire. Moreover, these fertile and tempting islands would 
have been attractive to Chinese and Korean emigrants.* 
With such a physical environment, the islanders could not be 
a hermit nation. As to the primitive intercourse between 
Japan and Korea, its beginning, according to the Japanese 
chronicle,* was the presence in Korea of the Japanese prince, 
Susono-o-no-mikoto, in the legendary age. It was also said 
that Ina-hi-no-mikoto, a brother of the Emperor Jinmu, went 
to Unabara (Korea), before the emperor came to Yamato.* 

^ Kojiki, the oldest chronicles of Japan, Chamberlain's English trans- 
lation in Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. x, supple- 
ment issue, sec 1, p. 145. See also Nihongi, the second oldest chron- 
icles of Japan, Aston's English translation, vol. i, p. 132. 

The authenticity of the greater part of ancient Japanese history down 
to about 400 A. D. is not acknowledged by occidental authorities, but 
it is affirmed by native historians and has been officially recognized by 
the government 

* Giddings, Inductive Sociology, p. 45. Agricultural fertility, fisheries, 
mineral weakli, commercial opportunities, etc., of the New World 
attract immigration. , 

^Nihongi, vol. i, p. 57. See also Dr. Takahashi's paper, Revue de 
droit int., igoi, vol. iii, no. 2. 

^Kojiki, sec. xliii, p. 129. See also Takekoshi, History of 2,yx> 
Years, p. 9. 


Referring to the coming of the Koreans to Japan, we find in 
the imperial proclamation of the eleventh year of the Em- 
peror Su-jin (97 — 30 B. c.) the first mention of the word 
naturalization/ which possibly shows the existence then of 
Korean immigration. Because the naturalization of Koreans 
in Japan was not officially recognized until the third year 
of the Emperor Suinin (30 b. c. — 70 a. d.), the privilege of 
settling in the Tajima province was specially granted to the 
Korean prince, Ameno-Hihoko.* 

The first Japanese contact with Qiinese, it is said, took 
place when seven Chinese survivors of a shipwreck landed 
on the Kumano coast of the Ki-i province in the reign of 
the Emperor Kosho, the fifth Mikado (475-393 b. c.).* A 
Chinese chronicle mentions the departure of this party, in 
which Sin-fu was commissioned by his celestial monarch, 
Chewang-te, a tyrant of the Draconian type, to search for a 
medicine giving immortality. Sin-fu, in reply, intimated 
that such an elixir of life could be procured only on the 
Fuji Mountain in Japan, and left China for that country.* 

But whatever the early intercourse of Japan with foreign 
countries may have been in other ways, her first diplomatic 
intercourse with the Koreans began in the sixty-fifth year 
of the Emperor Sujin (33 b. c.) when the king of Okara, 
one of the Korean kingdoms, sent Prince Sonaka-Cheulchi 
and his suite to Japan as an envoy with a present to the 
Mikado.' The envoy unfortunately did not secure an im- 
perial audience, as the emperor was then ill. Several years 

* Gaiko-Shiko (The Digest of Foreign Intercourse), compiled by 
the Bureau of Records, Department of Foreign Affairs, p. 457. 

» Ihid, « Gaiko-Shiko, p. 469. 

^ Mr. Nitobe gives an interesting account of Sin-fu in his Intercourse 
between the United States and Japan, p. 5. 

B For a full account of the mission of the Korean envoy, see Nihongi, 
vol. i, pp. 164-167. 


later, however, he was received by the succeeding emperor, 
the Suinin. The new emperor expressed deep r^ret that 
" the honorable visitor had not been presented to his august 
father " and desired to call the state from which he was 
sent, Imna, that being the personal name of the Emperor 
Suinin, in order to commemorate his coming.^ Upon his 
departure the emperor made liberal gifts to the suite of the 
envoy, and entrusted him with 100 pieces of red silk as a 
present for his sovereign. 

The official intercourse of Japan with China is said to 
have been inaugurated by the lord of Ito( Southern Kiushu), 
whose envoy was often at the court of the Han dynasty in 
China, in the latter part of the reig^ of the Emperor Suinin. 
It was this intercourse of China with a local lord of Japan, 
that often led the old Chinese historians to pretend that 
Japan was tributary to China. But the Yamato govern- 
ment of Japan had no knowledge of the intercourse with 
China conducted by the local lord.' In Japanese history it 
is often stated that Japan maintained relations with the 
Chinese courts of the " Three Kingdoms," which followed 
the fall of the Han dynasty; but the maintenance of such 
relations by the central government of Japan was infre- 
quent until the beginning of the seventh century. The Em- 
peror Suiko despatched Ono-no-Imoko to the court of the 
Soui dynasty in 607 a. d. with national products and an im- 
perial letter, which was addressed as follows : "A letter from 
the sovereign of the Sun-rise country to the sovereign of 
the Sun-set country." * The Japanese ambassador was cor- 
dially received at the Chinese court, where he was honored 

^ In consequence the Japanese historians called Okara, Imna. 

* GaikO'Shiko, p. 67. 

* Ibid.f p. 69. The name Nippon (Land of the Rising Sun) is said 
to have had its origin in this incident. 


with the Chinese name " So-Inko." In the following year, 
608 A. D., Ono-no-Imoko returned through the Korean 
peninsula, accompanied by a Chinese ambassador, Pei-Shih- 
Ching, who, with a suite of twelve persons, was sent in re- 
ciprocal acknowledgment of Japan's proffer of friendship. 
The Chinese embassy was received in July at the Bay of 
Naniwa with the most elaborate festivities by the people and 
the officials; * and on October 12 the ambassador was re- 
ceived in imperial audience, at which time he read his 
credentials * and presented to the Mikado splendid gifts 
from his sovereign. 

Japan, it will thus be seen, originally entered into diplo- 
matic relations with China and Korea in a peaceful and 
cordial manner, in marked contrast with the bloody strug- 
gles by which, in European history, such relations too often 
have been established. Among the ancient Asiatic nations, 
there was, of course, no permanent embassy; the envoy 
stayed in the foreign capital only a short time, on his special 
mission. The exchange of presents, consisting of national 
products, was a significant feature of diplomatic usage, and 
was regarded as a token of friendly and peaceful relations. 

Political Relations of Japan with the Korean Kingdoms 
and China, — The warlike islanders, becoming more cos- 
mopolitan by the intermingling of the Chinese and Korean 
immigfrants, and gaining in knowledge of the outer world 
and of the means of communication by sea,' could not con- 

* Nihongi, vol. ii, p. 136. 

* T-h^ text of the credentials may be found in Nihongi, vol. ii, pp. 
137 ^^ ^^Q- 

^ Nihongi, vol. i, p. 161. Emperor Suijin issued a ship-building edict 
in 81 B. C. : "Ships are of cardinal importance to tihe Empire. At 
present the people of the coast, not having ships, suffer grievously by 
the necessity of land transportation. Therefore let every province cause 
ships to be built.'' As the result of this auspicious encouragement sea- 
going ships were later developed. 


fine their activities within the limits of their island home. 
Formerly Korea was composed of several independent king- 
doms — Koryo in the extreme north, Shinra in the southeast, 
Pdcche in the southwest and Imna in the extreme south, 
just as Great Britain was once composed of the separate 
nations — England, Scotland and Wales. Shinra and Imna 
were often at enmity over the sovereignty of Sampamon, a 
territory of three hundred square leagues contiguous to their 
frontier, the possession of which the latter kingdom regarded 
as vital to its existence.^ Ever since the first Imna envoy 
visited Japan in the rtign of the Emperor Suijin, and re- 
ported the remarkable growth and activity of the country, 
the Imna government had been anxious to obtain Japan's 
assistance against Shinra encroachments ; and eventually an 
envoy, Ushiki-ari-shichi-Kanki, was despatched to Japan to 
ask the emperor to send a skilled general to Korea.* The 
emperor, after consulting with his ministers, in 27 b. c, 
commissioned General Shihotaritsu-hiko to restore the peace 
of the Korean kingdom. This was the first expedition ever 
sent out by Japan to maintain the int^rity of a foreign state, 
and it is also the first example of the maintenance of the 
" balance of power " in Korea by means of an alliance with 

Japan had been at peace with the Korean kingdoms for 
more than two centuries, when the Empress Regent Zhingo 
(201-269 A. D.) undertone to invade them. The Kumaso, 
one of the leading tribes, frequently revolted in Tsukushi,' 
had greatly embarrassed former emperors; and these con- 
stant disturbances were due to the encouragement given 

1 Gaiko-Shiko, p. 356. 

2 Ibid. Sec also Takckoshi, History of 2J00 Years, p. 27. 

* The present island of Kiushu, in which many Chinese and Korean 
immigrants then settled. 


by the Shinra kingdom. Especially prominent was the 
Kumaso rebellion during the reign of the emperor Chu-a-i 
(192-200 A. D.)> when the sovereign himself, commanding 
the navy, proceeded to Nagato (now Shimonoseki), to 
which place the Empress Zhingo was subsequently sum- 
moned. The imperial troops were mobilized in the revolted 
district, but the Kumaso were not to be conquered ; and at 
length the emperor held a council, in which the empress de- 
clared that " the Kumaso were not worth destroying, but 
that, if Shinra were conquered, Tsukushi would be easily 
subdued." ^ The emperor hesitated to adopt this advice 
but in the midst of the campaign, in February, 200 a. d., 
he became ill and died, whereupon the empress withdrew 
the imperial troops from Tsukushi and undertook prepara- 
tions for the invasion of Korea. In April the empress sum- 
moned her minister and made a declaration of war upon 
Shinra,* in which she swore that she would command the 
imperial forces in the " appearance of a man," enthusiasti- 
cally encouraged her minister and general and promised 
them to take " possession of the land of treasure." She did 
not, however, define the object of the war. Her minister 
answered, as " the object of the measure which the empress 
has devised for the Empire is to tranquillize the ancestral 
shrines, and the Gods of the Earth and Grain, and also to 
protect her servants from blame, with head bowed to the 
ground we receive the command." ' An imperial order was 
issued in September to collect ships from the sea-coast pro- 
vinces, and on October 3 sail was set from the harbor of 
Wani. When the formidable fleet, raising a thundering 
sound from drums, fifes and gongs, approached the Shinra 

^ GaikO'Shiko, p. 171. 

2 Nihongiy vol. i, p. 228, contains the text of the declaration of war. 

• Ibid. 


coast, the king of Shinra was so greatly terrified that he 
thought the country would be crushed by a single stroke. 
Therefore, taking a white flag, he went in person to the 
fleet of the empress to negotiate for peace, and solemnly 
promised that Shinra should " every spring and every 
autumn " pay a tribute and should bring " annual dues of 
male and female slaves." ^ On this occasion one of the 
Japanese generals said : " Let us put to death the king of 
Silla/* But the empress solemnly forbade him, saying, "slay 
not the submissive." * Even in these early days the " peace 
ccMmnissioner," the non-combatant, and the white flag were 
fairly respected. The empress accepted the proffered terms 
of peace and took eighty ship-loads of gold, silver and silk 
as indemnity. One of the higher officials of Shinra, named 
Mi-cheul-kwi-chi-kanki, was carried away as a hostage,* it 
being the custom in ancient times to give hostages as a 
guaranty for the performance of treaties. Learning of the 
signal success of the Japanese invaders, the kings of Koryo 
and Pekche also came of their own motion without escort, 
and said : " Henceforth forever, [we] will not cease to pay 

In consequence of these events, most Japanese historians 
have regarded the Korean kingdoms as states subject to or 
under the suzerainty of Japan ; but the annual contributions 
to China and Japan appear really to have been in the na- 
ture of formal presents, given in token of amity and good- 
will, with a view to avoiding aggressive demands. This is 
the more likely, since it was in spite of their long existent 
and admitted tributary relation to China that the Korean 

* Nihongi, vol. i, p. 231. The word " slaves " referred to Korean 
artisans, blacksmiths, carpenters, etc., whom the Japanese were anxious 
to obtain. 

» IM. « Ibid,, p. 231. 




kingdoms now assumed a similar relation to Japan. On 
the whole, the invasion of Korea by the Empress Zhingo, 
whatever its results may have been, was nothing but a 
measure of self-preservation against Koreans who encour- 
aged insurrection in Japanese territory. 

After this invasion, the Pekche kingdom, regarding the 
Japanese influence in the peninsula as essential to its pre- 
servation against the attacks of its bitter rival, Shinra, made 
constant efforts to cultivate friendship with Japan. In the 
pursuit of this object Pekche not only promptly paid tribute, 
in the form of annual presents, but also introduced the fine 
arts, literature and Buddhism into Japan.* Shinra, on the 
other hand, looking upon the Japanese as barbarians, de- 
pended upon Qiinese influence for political supremacy. Dur- 
ing the period of 362 years after the empress's expedition, 
Shinra in more than twenty instances failed to send its con- 
tribution and insulted the Japanese envoys or attacked the 
Miyake,^ in Imna. Japan, in each instance, sent an envoy 
or a force to demand an explanation and redress. Discon- 
tented Shinra, under the pressure of Japan and Pekche, 
made extraordinary efforts to introduce military arts and 
munitions from China, and entered upon an aggressive 
policy. She had indeed already seized most of the pro- 
vinces of Imna, and in 552 a. d. was preparing to invade 
Pekche. The king of Pekche, who was then at enmity with 
Koryo, the northern kingdom, which was friendly to Shinra, 

1 During the reign of the Emperor Ojin (270-310), the Pekche king 
sent to Japan a celebrated scholar named Achiki, who was appointed tutor 
to the crorwn prince. By introduction of Achiki, another learned man, 
named Wani, came to Japan with Qiinese books on literature and 
ethics ; and he also brought wkh him blacksmiths, weavers and brewers. 

* The Miyake was a Japanese granary, established in Imna immediately 
after the Korean invasion of the Empress Zhingo, and ever afterwards 
superintended by a Japanese general. Nihongi, vol. ii, pp. 8, 13. Gaiko- 
Shiko, p. 174. 


forseeing- the dang*er of a possible combination of his 
enemies, sent an envoy, who was accompanied by an envoy 
from Imna, on May 8, 552, to Japan, and requested the 
Emperor Kinmei (540-571) for an alliance.^ The next 
year several hundred Japanese soldiers were despatched to 
Korea and the peace of the peninsula was temporarily re- 

Shinra, however, increasing her forces on a gigantic 
scale, again undertook, in combination with Koryo, to 
overthrow Pekche and Imna. In January, 562, Imna had 
almost surrendered, and the Miyake was destroyed, when 
Pekche acquainted Japan with the situation and asked for 
the immediate despatch of a number of troops. In June 
the Emperor Kinmei declared war against Shinra,* and he 
was engaged in fitting out an expedition, when, on 
July I, Shinra, cunningly seeking to allay his indignation, 
sent an envoy to Japan to offer the tribute which had been 
so often n^lected.* The emperor scornfully repulsed the 
Shinra envoy. In the middle of July the Japanese general- 
in-chief, Kino-wo-maro-no-sukune, was despatched to 
Shinra and General Sadehiko to Koryo, and, in alliance 
with the forces of Pekche and Imna, they entered into hos- 
tilities against Shinra and Koryo. After many battles the 
Japanese generals were defeated and withdrew from the 
peninsula without effecting a settlement. The result was 
that Pekche and Imna, the kingdoms most friendly to 
Japan, fell under the influence of Shinra and Koryo. 

Pekche wished to restore the balance of power amongst 
the rival kingdoms ; but, in order to do this, it was neces- 
sary to secure the assistance of China to check Koryo, which 
Jiad been hostile to China ever since 230 a. d., because of 

1 The full text of the communication is found in Nihongi, vol. ii, p. 65. 
^Ibid., pp. 81-82. « Ibid., p. 83. 


Chinese encroachments on the frontier. Japan's assistance, 
too, was required in order to check Shinra, her traditional 
enemy. For these reasons Pdcche sent an envoy to the Soui 
emperor of China, and obtained from him the promise to 
attack Koryo; but the plan miscarried.^ The Chinese 
troops on the Korean frontier were defeated and driven out 
by the Koryo soldiers. Meanwhile the Soui dynasty had 
fallen. But, as soon as Taitsong the Great had established 
the Tong dynasty, he sent, in 613 a. d., heavy forces, to take 
revenge on Koryo. Though Koryo and Pekche were bit- 
ter enemies, they now r^^arded the Chinese as their com- 
mon foe, and for mutual defence united agrainst the Chinese 
invasion, which was utterly defeated.* 

The military success of the two kingdoms aroused the 
jealousy of Shinra, the pro-Chinese state. Shinra, there- 
fore, made an offensive alliance with the Tang emperor, 
who offered to send 100,000 men and several hundred 
vessels to the Pekchean coast.' The allied force was so 
formidable that Pekche was about to surrender, leaving 
Koryo at the mercy of the invader, when, in October, 
660 A. D., Kwisil Pok-sin, a Pekchean envoy and his suite, 
with a hundred prisoners of the Tang army, went to Japan 
and asked the Empress Saimei (655-661 ) to relieve his coun- 
try from the danger.* The empress granted his request, 
considering that ** to render help in an emergency " to the 
Pekche kingdom was the " unshakable " policy of Japan. 
An order for the expedition was issued.** The imperial 

1 Takekoshi, The History of 2,500 Years, p. 124. « Ibid. 

« Griffis, Hermit Nation, p. 36. 

* Nihongi, vol. ii, p. 268. 

^ See Nihongi, vol. ii, p. 269, for the full text of the order, in which 
the empress expressed her policy. The order is in the nature of a 
declaration of war. 


Staff was, in July, 661, advanced to Tsukushi. The crown 
prince, Naka-no-oye, superintended the fitting out of the 
imperial navy. Towards the end of the year, additional 
forces of the great Tang emperor invaded the Koryo 
frontier, and this was followed up in the spring of 662 
by an attack from Shinra. Koryo was now in desperate 
straits. Her envoy came to Japan in March, and asked 
the empress immediately to despatch a large force. ^ The 
Japanese court r^arded the combined invasion of Koryo 
by China and Shinra as dangerous, not only to the inte- 
grity of the Korean kingdoms but also to the peace of the 
Mikado's dominions. It was feared that the Chinese, if 
victorious, might invade Japan. Therefore, the crown 
prince Naka-no-oye, with his general-in-chief, Adzumi- 
no-Hirafu-no-Muraji, commanding ten thousand men and 
one hundred and seventeen vessels, on August 5, 662, 
landed on the Pekchean coast. The Japanese forces, com- 
bined with those of Pekche and Koryo, immediately at- 
tacked the two allied aggressors,* but they were not suc- 
cessful. They were utterly defeated in the last naval battle 
near the nw>uth of Naktong River, on August 27, 663. • 

The triple alliance headed by Japan could not counter- 
balance the overwhelming weight of the dual alliance of the 
most progressive kingdom of Korea with the great Chinese 
Empire. The conflict resulted in the dismemberment of 
two kingdoms. Pekche was absorbed by Shinra, and Koryo 
in 668 was partitioned between Shinra and China.* Thus 
the life of the several Korean kingdoms was terminated. 
After the defeat at the Naktong River, the crown prince 
Naka-no-oye (the Emperor Tench) changed the foreign 

1 Nihongi, vol. ii, p. 277. » /^i^.^ pp. 277-278. 

» Ibid., p. 280. See also Boulger, History of China, vol. i, p. 292. 

* The present Liao Tung peninsula originally belonged to Korea, but 
it ^became a Chinese possession in 668 A. D. 


policy of Japan. He established the principle of non-inter- 
ference in the aifstirs of the Korean peninsula, and forbore 
to seek revenge upon China, This most prudent sover- 
eign made indeed every possible effort to restore amicable 
relations among the Asiatic nations. When, therefore, the 
Tang emperor sent an envoy, named Liu-te-Kao, to Japan 
in 665, he was received with high honors and a Japanese 
envoy was soon sent to China in return.^ The war had 
not, however, annulled the tributary relation of Korea to 
Japan, for Shinra, in 668, sent an envoy to Japan with 
handsome tribute.* The abandonment of political inter- 
ference in Korea by the Emperor Tenchi did not escape crit- 
icism by the historians of succeeding generations. But his 
policy is justified by the maintenance of the Japanese na- 
tional dignity, and by the preservation of the peace of the 
Orient which resulted from it. 

Internal Affairs of Ancient Japan. — ^The Emperor Tench 
not only conducted wisely the foreign affairs of the country, 
but also showed great ability in the reform and improvement 
of the internal administration. 

The national state of Japan was originally based upon 
the principle of theocracy * as was that of all nations of the 
early ages. The Emperor Jinmu, the first Mikado, is said 
to be the divine descendant of Amaterast^Omikami, the 
Celestial Deity, who descended from heaven and created 
the land of Oyashi-ma (the original name of Japan). The 
sovereignty in Shintoism* (the Japanese theocracy) ex- 

1 Nihongi, vol. ii, p. 284. * Ibid.^ vol. ii, p. 289. 

* Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 
vol. i, p. 60. The earliest form of the state is theocracy, which was the 
ccMitrihution of Asia. 

* Shinto is the original religion of Japan. For a general account of 
Shintoism, see Chamberlain, Things Japanese, pp. 358 et seq. As to the 
conception of sovereignty in Shintoism, see Siebold, Japan and the Com- 
ity of Nations, p. 7. 


isted not only by the " grace of Gkxi," but further in virtue 
of descent from the ancestral creator of the lands of 
Japan. All Japanese rendered their loyal " deference and 
obedience " to the virtue and power of the Mikado. While 
the sovereignty of other nations was often altered through 
conquest, the Japanese maintained an " unbroken line 
of illustrious imperial sovereigns " and never recognized 
any ruler from any other source. 

The administrative function and organization was, in the 
reign of the Emperor Jinmu (660-585 b. c), very simple. 
The princes Ama-no-Taneko and Amatomi superintended 
dvil and religious matters, and the princes Umashi-machi 
and Okume attended to military affairs.* These princes 
had the official titles oi Omi and Muraji, the former re- 
ferring to the civil office, and the latter to the military. In 
the reign of the Emperor Suinin the office of Ohtfmraji, 
commander-in-chief (a head of Muraji), was initiated. In 
the reign of the Emperor Seimu (131-190 a. d.) that of 
Oh-omij prime minister (a head of Omi) was established. 
Since the reign of the Emperor Yuraku (457-479) both 
offices have existed side by side.^ As to local administra- 
tion, the general or soldiers who had shown merit in 
subduing hostile tribes or in suppressing insurrections, were 
appointed to Kum-no-Miyatsuko (governorships of pro- 
vinces), Agaia-Nushi (headships of districts) and Inaki 
(sqirires of villages) .* In the course of time the Mononobe, 
Imbe, Nakatomi and Kume families sprang from the 
princes already mentioned. The Soga family was de- 

^ History of the Empire of Japan, compiled under the direction of the 
department of education, at the request of the Imperial Japanese Com- 
mission to the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, translated by 
Captain Brinkley, p. 27. 

^ Nihongi, vol. i, p. 337. See note. 

• Arjga, KokuhO'gaku (Public Law of Japan), vol. i, pp. 26 et seq. 


scended from Takenauchi-Sukune, who was the commander- 
in-chief in the Korean expedition of the Empress Zhingo. 
Government offices, civil or military, central or local, became 
hereditary in these families. The common people, in these 
ancient days, were nothing more than serfs, the property of 
the governing classes, as in every primitive country. Tlie 
early form of government of Japan was thus that of a tribal 
feudal system under the Mikado. 

The Mononobe and Soga families, gradually growing in 
power, acquired the Oh-muraji and Oh-omi as their here- 
ditary offices. The administration of the country thus re- 
mained largely in the hands of these two families. For 
some time previously the Mononobe and Soga had been 
wrestling for the supremacy. The introduction of Budd- 
hism in the sixth century had served to accentuate their 
hostility. The former was conservative, adhered to the na- 
tional relig^on^ — celestial Shintoisnn — and opposed the spread 
of Buddhism. The Soga family was an enthusiastic ad- 
herent of the foreign religion, to which the imperial house 
was at first opposed, but which it was later inclined to adopt. 
With the assistance of Prince Shotoku, the most enthusias- 
tic leader of the new religion, Soga-no^umako killed the 
Mononobe-no-moriya in 587. After this event, the Mono- 
nobe family was ruined and the Soga house became pre- 
dominant. In order to obtain the supreme power, the Soga 
family essayed to interfere in the succession to the throne. 
Immemorial custom was the basis of the public law of 
Japan. Soga-no-umako endeavored to. place Princess 
Kashiya, the consort of the Emperor Bidatsu, who was 
favored by the Soga family, on the throne under the title 
of the Empress Suiko (595-628), despite the presence of 
direct successors in the male line.* The autocratic power 
of Imishi, of the Soga family, was still more pronounced; 

1 Arig2L, Kokuho-gaku, vol. i, p. 35- 


but it was surpassed by that of his son Iruka who attempted 
to destroy the lineal succession to the imperial throne by 
causing Prince Yamashiro, the l^itimate successor, to be 
killed, and by putting in his place Prince Furuhito-no-oe, 
a relative of the Soga family, hoping thereby in the end to 
usurp the supreme power for himself. But his treacherous 
design was discovered in time, and " father and son of the 
Soga" were killed in 645 by Prince Naka-no-oye, with the 
assistance of the Nakatomi-no-kamatari, one of the most 
loyal families. Prince Karu then ascended the throne; 
Prince Naka-no-oye became the crown prince and, presiding 
over the administration of the country, took up with Naka- 
tomi the work of sweeping reforms. 

On November 19, 645, the new Emperor Kotoku, accom- 
panied by the empress dowager and the crown prince, made 
a solemn declaration before all the ministers and generals : 

Heaven covers us ; Earth upbears us ; the imperial way is but 
one. But in this last degenerate age, the order of lord and 
vassal was destroyed, until supreme Heaven by our hands put 
to death the traitors. Now, from this time forward, both 
parties shedding their hearts' blood, the lord will eschew the 
double method of government, and the vassal will avoid dup- 
licity in his service of the sovereign. On him who breaks this 
oath. Heaven will send a curse and earth a plague, demons will 
slay him, and men will smite him. This is as manifest as 
the sun and moon.^ 

This oath clearly defines the comprehensiveness, exclusive- 
ness and permanency of the imperial sovereignty and the 
duty of the vassal. In the succeeding years, various edicts 
were promulgated regarding the administrative functions, 
census, taxation, etc,^ Omuraji and Ohmi were replaced 

* Nihongi, vol. ii, p. 197. 

* Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 206-209 and 226-230. See also History of the Em- 
pire of Japan, pp. 68-77, as to the Taika reformation. 


by three new offices, vie. : Minister of the Left, of the Right, 
and of the Middle. The territorial unit of the administra- 
tion and the estates of the privileged families were abol- 
ished. The test of ability was introduced in the appoint- 
ment of officers. The system of Densho, or the private 
ownership of serf and land by the official class, was done 
away with by the nationalization of the land and the estab- 
lishment of the Shoku-ho or wage system. The labor con- 
tribution was abolished and a system of commuted taxes 
was introduced. Under the new administrative measures, 
registers of population, books of accounts and records of 
censuses were ordered to be kept. Thus the old system 
of tribal feudalism was replaced by a central administra- 
tion. These measures, inaugurated upon the suppression 
of the Soga treachery, constituted a conspicuous reform in 
the political history of Japan. They were named the Taika 
Reformation, because they were introduced in the Taika 
era. The subsequent edicts promulgating these measures 
are said to be the first constitutional manuscripts of Japan. ^ 
The Taika reformation was greatly influenced by Chinese 
civilization. The centralized institutions of the Soui and 
Tang dynasties had been studied by Japanese scholars since 
the first Japanese envoy, Imo-ko, went to China. After 
the Emperor Tench restored peace with China, the Japanese 
were more interested in Chinese institutions and further 
adopted the Chinese codification. In the era of Taiho 
(702 A. D.), the Emperor Monmu promulgated a syste- 
matic body of codes, embracing administrative organization 
and functions, the imperial household and succession, offi- 
cial ceremonies, and criminal law in a rudimentary form, 
with a little civil law.* The Taiho code is but the comple- 

1 Ariga, Kokuho-gaku, vol. i, p. 37. 

* For the classification and table of the Taiho code, see History of 
the Empire of Japan, pp. 87-89. 


tion of the codification of the fragmentary edicts since the 
Taika reformation. 

To sum up, the imperial power was, by the Taika re- 
form, restored, and the Mikado became the real ruler, con- 
trolling all matters of peace and war. All the people of 
Japan were made direct subjects of the emperor, thus ce- 
menting the national life of Japan more firmly. From the 
Taika reform, (645) to the end of the reign of the Emperor 
Daigo (89&-930) was an auspicious period for the imperial 
sovereignty. This period is known in Japanese history as 
the " enlightened epochs of Nara and Heiau," epochs 
worthy of special reference because of the prosperity then 
enjoyed by the successive Mikados, and because of the de- 
velopment of civilization that took place with tranquillity 
at home and abroad. 


Dreams of Universal Empire, 894-1595 

The Activity of the Mongol Tartar. — ^The history of 
mediaeval Europe is known as the " daric ages." Reckless 
war, civil or international, the attempt to establish universal 
empire by destroying all national states, and piracy on the 
sea were the dominating features. So it was in Asia. 

The period of imperial prosperity after the Taika refor- 
mation did not last long. Because of the invaluable ser- 
vices of Nakatomi, in defeating the Soga treachery and 
bringing about the Taika reformation, his descendants, men 
of the Fujiwara family, were permitted to enjoy the min- 
isterial offices of the crown. They eagerly introduced the 
Chinese system of bureaucratic centralization and graduailly 
founded a strong autocratic government. Daughters of 
the Fujiwara family often became the consorts of the em- 
perors. Yoshifusa Fuji«wara was appointed Dajio DcAjin 
(prime minister) and Sessho (regent of the crown), offices 
which hitherto had been gfiven only to princes of the im- 
perial family. His adopted son, Mototsune, occupying 
these higher offices, interfered with the succession to 
the throne, and deposed the Emperor Yosei (877-884) and 
placed the Emperor Koko in his stead. Thus the imr 
perial power was about to pass into the hands of the 
Fujiwara family. Though the Emperor Daigo (898-930) 
temporarily restored the imperial authority with the loyal 
assistance of Michizane Sugawara, the succeeding emper- 
S8 [290 


ors were under the Fujiwara influence. The decline of 
the imperial power, though hastened by the crafty autocracy 
of the Fujiwara, was, to a great extent, influenced by 
Buddhism/ Its pessimistic doctrine affected the Mikados 
of the following generations. They became weary of 
affairs of the world and renounced political activity. 
On the other hand, the administration of the Fujiwara 
ceased to be strong enough to control the lords of the 
remoter . provinces, who, having originally been local 
officials, had gradually become feudal lords possessing 
territory and residing in castles. Under such condi- 
tions, civil war, rebellion, revolution against the central 
government and struggles for supremacy among the rival 
provincial lords themselves became common. Therefore 
the offices of Kebii-shi (military police) in each province 
and OryO'Shi (inspector-general) in the northern provinces, 
where rebellion chiefly occurred, were established and em- 
powered to exercise police functions with armed force.* The 
Fujiwara, not possessing adequate force themselves, filled 
these military offices with representatives of the military 
families, especially the Taira and Minamoto. These two 
military clans gradually grew in strength and eventually 
displaced the Fujiwara family; but in course of time they 
entered into a struggle for supremacy, which was prolonged 
until Minamoto Yoritomo subdued the Taira family. 
Yoritomo, after subjugating all the feudal lords, finally es- 
tablished Bakufu, a military government, at Kamakura, 
in the province of Suruga, in 1186. He styled himself 
"Shogim" (generalissimo). Thereafter the Minamoto 
family ruled the political and military affairs of the country, 
from Kamakura. The dual system of government was thus 

^Griffis, The Mikado's Empire (9th «d.), P- IM- 
* History of the Empire of Japan, pp. 1 34-135- 


inaugurated in Japan, the Shogun maintaining a de-facto 
sovereignty, and leaving the de-jure sovereignty to the 
Mikado, as a figure-head, at Kyoto. Identically the same 
thing occurred in China when the downfall of the Tang 
dynasty was followed by the military struggle of the five 
petty dynasties. Constant civil war prevailed in China as 
in Japan. Under such conditions, piracy in Asiatic waters 
was a natural outcome, and commercial intercourse could 
not be maintained. Japan discontinued diplomatic inter- 
course with China, after Michizane Sugawara in 894 ad- 
vised the Emperor Daig-o not to send an envoy to China, on 
account of the unsafe conditions on the high sea and the 
existence of civil war in China.^ Japanese intercourse with 
Korea was frequently interrupted.* Korea had often ne- 
glected to send the annual embassy to Japan, having taken 
advantage of the civil war of Taira-Minamoto. In shorty 
international intercourse among Asiatic nations almost 
ceased to exist, owing to piracy on the sea and civil war 
on land, until the Mongol Tartar overwhelmed Asia in the 
thirteenth century. 

The Tartar tribes, at even so early a period as 238 b. c.> 
were so feared by the Chinese that the Great Wall was 
constructed as a defense against the " northern barbarian.'' 
Century after century the Tartars were steadily gaining in 
power, absorbing the tribes of Siberia and encroaching upon 
northern China, until they finally formed a gigantic dynasty 
called the Khan Empire. The Mongol Tartar, in the ban- 
ning of the thirteenth century, was surging from the grassy 
plains of Manchuria over the Asiatic and even the European 
continents ; and the wave flung its last drops of spray over 
Japan. While Ghingis Khan was wrestling with the Zung 

1 GaikO'Shiko, p. 95. 

^ In 918 the name of the Shinra kingdom was changed to Korai. 


dynasty in China, a division of his armies, under General 
Sal-ye-tap, moved into the Korean peninsula through the 
Liao Tung frontier and crossed the Yalu river in the spring 
of 1 23 1. The general then sent from his camp to the 
Korean king, Ko-jang, a letter demanding his surrender/ 
The king at first took up arms, but he finally surren- 
dered to the demand of the invaders in 1232, offering 
valuable tribute of gold and silver and declaring himself 
a vassal of the Mongol. The latter now established mili- 
tary governors to control the administration. These gov- 
ernors had little respect for the Korean court, and oppressed 
Korean subjects with heavy contributions. The Korean 
king, according to the advice of his minister, had moved his 
court to Kang-wha Island, rather than behold his own dis- 
grace.* This caused the second invasion of the Moi^ol and 
hostilities did not cease until the crown prince was des- 
patched, in 1259, to the Mongol court to pay homage. Dur- 
ing the stay of the crown prince at Peking, Kublai, grand- 
son of Ghingis Khan, ascended the throne in 1260. The 
new emperor treated the Korean with the utmost kindness, 
and the latter, on his return to Korea, finding that his 
father had died, ascended the throne, in 1261. Kublai, 
perceiving that a good opportunity had come to persuade 
the new Korean king to absolute submission, wrote him 
a letter,* pointing out the dangers in his situation and the 
great benefit to be derived from a coalition. By this 
threatening but placating diplomacy, the Korean king was 
induced to become an obedient vassal and ally of Kublai. 
At this time the Emperor Sung of China was on the verge 
of being overthrown; and Kublai, having subjugated almost 

^ Korean Review, History of Korea, vol. i, p. 528. 

* Ibid., vol. i, pp. 563-565. 

* For tbc text of letter, sec Mailla, Histoire de la Chine, vol. ix, p. 092. 


all the Asiatic continent, now conceived the project of bring- 
ing Japan within the sphere of his influence. 

His first step toward consummating this design, was to 
try to conquer Japan by diplomacy, and to this end he ap- 
pointed Heuk Chuk and Fun Hong as envoys in 1266. He 
gave them a letter addressed to the ruler of Japan, in which 
he observed that it was customary for a vassal to send a 
congratulatory message to the emperor on his coming to the 
throne, and cc«nplained that no such message had been sent 
by Japan. ^ He further demanded of Japan that an envoy 
be sent to Pricing at the earliest possible time in order to 
avoid forcible subjugation. The envoys were instructed to 
proceed to Japan by way of Korea and to take with them to 
Japan a Korean envoy who understood Japanese affairs. 
The envoys set sail for Japan by the way of Koje harbor 
(present Masampho), but were driven back by a stormy 
ocean. The Korean envoy, who was not willing to guide 
the messengers of the aggressive Mongol to Japan, exag- 
gerated the danger and difficulty of the voyage and finally 
dissuaded the Mongol envoys from their undertaking. The 
latter, being unaccustomed to the sea, abandoned their mis- 
sion and returned to Peking. Two years later, Kublai sent 
another ambassador to the Dcusai-fu of Kuishu ( the branch 
office of foreign affairs of Japan) furnished with a letter 
addressed to the " King of Japan." * Japan was, at this 
time, under the regime of the Hojo family (1215-1333), 
which had succeeded the military government of the Mina- 
moto family, and Tokimune Hojo was administering the 
affairs of the country. The letter from Kublai was for- 

^ Mailla, Histoire de la Chine, vol. ix. For copy of the letter, see pp. 

* This letter contained substantially the same demands which were 
made by Kublai in his previous letter in 1266. The text of the letter, in 
the Japanese language, is in Gaiko-Shiko, sec. 6, p. 254. 


warded by the governor of the Dazai-fu to Tokimune, by 
wiiom it was in turn sent to the imperial court at Kyoto. 
A draft of a reply, in which every demand made by Kublai 
was refused, was prepared and handed over to the Kama- 
kura government. Tokimune, however, a military states- 
man, considered that a communication from a foreign 
ruler in which the dignity of Japan was insulted, should 
not be treated so respectfully, and he gave instructions to 
the Dazainfu for the immediate expulsion of the Mongol 
ambassador, without any answer to the letter. This news 
caused much anxiety throughout the empire, and it was 
feared that the Mongol would invade Japan. The Emperor 
Kameyama commissioned Michimasa, to lay before the 
shrine of Daijingu (the Deity of the Ancestor of the Im- 
perial Sovereign) an autographic supplication for the heav- 
enly protection of the country. All priests were ordered 
to follow the same example in their temples. On the other 
hand, careful measures were taken to guard the southern 
coasts. Kublai being still at war with the Sung forces, 
his whole army was not available for the invasion of 
Japan, and he sent orders to the Korean king to furnish 
one thousand bags of rice and a contingent of 40,000 
troops.* A second Korean envoy was sent to Japan in 
1269 to demand an answer to the letter of 1268, but he was 
ruthlessly expelled by the governor of Tsushima island. 
This envoy, on his way home, captured two Japanese, 
Tanjiro and Yajiro, and sent them to Peking. Kublai was 
exceedingly deliglited with the " valuable prisoners " and 
showed them his brilliant palaces and grand military 
parades. The two Japanese were then sent home to tell 
their ruler about the greatness of the Mongol emperor and 
to urge him to make Japan a vassal of the Mongol em- 

1 Korean Review, History of Korea, vol. ii, p. 38. 


pire/ Their report, however, caused Japan to stand even 
more firmly against the world-aggressor. Kublai com- 
pletely overthrew the Sung dynasty in China and established 
his own in the name of Yuen, in 1271 ; and being now freed 
from internal opposition, he took more decisive steps in deal- 
ing with Japan. In September he sent a third ambassador, 
Chiu Liumgpat, with a suite of one hundred followers. 
This ambassador did not entrust his original letter to the 
officials of the Dazairfuy but demanded that he be allowed 
to hand it to the emperor or shogun in person. As he was 
not permitted to proceed to the capital, a copy of the docu- 
ment was subsequently given to the governor of the Dcusairfu 
and forwarded to Kamakura, and from thence to Kyoto. 
In the letter Kublai complained that no answer had been 
given to his previous communications and demanded that 
an embassy be sent to the Yuen dynasty to restore amica- 
ble relations, and he hinted that any delay would cause a 
war. He limited the time during which he would await an 
answer to the end of November.* Again the imperial court 
and the Kamakura government decided, in December, to 
give no answer. Again the emperor caused the whole 
country to pray for the divine support of the national exist- 
ence. In 1272 and during the following year Mongol en- 
voys came to Japan from time to time; some of them were 
expelled and some were killed, for Japan regarded their de- 
mands as a national insult. 

Incensed at the conduct of Japan, Kublai renounced di- 
plomacy and sent an " invincible armada," consisting of 900 
war vessels and 25,000 Mongol-Chinese, under Generals 
Hoi Fon, Hong Ta-gu and Yu Poldiyong, and 15,000 
Koreans under General Kim Pang-gyung.* In November, 

1 GaikO'Shiko, sec 6^ p. 256. > Ibid., f>. 257. 

» Korean Review, History of Korea, vol. ii, p. 44. 


1274, the invaders arrived at Tsushima island. In spite of 
the vigorotts resistance of the governors and their troops on 
Tsushima and Iki islands, the Mongols easily occupied these 
places, and directed their main forces against the Chikuzen 
coast of Kiushu. The military lords of Kiushu, Shoni, 
CXocno, Matsurura, Kikuchi, and others, ralHed to the na- 
tional defence The Mongol invaders, armed with fire 
engines, called Do,^ and equipped with the improved 
weapons which had been introduced by the Venetians, 
caused great havoc among the Japanese forces, and the 
invaders were about to occupy the mainland, when, fortun- 
ately for Japan, a raging typhoon broke upon them, many 
of their war vessels were destroyed, and the remainder of 
their forces escaped under cover of darkness. 

This disaster did not cause Kublai to abandon his de- 
signs upon the Island Empire. In the next year, 1275, he 
despatched envoys in order to bring Japan to terms ; but the 
Japanese, rendered confident by their naval victory and their 
insular position, refused to yield to his threats. The re- 
peated expulsion and persecution of the Mongol envoys 
caused the second invasion of Japan. During 1280 great 
preparations were made in all the harbors of Kiangsu, 
Chekiang and Fuken for the expedition against Japan. The 
Mongol armada, consisting of 1000 vessels, and having on 
board 20,070 Korean soldiers and 50,000 Mongols under 
the command of Hwan Bunko, appeared in Japanese 
waters in May, 1281.* Not only were the entire army and 
navy of Kiushu Island called into service, but numerous 
forces from the mainland under Commander Hojo Sane- 
masa, brother of the Shognn, Tikimune, were pressed into 

* Do was a machine for throwing blazing arrows into the ranks of 
tlie enemy. 

» As to the number of the Mongol force, see Korean Review, History 
of Korea, vol. ii, p. 81. 


the campaign. The Mongol invader, however, enjoyed the 
great advantage of possessing much heavy ordnance, with 
which Japanese forts were bombarded and numberless sol- 
diers slaughtered. While the islanders were desperately 
defending their empire, a rumor spread that the Mongol 
invaders, having crushed all resistance, were pushing on to 
the main island and were on the point of advancing to the 
capital. The emperor, much distressed by this national 
misfortune, proceeded in person to the Hachimanku shrine 
(God of War) of Iwashimisu to pray for national tran- 
quillity, and he also sent an autographic supplication to the 
shrine of Daijingfu as he had done before. While the con- 
test was being fiercely continued in Kiushu, a northwest 
gale washed away the foreign invaders on July 30, 1281, 
and wrecked many of their ships, with great loss of. life. 
Several thousand of the wrecked warriors toc^ refuge on 
the island of Takashima, off the coast of the province of 
Hizen, where General Shoni Takasuke executed all of them 
except three persons,^ who were sent to China to report the 
fate of the great expedition. Kublai, a man full of ambi- 
tion, a type of the oriental hero, would not abandon the 
dream of world-empire. In the following years he again 
made energetic preparations towards repairing his former 
defeat, and in 1283 he ordered the Korean king to increase 
his naval equipment. But, in 1286, on the advice of Gen- 
eral Lieousinen, his chancellor, the " Emperor of Earth " 
abandoned all further designs upon Japan.' 

It has been said that Japan spent as much money for re- 

^ While a Japanese record describes three persons as having arrived 
safely at China, a foreign authority mentions eight persons. See Gaiko- 
Shiko, p. a6i. See also Yule, The Book of Sir Marco Polo, vol. ii, 
note to page 243. 

> The text of the advice is in Mailla, Histoire ginirale de la Chine, 
vol. ix, pp, 427-42i& 


ligious services at shrines and temples throughout the em- 
pire as was spent for military operations during these 
national crises/ Of course the people and historians of 
those days attributed their successful defence to the " heav- 
enly support." As a matter of fact their naval fighting was 
far superior to that of the continental soldiers. Neverthe- 
less, it must also be admitted that an island nation is better 
protected by nature against foreign invasion than are con- 
tinental nations. 

The Result of the Mongol Invasion — Period of Piracy. — 
The attempt at Mongol imiversalism had little or no direct 
influence upon Asiatic civilization ; but, in the reaction that 
followed, there was produced one most evil result — a swarm 
of pirates in Asiatic waters. After the military activities 
of the Mongols were checked by the Teutons in the West 
and by the islanders of Japan in the extreme East, the 
southern Chinese, tiring of their military absolutism, soon 
set to work upon the destruction of their mighty empire; 
and, while rebellions against the Mongol governors pre- 
vailed throughout southern China, pirates swarmed on 
the seaboard, and Mongol fleets were captured by the 
celebrated pirate Frangkue Chin in the beginning of the 
fourteenth century.^ After that, Chinese piracy was ram- 
pant on the coast of southern China and in the Indian 
ocean. Moreover, the Japanese, after the Mongol invasion, 
bitterly hated the Mongol and his ally, the Korean, and 
many of the soldiers and sailors who had defended their 
country became pirates and revenged themselves upon their 
old foe by raiding the Liao Tung and Shan Tung penin- 
sulas, and the Korean coast as well. 

Japan again drifted into civil war in the beginning of 

1 The History of the Empire, p. 189. 

* Boulger, History of China, vol. i, p. 602. 


the fourteenth century; the military government of the 
Hojo family at Kamakura was destroyed, and the Emperor 
Godaigo (1318-1339) temporarily restored the imperial au- 
thority, through the loyalty of the Nitta and Ashikaga 
families. But the rivalry of these two families soon caused 
another civil war, the so-called "War of Chrysanthemums," 
and the imperial power was again clouded. Takauji, of 
the Ashikaga family, established the Shogun government 
at Kyoto in 1342. Taking advantage of these civil dis- 
turbances, the Japanese pirates of the southern provinces 
became more and more aggressive in their descents upon 
the Korean and the Chinese coasts. The national guards 
of Korea often fought in vain at the seaports with the 
adventurous Japanese raiders. In order to warn the people 
of the approach of piratical invasions, the Korean govern- 
ment now adopted the "signal fire" in the national ser- 
vice.^ Combining with Chinese pirates, the Japanese 
marauders often raided the districts of Shantung, Fokkien 
and Sikkong, burning towns, killing defenceless people and 
even fighting with regular soldiers. In those days, the 
Koreans and the Chinese feared the Japanese pirates 
more than the Europeans once dreaded the Vikings, 
and they were accustomed to call the Japanese pirate 
WairKol (the dreadful creature of Japan). Although 
Takauji and the second Shogun, Yoshimori of Ashikaga, 
re-established the internal administration of the country, 
the piracy in the southern provinces -was entirely beyond 
their control. Thus, on account of frequent civil wars and 
piracy, diplomatic and commercial intercourse among ori- 
ental nations hardly existed for many generations after the 
Mongol invasion. 
Official intercourse with Japan was revived by China and 

* Grifllis, CoreOy the Hermit Nation, p. 74. 


Korea at the end of the fourteenth century — not for the 
purpose of exchanging courtesies and sending tribute as in 
ancient times, but for the purpose of making complaints 
against Japanese piracy. In 1367 the Korean king sent an 
envoy to Japan for the latter purpose.^ In the following 
year order was restored in China by the establishment of the 
Ming dynasty; and in 1369 an envoy was sent to Japan to 
convey information of the change of sovereigpns as well as 
to ask that measures for the suppression of piracy be taken.* 
From this time on, China and Korea repeatedly despatched 
envoys to Japan to demand redress for the ravages of the 
pirates; but the Japanese government usually claimed to 
be unable to control them. Yoshimitsu, the third Shogun 
of the Ashikaga family (1368- 1393), greatly appreciated, 
however, the arts and luxury of China and Korea; and it 
was he who toc4c the first step for the suppression of piracy, 
in order to foster commerce with those countries.* He 
frequently sent envoys to their courts and on several occa- 
sions caused expeditions to be sent to the piratical districts. 
The Chinese government appreciated these measures, and, 
when Yoshimitsu died, honored the deceased Shogun by 
conferring on him the title of " Kyoken-O " (King of the 
Sages), and in 1404 issued the " Kmtr-go " to Japanese mer- 
chant ships in order to distinguish them from piratical 
junks.* Subsequently, a member of the Ouchi family, a 
lord of Kiushu, was dq)uted by the Shc^fun govwnment to 
watch the pirates on the southern coast, and to take charge 
of Chinese trade. A member of the So family, the gov- 

1 GaikoShiko, p. 218. ^ /^iVf., pp. 99 a«d ^3- 

*Ihid., p. 223. See also Korean Review, Korean History, w)l. ii, p. 

* Gaiko-Shiko, p. 746. Kan-go is the return tickc*, or duplicate, 
issued by the Chinese government as a passport to Chinese ports. 


ernor lord of Tsushima, who was accustomed to deal with 
the Koreans, was designated to manage the intercourse with 
that country. In 1443 So Sadamori negotiated a treaty ^ 
with Korea, by which the So family might annually 
send fifty Japanese vessels to Korea, in order to export 
20,000 koku of Korean beans and rice to Japan. Similar 
trade franchises were obtained by several other feudal lords 
of Japan. Under such auspicious conditions the foreign in- 
tercourse of Japan — official and commercial — ^flourished 
for several generations. 

The Shogun government of the Ashikaga family, how- 
ever, gradually became corrupt and ceased to be strong 
enough to control the powerful lords who had accumulated 
fortunes and retainers for many generations. A great 
civil war, known in Japanese history as the " complication of 
the Onin," began in 1467, and again brought on a crisis 
in foreign affairs. The conflict degenerated into military 
anarchy and lasted a century, till Oda Nobunaga set about 
restoring order in 1573. During these dark days the 
Japanese pirate, who had been termed " Papan-sen " by the 
Chinese,* again dominated Asiatic waters and foreign inter- 
course with Japan almost ceased. 

The Attempts of Taiko the Great to subjugate China and 
Korea. — Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the greatest hero that 
Japan ever produced, though he was of humble origin, 
quickly raised himself to the position of one of the most 
prominent generals of Nobunaga, the general-in-chief . In 
a conversation with Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, when about to 
set out on an expedition to the Kiushu provinces, remarked 

1 GaikO'Shiko, p. 725. 

2 In those days the Japanese pirate ships used a flag on which the 
legend "Hachimansen" (tiie fleet of the War-<3od), was written; the 
Chinese pronounced the ideographs "Papan-sen." 


that it would be possible to subdue Korea with one year's 
revenue of Kiushu, and then with a Korean army to con- 
quer China, and thus to make China, Korea and Japan one ; ^ 
and when, in 1582, Nobunaga, on account of the sudden 
attack of his treacherous general, Mitsuhide, was forced to 
kill himself, the work of national tmification, which No- 
bunaga had b^iun, was carried to completion by Hideyoshi. 
Hideyoshi's extraordinary success in subjugating all the 
feudal lords and establishing administrative control over 
the country induced him to attempt to realize his immoder- 
ate ambition, namely, the founding of a universal empire in 
Asia. As a preliminary step, he sent a messenger to So 
Yoshitomo, the governing lord of Tsushima, who had su- 
perintended the Korean trade for a long time, directing him 
to take measures for the restoration of the old tributary re- 
lation of Korea to Japan and to demand that Korea act as an 
intermediary to secure from China a tribute to Japan in or- 
der to preserve friendly relations.* In conformity with 
this plan, Aburatani, a retainer of the daimio So, was sent 
as envoy to Korea. Aburatani demanded of the Korean 
king that he send an envoy to Japan, in order to restore the 
old relations; but the king politely refused to do so, ex- 
cusing himself on the ground of the dangers of navigation.* 
In the spring of 1589, Hideyoshi commissioned Lord So 
Yanakigawa and the monk Genso to act as envoys to Korea, 
and they renewed the demand for the immediate despatch 
of an envoy to Japan. After waiting for several months, 
they received an answer to the effect that the king would 
send an envoy on condition that Japan should seize and de- 
liver up a number of Korean pirates who were raiding the 

* Doling, Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, p. 263. 

* GMo-Shiko, p. 227. 

» Korean Review, History of Korea, vol. ii, p. 424. 


southern seaboard in company with Japanese.* This con- 
dition was duly fulfilled, and the Korean king then ap- 
pointed Whang-yan-gil, Kim-Sungli and Ho-sung as an 
embassy to Japan. Accompanied by the Japanese com- 
missioners, they arrived at Kyoto in May of 1590; and in 
September, an audience having been granted them, they pre- 
sented to Hideyoshi the royal letter and the tribute.* 
Hideyoshi, however, was not satisfied, as the letter made 
no reference to China; and, when the Korean envoys were 
about to depart, he gave them an answer, the substance of 
which was that the king of Korea should open his country 
to the Japanese forces, and that the Korean army should 
co-operate with them in an attack on China.' As Korea 
had since the advent of the Mongol dynasty, depended more 
upon China tiian upon Japan, it is no wonder that the 
ambassadors declined to accept this proposal. Never- 
theless, Hideyoshi dispatched to Korea an envoy, who per- 
sistently demanded a definite and favorable answer. Tbe 
Korean government, on the other hand, sent a messenger 
to Peking, to warn the Chinese court of the projected in- 
vasion; but, before his arrival, information of Hideyoshi's 
designs had reached the court from the king of the Lxxxrhoo 
islands, who had just been in Japan, paying homage to 
Hideyoshi.* The diplomatic interchanges between Japan and 
Korea ended with a mission of the So family in the spring 
of 1 591, which failed to secure the co-operation of Korea 
in an invasion of China. 

Hideyoshi, in the council of the elder generals, decided 

1 Korean Review, History of Korea, p. 425. Sec also Gaiko-Shiko, 
p. 227. 

* Tht text of the letter and the list of tribute may be found in 
Aston, " Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea," Transactions of the Asiatic 
Society of Japan, vol. vi, p. 231. 

■ Ibid., p. 232. Sec also Gaiko-Shiko, p. 228. 

* Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. vi, p. 223. 


to invade the Asiatic continent and issued a decree proclaim- 
mg war measures/ Almost a year was spent in prepara- 
tions.* Hideyo^i gave up the office of Kzvatnpbaku ( regent 
of administration) to his son, Hidetsugu, assuming for 
himself the title, Taiko (the Great Lord) ; and freed from 
the cares of internal administration, he concentrated his ef* 
forts on the foreign expedition. In March, 1 592, the Taiko 
proceeded to NagO)ra, in Kiushu, where his headquarters 
were established. A force of 150,000 men, including sailors 
and soldiers, in eight divisions under as many generals, 
which had gathered at Nagoya, set out for Korea in April. 
Tlie conditions were favorable to the Japanese. Their war- 
like spirit had under feudalism, from the time of the struggle 
between Taira and Minamoto, been constantly developed, 
and it was intensified by the Mongol invasion. Although 
dissipated in the military anarchy of the Onin, it was re- 
vived and concentrated by Nobunaga, and it was now about 
to be directed to a foreign invasion by the Napoleon of 
Japan* Besides, many of the Japanese soldiers were 
equipped with firearms,' which were destined to play an im- 
pcMtant part in the war. On the other hand, Korea and 
China had enjoyed peace for more than a century, and their 
people were unwilling to take up arms; nor had they be- 
come so well acquainted with the use of firearms as the 
Japanese. Nevertheless, the Kcweans made elaborate prep- 
arations for the defence of their kingdom. 

One division of the Japanese forces under General Kon- 
ishi, in spite of desperate naval resistance, landed in Korea 
near Port Fusan on April 13, 1592. Thence they marched 

1 As to -the council of generals, see Gaiko-Shiko, p. 229. 

* For an account of the war preparaitions, sec Transactions of the 
Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. vi, p. 335. 

»In 1543 firearms were introduced by the Portuguese into Japan, 
where their manufacture soon developed. 


to Tongue, a neighboring castle of Fusan, and subdued the 
enemy after half a day's skirmish. General Kiyomasa and 
his corps shortly afterward landed in Korea and easily cap- 
tured the strong fortress of K^^shagchiu. The whole 
country was now opened to the vast force of the invaders 
and they advanced toward the capital. The fall of Tyung- 
Chiu, considered to be one of the strongest castles in the 
middle province, caused a great panic in the capital. On 
April 30 King Lien held a royal council, in which it was 
decided, on motion of the war minister, Yi-Sanha, that 
" the court should remove to Ping- Yang, the old capital," 
and the royal train set out from Seoul that night.* Three 
days later, Seoul surrendered and was occupied by the 
Japanese army. At a conference with the Korean general, 
Ri Tokukei, General Konishi offered to spare Korea, if, 
even at that late day, a free passage to China should be given 
to the Japanese army. The negotiations, however, ended 
in failure.* General Kato pushed on to the north and cap- 
tured two Korean princes in the strong castle of Kaineifu. 
His demonstration was so formidable that he is known even 
to present-day Koreans as " Kishokwun " — the demon gen- 
eral. King Lien, alarmed by the approach of the Japanese 
army, on June 2 held a council * and decided to abandon 
Ping- Yang, and to proceed north to Hang- Yung ; but, find- 
ing there that Kato's soldiers had already overrun that dis- 
trict, he turned westward to Wuji on the frontier of China. 
The Japanese forces occupied Ping- Yang on June 11, and 
determined to hold the city as their second headquarters. 

Meanwhile, the Chinese governor of Loatung, a province 
adjacent to Korea, on the urgent appeal of King Lien, had 

> Korean Review, History of Korea, vol. ii, p. 472. 

■ Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. vi, p. 240. 

» Korean Review, History of Korea, vol. ii, p. 527. 


sent 5,000 men to Ping Yang in July/ They were, how- 
ever, defeated with wholesale slaughter. This disaster 
startled the Chinese court, which determined at once to send 
a large force to the aid of Korea. But, as time was re- 
quired for preparation, the Chinese government sent an en- 
voy, named Chin Weiking, who was to gain delay by pre- 
tending to enter into peace n^otiations.^ Weiking, upon 
his arrival at Ping Yang, immediately entered into confer- 
ence with General Konishi and succeeded in obtaining an 
armistice of fifty days. In return, he promised to proceed 
to Peking and come back to Ping Yang with an " arrange- 
ment for a peace satisfactory to both parties." As the re- 
sult of this agreement, the Japanese troops had rather an 
idle time during the rest of the year, till Chin Weiking re- 
appeared at Ping Yang, not with terms of peace, but with 
40,000 soldiers under General Li-Jusong.* The Japanese at- 
tacked them on January 6, 1593, but so large was the Chinese 
force that the Japanese were compelled to retire to Seoul 
in order to concentrate their divisions. After three months 
of hard fighting, both the Japanese and Chinese grew anxi- 
ous for peace. Weiking came to the camp of General 
Konishi in April and proposed negotiations, and, as the 
Japanese forces were suffering from plague and famine, 
Konishi, in spite of Weiking's previous treachery, accepted 
the proposal and seot to the Taiko for instructions. 

Hideyoshi drew up in June a basis of peace, consisting 

1 Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. vi, p. 242. 

2 Ibid., p. 243. Chin Weiking, a native of Chekiang and a man of 
talent and eloquence, was chosen for the mission probably for his knowl- 
edge of Japanese and for his ability in the "tricky" diplomacy which 
prevailed among the feudal kings of China in the age of military anarchy. 

•Aston, "Hideyoshi's Invasion," Transactions of the Asiatic Society 
of Japan, vol. ix, part i, p. 87. 


of seven articles, and forwarded it to Konishi.* After sev- 
eral conferences, it was accepted by the Chinese with a few 
modifications, and Weiking proceeded to Peking to obtain 
the sanction of the Celestial emperor. The principal pro- 
visions of the treaty were, first, the surrender of the two 
Korean princes captured by General Kato; second, the re- 
storation of half the territory of Korea to the Korean king, 
the other half to be retained by Japan ; third, the payment 
of an annual tribute to Japan ; and fourth, the investing of 
Hideyoshi with the title of king.' The Japanese under- 
stood that the fourth clause meant that Hideyoshi was to be 
invested with the title of king of China, and, being more ac- 
customed to arms than to diplomacy, they did not forsee the 
opportunity which the silence of the article on this point 
would give to the crafty Weiking to pervert and evade the 
stipulation. After the conclusion of the treaty military opera- 
tions ceased, and in the spring of 1594 Hideyoshi despatched 
Naito Nyo-an to obtain a definitive approval of the peace. 
Time passed and no report was received, and Hideyoshi, be- 
coming impatient, declared that he would in person invade 
China with 300,000 soldiers, but he delayed action on the 
advice of General Asano.* Meanwhile the cunning Weik- 
ing had advised the Chinese court that " Taiko Hideyoshi 
wanted to beccnne king of Japan." The court at first 
doubted, but, being reassured by the precedent that Ashikago 
Yoshimitsu was once honored with the title of king, at last 
decided to act upon Weiking's view.* The document of 
investiture and the insignia were prepared, and Fang Hsiang 
and Chin Weiking were commissioned, as ambassador and 

* For the text of the basis of the treaty, see Takekoshi, History of 
2SO0 Years, p. 552, in note. 

* GaikO'Shiko, p. 274. The other three clauses being secret, are un- 

* GaikO'Shiko, p. 275. * Supra^ p. 69. 


vice-ambassador, to proceed to Japan to perform the cere- 
mony. The embassy arrived in Japan in August, 1596, 
with 300 horses and gold and silver as presents for Hide^ 
yoshi. The Tatko, confident that he was to be invested with 
the title of king of China, and adorning himself with the 
regalia which he had just received, gave the embassy a most 
elab(xate audience at the Fushimi castle and directed the 
ambassador to read the investiture. When the ambassador 
came to the clause where it was stated that "We [the 
Chinese Emperor] do therefore specially invest you with the 
dignity of king of Japan," * the Taiko flew into a violent 
rage, and, seizing the document and throwing it on the floor, 
declared that he would become king of China and would 
teach the Chinese court how little it had to do with the 
sovereignty of Japan, which belonged exclusively to the im- 
perial blood. Thus the transaction was ended, and Hide- 
yoshi immediately issued an order for a second invasion. 

The campaign began in February, 1597, and ended on 
September 15, 1598, when General Tokugawa, in accord- 
ance with Hideyoshi's wishes, instructed all the generals to 
withdraw from Korea.' The last word of the g^eat Taiko 
on his death-bed, was " not to let the Japanese soldiers turn 
to the ghosts in the foreign land." 

As the Mongol had failed, so Hideyoshi failed to realize 
the idea of universalism after having wasted more than 
260,000 human lives.* On the other hand, the great hero 

1 The translation of the full text of the document is given in Trans- 
actions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. ix, p. 218. 

* For the account of the second invasion, sec Griflfis, The Hermit 
Nation, chaps. 18-19. For a more full and trustworthy account, see 
Shosen Monogatari {The Story of Korea), translated into German by 
Dr. Pfizmaier. 

* For this estimate by Mr. Ogawuohi, see Griffis, The Hermit Nation, 
p. 144. 


was unable to secure for his descendants even the adminis- 
trative control of his own country; for, while he was engaged 
in the foreign wars, Tokugawa lyeyasu usurped the power 
of the Hideyoshi family. His unsuccessful invasion of 
Korea would have resulted in fostering piracy in Asia by 
Japanese sailors who had been engaged in the naval struggle, 
had not armed vessels of the maritime nations of Europe ap- 
peared and had not Tokugawa prohibited the building of 
ocean-going vessels in the beginning of the seventeenth 

^ Nitobe, Intercourse between the United States and Japan, p. 14. 
"After 1609, ships above a certain tonnage (500 Koku = 2,500 busheb 
or 30,000 cu. ft) were not allowed to be built, the motive of this legis- 
lation being to cripple distant navigation." 


The First Intercourse of Japan with European 

Nations, i 541-1638 

Intercourse with the Portuguese and Spaniards. — ^Al- 
though India and China had intercourse with the Greeks 
and the Romans in ancient, and with the Italians in mediae- 
val times, none of the western peoples set foot in the Island 
Empire .of Japan until a wrecked Portuguese ship was 
brought thither by the Black Current in 1541. Japan and 
the Japanese were first described to Europe by Marco Polo, 
at the end of the thirteenth century, as 

Chipangu, an island towards the east in the high seas, 1,500 
miles from the continent ; and a very great island it is. The 
people are white, civilized, and well favored. They are idol- 
aters, and are dependent on nobody, and I can tell you the 
quantity of gold they have is endless ; for they find it in their 
own islands.^ 

His mention of gold may to some extent have stimulated 
the Portuguese and Spaniards to endeavor to open a new 
sea route to Asia in the fifteenth century. " Cipango " 
occupies a significant place to the east of Asia in Toscanelli's 
map, which was used by Columbus for his voyages, and the 
latter earnestly inquired for that island when he reached the 
archipelago of the West Indies.' 

' Yuk, The Book of Sir Marco Polo (second edition), vol. ii, p. 335. 

3 Hildreth, Japan as it Was and Is, p. 14. See also Murray, Japan, 
p. 2. In the map there is no American continent between "Cipango" 
3"] 79 


The lucrative mcmopoly of Asiatic trade by the overland 
route, hitherto held by the Venetians, awakened jealousy on 
the part of the rival commercial nations on the Mediter- 
ranean, and the " gold land of Asia " became a watch-word 
among them. Portugal was the first to launch forth upon 
the ocean to discover a sea route to India. Pope Nicholas 
V by the Bull of 1452 authorized the Portuguese king to 
" attack and subjugate all the countries of the infidels, to 
reduce all their inhabitants to slavery and to seize all their 
property." * Two years later, rewarding the intention of 
Prince Henry to discover India by way of the African con- 
tinent, the same Pope gave to the Portuguese sovereign the 
right to all the regions discovered and to be discovered 
" as far as the Indies." * Portugal thus acquired a mon- 
opoly of the privilege of colonizing and subjugating all the 
non-Christian world. Under the guidance of Prince Henry 
the Portuguese made repeated efforts to round the African 
continent, but in this they were not successful until Diaz in 
1487 reached the southern point of the continent. 

Meanwhile, Columbus, believing the earth to be round, 
hoped to reach the eastern coast of India by sailing across 
the Atlantic, and applied to Dom Joao II of Portugal for 
permission to carry out his plan. The king was not disposed 
to countenance so vague a project. Applying then to 
Spain, through the influence of Queen Isabella of Castile, 
Columbus eventually received permission to fit out an 
expedition, and in 1492 discovered the New World. 
Thereupon the Spanish sovereign adced the Pope for 

and Europe. Columbus's aim was to discover "a route to this re- 
putedly rich island and to the eastern shores of Asia." 

^ As to the Bulls of 1452 and 1457, see Harrisse, The Diplomatic 
History of America ( 1452*1493) > p. 6. 
« Ibid. 


a grant of the newly discovered dominions. By the fam- 
ous Bulls of partition, in May, 1493, ^^ newly discovered 
region was recc^;nized as Spanish, and the unknown world 
was divided by an imaginary line (some leagues west of 
the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands) between Spain and 
Portugal.^ Against this arrangement the Portuguese pro- 
tested, and it was modified in the next year by the treaty 
of Tordesillas, between Spain and Portugal, which fixed the 
divisional line " at a distance of three hundred and seventy 
leagues west from the Cape Verde Islands." * Each nation 
then proceeded to exploit its respective sphere. 

In 1498, Vasco de Gama, of Portugal, discovered the 
coveted sea route to India, and the Portuguese then began 
to swarm to the East. In 15 10 they forcibly occupied Goa 
and established there a provincial government. In the fol- 
lowing year they founded a naval station and commercial 
staff at Malacca. As early as 15 16, they sailed to the coasts 
of Siam, Burmah and southern China. In 15 17 Admiral 
Andrade effected a commercial arrangement with the gov- 
ernor of Canton.' He also sent an ambassador to Nanking, 
the old Chinese capital, but the Portuguese representative 
was there cast into prison. The Portuguese, however, al- 
tihough they established a stronghold in the Spice Islands and 
maintained regular communication with China, did not at- 
tempt to cross the ocean to " Chipangu " mentioned by 
Marco Polo. 

In 1 54 1, certain Portuguese traders from Siam, while 
sailing for China in a junk, were driven by a typhoon out 
to sea, and reached the Jinguji bay of the Bungo province, 

1 Sec chapter iii, " The Three Bulls of May, 1493," in Harisse, The 
Diplomatic History of America, The definite line of demarcation is 
sdll unknown. 

» Ibid,, p. 78. 

* Major, Prince Henry the Navigator, p. 418. 


in Japan. According to the European account, their names 
were Antoine Mota, Francois Zeimoto and Antoine Pexota.* 
By a number of historians, however, Fernando Mendez Pinto 
is r^;arded as the first European visitor to " Chipangu." 
This famous traveler was cast ashore on Tanegashima 
Island, off the province of Satsuma, in a shipwreck in 
1543. The "queer locking persons" were questioned as 
to " where they came from " and " what they were." For- 
tunately, there was a Chinaman in the company, named 
Go How, who was able to answer, by writing in Chinese 
characters on the sandy beach : "This is a foreign ship from 
the Southwest [India, Cochin-China or Manila], come to 
trade with you." * This primitive conference is said to have 
been the first ever held between Japanese and Europeans. 
Tokitaka, the governor-lord of the island, was much in- 
terested in the Portuguese and treated them with the utmost 
hospitality, and they made him a present of firearms, which 
had never before been seen by the natives. Pinto then 
visited the province of Bungo, from the lord of which he 
obtained permission to trade at the port of Hirato.* The 
reports of these proceedings, detailed and exaggerated by 
the refugees, attracted eager attention among the Portu- 
guese, both at home and abroad. Their merchants at Goa 
soon fitted out a number of vessels for Kagoshima, in Sat- 
suma, and for Hirato. The account of Marco Polo of the 
gold of Chipangu did not prove to be altogether deceptive. 
TTie Portuguese found the trade with Japan so lucrative that 
they were encouraged to come year after year. 

^ Goiko-Shiko, pp. 441 and 787. See also Charlevoix, Histoire du 
Japon, p. 38. 

2 GaikO'Shiko, p. 788. See also Nitobe, Intercourse between Japan 
and the United States, p. 8. 

s Gaiko-Shiko, p. 789. See the note. 


This was the epoch of feudal autonomy in Japanese his- 
tory. Provincial barons, jealous of one another's military 
supremacy, were anxious to buy firearms. They were also 
very willing to spend their gold and silver, which had ac- 
cumulated from generation to generation, for the new 
luxuries of Europe and India imported by the Portuguese. 
To foster foreign trade, the feudal barons of Kiushu 
willingly opened their ports. They granted to the Portu- 
guese the privilege of traveling freely in the interior, and 
hospitably invited them to settle upon their lands, even 
offering to exempt them from " all kinds of taxation and 
duties." ^ Nagasaki was also opened to foreign trade, the 
Portuguese founding there a large settlement in 1 566. The 
promising commercial intercourse between Japan and 
Europe thus initiated was, however, eventually hampered 
by the religious propaganda of the Catholic missions. 

Although the Portuguese opened up the Spice Islands by 
force and tried to gain admission to China by threats, they 
did not attempt forcibly to colonize or subjugate Japan, for 
the long distance from Goa, their central station, prevented 
them from employing military measures, and a warlike peo- 
ple like the Japanese were not likely to be subdued except 
by the mild means of religion. That " the missionary fol- 
lows trade" was particularly true of the Portuguese in 
Japan. With the second visit of Pinto, Francis Xavier came 
to Koyoshima in 1549 and introduced the work of the 
Jesuits.* On his fourth visit, in 1556, Pinto acted as am- 
bassador from the Portuguese viceroy, Don Alonzo de No- 
ronha, to the lord of Bungo, and brought with him " Father 
Gaspard Vilela, four brothers and five young orphans." ' 

1 Kampfer, The History of Japan, book iv, chap, v, p. 311. Sec also 
Sttgasiuina, Dai-Nihon ShogyoShi {Commercial History of Japan), 
p. 305. 

2 Hiidreth, Japan as it Was and Is, pp. 47-49. • Ibid., p. 76. 


" The meek and comfortable doctrine of the Gospel " soon 
gained the hearts of the Japanese; the Jesuits spread 
throughout Kiushu; and it was estimated in 1581 that the 
native Christians in the chief ports of the principal islands 
numbered as many as 150,000.^ The lords of Arima, 
Bungo and Omura were not only converted to the alien 
creed, but in 1582 sent their ambassadors to Rome to pay 
homage to Pope Gregory XIII.' Converting one by one 
the provincial lords who maintained their local autonomy, 
the Portuguese Jesuits would easily have subjugated the 
whole empire, had there been no central control over the 
feudal princes. 

Nobunaga, though he brought about the unification of 
Japan, had no opportunity to deal with the new religion. 
Taiko Hideyoshi, however, Nobunaga's successor, assum- 
ing the whole administration, determined to suppress the 
foreign propaganda and took the first step through the edict 
of July, 1587.* By this edict the Jesuit missionaries were 
ordered to leave Japan. Merchants were not affected by it. 
Most of the converted lords in Kiushu, whom Hideyoshi 
had not yet absolutely subjugated, stood firm and protested 
against the banishment of the missionaries. The edict 
alarmed the colonial government of Goa, whose viceroy was 
sent on a special mission to Hideyoshi, with a letter asking 
him to continue the " favor " which had been shown to the 
the Portuguese in the past.* After careful consideration, 

^ Heine, Japan, Beitrdge lur Kenntniss des I^andes und seiner Be- 
wohner, p. 53. 

* For a full account of the Jai>anese embassy to Rome, and the teict 
of the letter to the Pope, see Mr. Satow's paper, Transactiofu of the 
Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. xviii, part ii. 

< For the text of the edict, see Heine, Japan, p. 57. 

^ For a copy of the letter, see Hiklredi, Japan as it Was and Is, p. 


Hideyoshi on July 25, 1592, gave an answer justifying 
the edict.* He was not blindly anti-European, for he did 
not propose to banish Portuguese who were merely engaged 
in trade; but he desired to exclude any foreign element 
which would menace the national existence. He aimed at 
nothing but " self-preservation/' or nationalism, as his an- 
swer to the viceroy clearly pointed out : 

As to wtiat regards religion, Japan is the realm of the Kami, 
that is, of Sin, and the beginning of all things, and the good 
order of the government depends upon the exact observance of 
the ancient laws of which the Kami are the authors. They can- 
not be departed from without overturning the subordination 
which ought to exist, of subjects to their sovereign, wives to 
their 'husbands, dhildren to their parents, vassals to their lords, 
and servants to their masters. These laws are necessary to 
maintain good order within and tranquillity without. The 
fathers, called the Company, have come to these islands to 
teach another religion ; but as that of the Kami is too deeply 
rooted to be eradicated, this new law can only serve to intro- 
duce into Japan a diversity of worship very prejudicial to the 
state. It is on that account that, by an imperial edict, I have 
forbidden these strange doctors to continue to preach their 
doctrine. I have even ordered them to leave Japan, and I am 
determined not to allow anybody to come hither to retail new 

Of commercial intercourse he spoke as follows : 

But I still desire that commerce between you and me may 
continue on its old footing. I shall keep the way open to you 
by sea and land, by freeing the one from pirates and the other 
from robbers. The Portuguese may trade with my subjects in 
all security, and I shall take care that nobody harms them. 

1 HUdreth, Japan as it Was and Is, p. no, for the full text of Hide- 
yoshi's answer to the Portuguese viceroy. A copy of the original letter, 
in Japanese, is in Suganuma, The Commercial History of Japan, p. 329. 


Hideyoshi, however, was unable strictly to enforce his edict, 
being engaged in the invasion of Korea. 

In the sixteenth century, the Spaniards little respected 
the sovereign rights of other nations. On the contrary, 
they entertained the idea of establishing a world-empire; 
and, in spite of the Bull of 1493 ^^^ ^^^ treaty of Torde- 
sillas, made every effort to destroy the colonial and com- 
mercial monopoly of the Portuguese in Asia. While they 
did not venture to cross the Portuguese sphere by way of 
the Cape of Good Hope, they came from another direction. 
Magellan, a native of Portugal who had become a Spaniard 
by naturalization, penetrated, in the course of his celebrated 
voyage, to the Philippines and the Moluccas by rounding 
Cape Horn. This encroachment on the Portuguese sphere 
was settled in 1529 by the treaty of Sarago<;a. Portugal re- 
covered the Moluccas by paying to Spain the sum of 350,000 
gold ducats, and a line of demarcation was drawn 17° to 
the east of those islands.^ But this did not prevent the 
Spaniards from conquering the Philippine group, which lay 
well within the Portuguese sphere, as Zebu was captured by 
them in 1564 and Manila in 1571. 

Although Spanish ships from Mexico and the Philippines 
often touched at Japanese ports, their appearance was not 
officially recognized until a Spanish ship brought "blade 
slaves " to Nobunaga.* When Philip II seized upon the 
crown of Portugal, the Spaniards of Manila sought to arro- 
gate to themselves all the privileges of the Portuguese as 
to commercial and missionary enterprises in Japan. Philip 
did not endorse this extreme claim, and the exclusive privi- 

^ A full account of the Spanish and Portuguese rivalry is given in 
Satow's paper. Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. xvtii, 
part ii, pp. 155 et seq. 

« GaikO'Shiko, p. 577. 


l^es of the Portuguese Jesuits were confirmed by the Bull 
of Pope Gr^nory XIII, in 1585;^ but the governor of 
Manila did not relinquish his projects. Hideyoehi demanded 
that the Manila government pay homs^e to Japan.* This 
inq)erious demand the governor of course r^;arded as an 
insult to Spanish sovereignty; but he saw in it an oppor- 
tunity both to gain access to Japan, and to deal a blow at 
the Portuguese monopoly. In 1592, a Spanish envoy, 
Liano, appeared and had an audience with Hideyoshi, who, 
with his staff, was then at Nagoya, in Kiushu, preparing for 
the invasion of Korea. Liano bitterly complained of the 
Portuguese trade monopoly at Nagasaki, and charged the 
Portuguese with being engaged in a religious conspiracy to 
evade the recent edict.* The result was that Hideyoshi in- 
stantly issued an order for the destruction of the Portuguese 
churches. The unscrupulous diplomacy of the Spanish en- 
voy was not, however, altogether successful, since the Span- 
iards did not at once obtain the privil^e either of trading 
or of preaching. Nevertheless, in the following year, an- 
other envoy came and secured a charter to trade at Port 
Sakai, making at the same time an oath not to bring any 
missionary.* Thereafter the Spaniards came in large num- 
bers to Japan, but their missionaries were more numerous 
than their traders and promptly engaged in strife with 
the Portuguese. This religious rivalry between the Jesuits 
and the EkMninicans of the Latin nations, induced Hide- 
yoshi and his successors to impose further restrictions upon 
them, and enabled the new-comers, the Dutch and the Eng- 
lish, to enjoy the lion's share of the trade. 

^ Sfttow, loc. cit, p. 156. Also Hildreth, Japan as it Was and Is, p. 
2 Ibid., p. 108. 

* Goiko-Shiko, p. 791. See also HUdreth, op. cit, p. 114. 
^ GaikO'Shiko, p. 792. 


Intercourse with the Dutch and English. — It was chiefly 
England and Holland that checked Spain's scheme of uni- 
versal empire in Europe; and it was their sailors and mer- 
chants who destroyed the colonial and commercial monopoly 
of Spain and Portugal in America and in Asia. While 
the Portuguese held the monopoly of the Asiatic trade in 
the sixteenth century, Dutch merchants made a fair profit 
by reselling in the north of Europe Asiatic merchandise 
which had been brought to Lisbon. The Spanish absorp- 
tion of the Portuguese dominions in 1 580 was soon followed 
by the brutal seizure of fifty Dutch ships at Lisbon, and by 
the forcible exclusion of Dutch merchants from trade with 
Portugal. The Dutch then hegsn to cherish, more ardently 
than any other nation, the design of direct commerce with 

Several trading companies soon sprang up to promote 
ocean trade. At first the Dutch attempted to explore an 
independent route to the East by the Arctic seas; but, 
learning its difficulties they adopted the southern route and 
entered into direct competition with the Portuguese and the 
Spaniards.^ Four vessels, fitted out in 1595 by the East 
India Company, an association of merchants of Amsterdam, 
sailed by way of the Cape of Good Hope to Java, where 
many hindrances were put in their way by the Portuguese. 
Information as to the Portuguese trade with Japan had al- 
ready been furnished to the East India Company by Von 
Linschoten, who returned to Holland from the East in 
1592, and in 1595 published his Reys-Gheschrift von de 
Navigation der Portugalaloyers in Orient en,^ TTie first at- 

1 Cunningham, Western CiviUzatiotiy vol. ii, p. 199. Sec also Hil- 
drcth, op, cit., p. 132. 

» Ctmningiham, Western CtvUisation, vol. ii, p. 199. 

* Nachod, Die Beziehungen der niederldndischen ostindischen Kom- 
pagnie su Japan im siebsehnten Jahrhundert, p. 91. 


tempt of the Dutch to enter Japan was made by a fleet 
tinder the command of Jacques Mahn, which left Holland 
on June 27, 1598. He was instructed to make his way 
through the Straits of Magellan and across the Pacific. 
The fleet, however, became separated during a storm while 
oflF the Chilian coast. Some of the ships were wrecked; 
one was captured by the Spaniards. The " Liefde," the 
only survivor, conducted by William Adams, an English 
pilot, steered for Japan and arrived at Hirato in the middle 
of April, 1600.* In consequence of these misfortunes, 
which fell heavily upon small associations, and in order 
better to meet the severe competition -of the Portuguese 
and the Spaniards, various Dutch companies, in 1602, con- 
solidated, for greater business efficiency, into a gigantic 
corporation, which acquired celebrity as the " Dutch East 
India Company," and which was authorized to make peace 
and war with the " Eastern Princes." ' Immediately after 
this consolidation, the Dutch successfully established them- 
selves in India, Java and Formosa. In December, 1607, 
a fleet composed of the ships "Roode Leeuw met Piulen" and 
" Griffoen," under Pieter Willemszoon Verhoeven, was de- 
spatched to Japan. It arrived at Hirato on the evening of 
June I, 1609. The supercargoes left on July 27 for the 
court of the Shogun, at Suruga, bearing a letter to lyeyasu 
from the Prince of Orange, and accompanied by Van Sant- 
vort as interpreter.* They had no difficulty in obtaining 
permission to trade, to build residences and warehouses at 
any port or harbor where the Dutch merchants came, and 
to maintain " neighborly relations " with Japan. lyeyasu 

^ Nachod, Die Begiehungen der niederldndischen ostindischen Kom- 
pagnie gu Japan im siehsehnten Jahrhundert, pp. 95, 98, 99. 

^ Raynal, India, vol. i, p. 166. 

• Nachod, op. «/., pp. 112-113. 


furnished them with a reply to the letter of the Prince of 
Orange, in which these privileges were guaranteed, to- 
gether with a letter-patent for the free passage of the Dutch 
ships/ Under these favorable conditions the Dutch es- 
tablished their main trading-post at Hirato, where Jacques 
Specx was appointed as " Cape Merchant '* to superintend 
their business, with three assistants, an interpreter and a 

The success of the Dutch was due largely to the personal 
influence of William Adams over lyeyasu, who, impressed 
by Adams's frankness and straightforwardness, and his 
knowledge of mathematics and of ship-building, had per- 
mitted him to remain in Japan since 1600. lyeyasu con- 
fided in Adams's assurance that the ^* Dutch had no ambi- 
tion beyond commercial relations." It is said that Adams 
was treated as " a lord of England," and that he enjoyed the 
*' office of foreign adviser " at lyeyasu's court. 

As soon as the favorable answer of the Japanese ruler 
reached Amsterdam, another ship, the " Broch," was de- 
spatched, in 161 1, by the Dutch East India Company for the 
Japanese trade. Immediately after its arrival at Hirato, 
Specx proceeded to Yedo as the Dutch envoy to express the 
gratitude of the company for the privileges so generously 
granted by lyeyasu two years before, and he brought with 
him presents of European products newly imported.' 
lyeyasu then gave Specx another letter-patent, which is, 
however, substantially the same as the one given in 1609. 
Its English translation runs as follows : 

1 The German translation of the text of the reply is given in Nachod, 
op. cit, appendix 5. An English translation is in Hildreth's Japan as it 
Was and Is, p. 143. A copy of the original Japanese letter is in Suga- 
numa's The Commercial History of Japan, p. 562. For the text of the 
letter-patent, see appendix 6, in Nachod, op. cit. 

' Nachod, op. cit,, pp. 114-115. 

» GaikO'Shiko, p. 795. 


All Dutch ships that come into our empire of Japan, whatever 
place or port they put into, we do hereby expressly command 
all and every one of our subjects not to molest them in any 
way, nor in any way to be a hindrance to them ; but on the 
contrary, to show them all manner of help, favor and assist- 
ance. Every one shall beware to maintain the friendship in 
assurance of which we have been pleased to give our imperial 
word to those people ; and every one shall take care that our 
commands and promises be inviolably kept.* 

A Japanese record mentions, as the first appearance of 
an English ship, a vessel which anchored near the " Five 
Islands" of Hizen, in Japanese waters, as early as 1554.* 
Another English ship, which arrived at Hirato in 1580, ob- 
tained a permit to trade from Lord Matsu-ura. William 
Adams, who took up his residence in Japan in 1600, though 
originally an English subject, was sworn to Dutch allegi- 
ance. But, although these incidents may have been in a 
sense preliminary, English intercourse with Japan did not 
assume a definite form until the arrival of Captain Saris, an 
agent of the East India Company, in 161 3. After the de- 
struction of the Spanish armada, Elizabeth put forth every 
effort to make her colonial and commercial power as great 
as that of France and Spain. These efforts were not at 
first very successful, owing in part to anxiety to avoid a 
collision with the Spaniards. In 1600, however, England, 
adopting the Dutch policy, entered upon a direct attack on the 
colonial empire of Spain, by chartering the East India Com- 
pany.* In April, 1602, the company entered into an agree- 
ment with George Waymouth, navigator, for a voyage by 

* Kampfer, The History of Japan, book iv, p. 382. The German text 
is found in Nachod's work, p. 148, and the original Japanese text, in 
Suganuma's book, p. 509. 

« Gaiko-Shiko, p. 790. 

* Secley, The Growth of British Policy vol. i, pp. 291-292. 


the "north-west" passage to Cathan (India), China, or 
Japan, but the scheme of Way mouth was not realized.^ 
Two years later Sir Edward Michelbome obtained a li- 
cense to explore the Asiatic countries as far as Japan, by 
the route around the Cape of Good Hope. His voyage 
was prematurely ended by the killing of his pilot, John 
Davis, by Japanese pirates on the coast of the Malay pen- 
insula.* On April 4, 1611, the East India Company issued 
a commission for the exploration of Asia, by which Captain 
John Saris was appointed to command a fleet consisting of 
the " Qove," the " Hector " and the " Thomas," and by 
which he was specially instructed to proceed to Japan with 
the " Qove " from Bantam, and to consult, upon his arrival 
in Japan, with Adams, who lived at the Japanese court and 
enjoyed great .favor.* The fleet sailed from England on 
April 16, 161 1, with four royal letters addressed respec- 
tively to the Great Mogul of Surat, to the king of Bantam,, 
to the lord of Hirato, and to lyeyasu (" Ruler of Japan "). 
On January 14, 1613, Captain Saris left Bantam for Japan 
with only the ship " Clove," and arrived at Hirato after 
a five-months sail. Through the assistance of the Lord 
Matsu-ura and Adams, he soon proceeded to the court at 
Suruga, where, on September 8, he was received in audi- 
ence by the Shogun, lyeyasu. Saris delivered to Iye3rasu 
a letter.* from King James I, and presents of European 
products. Praising the glory of the Ruler of Japan, and 
explaining the objects of the English commissioner, the let- 
ter requested lyeyasu to afford English subjects " securities 

* Satow, The Voyage of John Saris to Japan, introduction, p. iv. 

* Ibid,, introduction, p. v. 

* For the abstract of Saris's commission, see ibid., pp. x-xv. 

^Ibid., pp. Ixxvi-lxxvii, English text. Suganuma, The Commerciai 
History of Japan, p. 514. The Japanese translation was made with the 
help of Adams. 


and liberties of commerce" for the mutual benefit and friend- 
ship of both countries, and invited the Japanese merchants 
to come freely to England. lyeyasu was very graciousljr 
disposed towards a commissioner from Adams's country, and 
asked Captain Saris to state in writing what privileges he 
desired.^ Saris, with the help of Adams, who had a fair 
knowledge of Japanese, drew up a draft of a petition in 
Japanese characters and submitted it to the secretary of 
state, Honda Kodzake-no-suke. The petition was soon ap- 
proved, and Saris received a letter-patent and an answer to 
King James on October 8.* By the letter-patent the fol- 
lowing privil^es were given to the English in the name 
of the governor of the East India Company : 

I. Freedom of commerce and navigation in the ports of 

II. Absolute exemption from tariff duties, import as well 
as export, and from transit duties. 

III. All necessary relief and assistance to wrecked ships 
and persons, and necessary provision and accommodation 
during their stay and on their departure. 

IV. Judicial control by the Cape Merchant (the head of 
the English factory) over the property of deceased English 
subjects and over all offences committed by English sub- 
jects — the Japanese law to have no effect upon their persons 
and their property. 

V. An assurance that Japanese subjects would be re- 
quired to fulfil their contracts of sale. 

VI. A guarantee against official confiscation of English 
goods, and an assurance of payment for official purchases. 

1 Ricss, " History of Hirato/' in Transactions of the Asiatic Society 
of Japan, vol. xxvi, p. 23. 

* The letter to King James is given in the Diary of Captain Saris, 
p. 137. The original text of the Japanese is in Suganuma's Commercial 
History of J^pan, p. 515. As to the letter-patent, see the full teact, 
ibid^ p. 138, and the Japanese text, (bid,, p. 518. 


VII. The supply of Japanese subjects to English naviga- 
tors in case they should need men for service in the prosecu- 
tion of their trade and navigation. 

VIII. Permission to explore Yezo (the present Hok- 
kaido), or any adjacent islands of the empire, without a 
further passport. 

By the earnest assistance of Adams, Captain Saris thus 
succeeded in obtaining commercial privileges in Japan more 
liberal than any ever before given to foreigners. Uraga, 
near Yedo, was first suggested to the English commissioner 
as the place for the English factory; but Saris preferred 
Hirato, which afforded better accommodations for Euro- 
peans.^ Before his departure, Saris held a council at Hirato 
on November 26, and it was resolved to establish the main 
factory there, its staff to consist of eight Englishmen, with 
Richard Cocks as " Cape Merchant." 

Under the auspicious guarantees of the letter-patent, the 
English traders, like the Dutch, easily forced out the Por- 
tuguese monopoly. The English soon established branch 
houses at Yedo, Osaka, Fukui, Karatsu, Suruga, Hyogo, 
Sakai, Nagasaki, and other places. The death of the gen- 
erous Shogun, lyeyasu, in 161 5, however, was a severe blow 
to English commerce. Hidetada, the second Shogfun, re- 
stricted their commercial privil^es to the port of Hirato, on 
account of their alleged adhesion to the Catholic faith, the 
Dutch having informed him that the English representatives 
were of the same religious body as the Spanish and Portu- 
guese, as shown by the marriage of King James to the Portu- 
guese princess.* The strenuous efforts of Adams and Cocks 

^ Sa»taw, Diary of Captain John Saris, p. 136. 

» LHary of Richard Cocks O^iS'J^^^)^ vol. i, p. 191. Sec also Gaiko- 
Shiko, p. 798. 


could not accomplish the restoration of the English privi- 
l^es. The Teutonic nations, though they had co-operated 
with each other until they had crushed the world-monopoly 
of the Latin nations, now came themselves into serious con- 
flict over the commercial supremacy in Asia. The claim 
by the Dutch of the monopoly of trade with the Spice 
Islands was the origin of their difficulties with England. 
Although the directors of the Dutch East India Company 
had instructed the governor at Bantam not to interfere with 
EngUsh traders, yet their collision was inevitable. A re- 
gular skirmish took place on November 22, 161 7. The 
Hollanders captured the "Attendance," an English ship, at 
the Moluccas, and brought her into Hirato. This news ex- 
cited the English traders there, and it was unanimously re- 
solved at their council to despatch Mr. Cocks to the Shogun 
government for redress for the " unlawful capture of an 
English ship." ^ The Shogun, Hidetada, refused to take 
cognizance of anything done outside of his own territory,* 
it being his policy not to entangle himself in any foreign 
complication. The struggle between the English and the 
Dutch g^ew more and more intense, and, the English fac- 
tory was often protected by the soldiers of the lord of Hirato 
against the violence of the Dutch sailors. Happily for the 
English traders a " treaty of defence " was on June 2, 1619, 
concluded in London, by which it was agreed that the East 
India companies of the two nations should act as partners 
in the trade with the Spice Islands.* At the same time 
the Dutch captains were instructed that prizes captured from 
the Spaniards and their adherents, in the waters near Japan, 
should be divided between the establishments of England 

* Cocks's Diary, vol. ii, p. 63. 
' Riess, loc, cit., p. 81. 
» Ibid,, pp. 86-87. 


and Holland at Hirato. This arrangement, however, was 
of brief duration, as it was reported in Hirato on August 2, 
1622, by the "council of defence" that the Dutch had 
separated their shipping trade from the English. The 
massacre of Amboyna occurred in 1623, and was followed 
by the exclusion of English traders from the Spice Islands. 
In the same year the British East India company decided in 
the council of Batavia, to withdraw from Japan. ^ Nor was 
this decision strange, since English trade with Japan was 
practically ruined by the edict of 1616, by which it was 
confined to Hirato. 

The Diplomacy of the Tokugawa Shogunate. — After the 
death of the celebrated Hideyoshi, and the battle of Sakiga- 
hara, lyeyasu Tokugawa brought all of Japan under his 
rule and in 1603 inaugurated the Tokugawa regime, es- 
tablishing the Bakufu government in Suruga province. The 
second Shogun of the Tokugawa, Hidetada, transferred the 
Bakufu to Yedo which, for two centuries and a half, re- 
mained the seat of the Tokugawa government. 

lyeyasu appreciated the economic value of foreign inter- 
course and its effect upon the prosperity of the country more 
keenly than any of his predecessors in the central authority. 
He adopted the open-door policy, a policy based upon prin- 
ciples of peace and friendship and freedom of commerce 
with other nations. He especially sought to appease the 
Koreans, who deeply resented the terrible reverses inflicted 
upon them by Hideyoshi's invasion, and, acting through So 
Yoshitomo, the governor-lord of Tsushima, he repeatedly 
sent envoys to the Korean court, with a view to re-establish 
the friendly intercourse of former times. For a while his 
overtures were in vain, but at last he convinced Korea that 

^ Letter of recall of Mr. Gxks by the East India Company, in his 
Diary, vol. ii, pp. 340-344- 


Japan under his rule was totally different from the " Japan 
of Hideyoshi," and a Korean envoy was despatched to him 
with a royal letter and presents/ The envoy was warmly 
received at Suruga, in 1607, and two years later Lord So 
concluded with Korea a commercial treaty.* But, al- 
though Korea thus accepted the amicable advances of Japan, 
China was not inclined to do so. Traders from southern 
China, however, often came to Nagasaki, and were treated 
in the same manner as Europeans. So anxious was lyeyasu 
to restore commercial relations with China that he gave, in 
1610, a charter of " Shuin " to the Canton ships, in order 
to encourage their coming. Two years later he sent Honda 
as a commercial agent to the viceroy of Foukin, in order 
to obtain the "Kan-go " for Japanese ships. The provin- 
cial lords of Kiushu were ordered, in 161 3, to open all their 
ports to Chinese trade.* European nations were treated 
with great liberality. The privil^es granted to the Portu- 
guese and the Spanish, which wer^ curtailed by Hideyoshi, 
were restored by lyeyasu. To the Spanish governor of the 
Philippines he once wrote a letter, expressing his intention 
to establish direct commercial intercourse between Japan 
and Mexico.* He gave letters-patent to Spanish vessels in 
1608 and especially opened the port of Uraga, in the pro- 
vince of Sagami, to Spanish trade." Prior to the arrival 
of Verhoeven, with the Dutch fleet, in 1609, ^ Spanish 
envoy, Don Rodrigo de Vivers, besought lyeyasu, besides 
continuing commercial relations, to grant the royal pro- 
tection to Spanish missionaries, but to deny rights of trade 

1 For the text of the letter, see Aston, Transactions of the Asiatic 
Society of Japan, vol. xi, p. 124. 

* The Japanese text of the treaty is given in Suganuma's Commercial 
History of Japan, p. 417. 

* Gaiko-Shiko, p. 751. * Ibid., p. 793. 

' Suganuma. The Commercial History of Japan, p. 380. 


to the Dutch, who were denounced as " pirates and enemies 
of Spain." The first two requests were granted, but the 
request for the expulsion of the Dutch traders lyeyasu pro- 
nounced " impossible." To the Dutch and the English, who 
fully respected the sovereign rights of Japan, who had not 
the slightest ambition to encroach upon her territory, and 
who confined themselves to commercial relations for mutual 
benefit, lyeyasu granted most liberal privileges. As noted 
in the Dutch and English letters-patent, all the ports of 
the empire were opened to them, and, besides being exempt 
from the local jurisdiction and from taxes, they enjoyed 
the privil^e of the coasting trade. 

Nor did lyeyasu omit to encourage natives to go abroad 
to trade. He had made a favorite of William Adams be- 
cause the latter was an able ship-builder. It is said that 
the Japanese in lyeyasu's time possessed ocean-going vessels 
" measuring as much as 120 feet by 54, fully rigged with 
three nwists." The Shogun also adopted the plan of giv- 
ing to merchant-ships a license called " Shuin" or a letter 
with a vermilion seal, which was originated by Hideyoshi, 
in order to distinguish them from piratical craft. Such 
licenses were granted to many Japanese vessels of Sakai, 
Uraga, Nagasaki and Yedo, and to foreign vessels as well. 
Under this protection, Japanese sailors freely navigated the 
coasts of South China, Java, Manila, Anam, Siam and 
Malacca, and as far as India. ^ While the maritime nations 
of Europe were struggling with each other for colonial and 
commercial advantages, lyeyasu not only opened his country 
to foreigners, without regard to nationality and race, but 
also encouraged his fellow-merchants to go abroad for 
" honest trade." 

^ See Satow, " Notes on the Intercourse between Japan aiid Siam in 
the Seventeenth Century," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 
vol. xiii, p. 133. 


But, while lyeyasu was liberal to western nations in mat- 
ters of commerce, he was not indulgent towards the re- 
ligious enterprises of the Catholic nations. He made as 
clear a distinction between commerce and religion as had 
Hideyoshi. He believed that " foreign trade " made 
the country prosperous, but that " the foreign religion " 
menaced its " tranquillity." As to the latter, he made up 
his mind to watch and restrict, and to banish, if necessary. 
While he was occupied with his campaign against the feudal 
barons and the ex-generals of Hideyoshi, who had refused 
to recc^fnize his supremacy, he forbore to act, but, as soon 
as he had suppressed this opposition, he gave a proof of his 
policy by issuing, in 1600, an edict for the expulsion of the 
missionaries. This measure, however, he was compelled 
to withdraw " in consequence of the threatening attitude 
adopted by certain Christian nobles." ^ Even Hideyoshi, 
the great hero, had been unable to enforce his edicts of ex- 
clusion effectively, since his general, Konishi Ukinaga, was a 
chief supporter of the Christians, and the provincial lords 
of Kiushu often threatened him with civil war. With the 
exception therefore of certain minor restrictions, lyeyasu 
left religious matters in statu quo till 1612 ; and the Catholic 
missionaries, taking advantage of the opportunity, flocked 
to Japan in greater numbers than ever before. It is said 
that out of sixty-four provinces, there were only eight " in 
which Christianity had no footing." * The Franciscans 
were in Yedo and Uraga, the Jesuits in the provinces of 
Kyoto, Shikdcu and Kiushu, and the Dominicans in Satsuma. 
But, from 1612 to 1614, several edicts were issued for the 
persecution and expulsion of the Franciscans and Jesuits 

* Gii>bins, " Review of the Introduction of Ghristianity into China," 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. xi, p. 17. 

* Ibid., p. ao. 


and the destruction of their churches, while native converts 
were called upon to renounce the foreign religion. The 
Jesuit accounts attribute these anti-Christian measures to the 
intrigues of the Dutch and the English/ Nevertheless, 
lyeyasu did not restrict commercial privileges on account of 
religious difficulties. 

The death of lyeyasu, however, opened the way to new 
measures. Hidetada, the second Shogun, continued the 
anti-Cathoiic policy, and even pushed it a step further when 
he restricted English traders to Hirato, because they were 
** Catholic." * It was of course impossible to enforce anti- 
Catholic measures in localities in which the provincial lord 
and Christian converts were predominant; but the policy, 
formulated by lyeyasu, of weakening the feudal princes so 
as to secure control over them, was steadily pursued. In 
1623 lyemitsu, a grandson of lyeyasu, and a man of ability 
and determination, became the third incumbent of the Sho- 
gunate. He reduced the powers and estates of the most 
powerful lord, called " Tozama Daitnio," to those of a 
second-rate baron, " Fedai Daimio'^ The Franciscans in 
Yedo, who were suspected of smuggling in missionaries, 
were banished from the town. This was followed by the 
edict of 1624 by which " all ports of Japan were closed to 
the foreigners, except Hirato and Nagasaki, of which 
Hirato remained open to the Dutch and English, Nagasaki 
to the Portuguese, and both to the Chinese." * A vigorous 
effort was made to hold in check the province of Kiushu, 
in which the foreign faith was still predominant; and 
Mizuno, lord of the province of Kawachi, was sent to 
Nagasaki to make a rigid search for Christian conspirators. 

* Charlevoix, Histoire du Japon, p. 214. ^ Supra, p. 94. 

* Hildret'h, Japan as it Was and Is, p. 186. See also Charlevoix, His- 
toire du Japan, p. 244. 


At the same time, Matsukura Shigemasa, a determined op- 
ponent of the Christians, was appointed lord of the province 
of Hizen, in which lay Amakusa, the strong-hold of the con- 
verts of the Jesuits. His tyrannical measures and the nu- 
merous anti-Christian edicts of the central government 
aroused hot indignation among the converts and produced, 
in 1637, a terrible insurrection, known as the " Shimabara 
rebellion " or the "Amakusa war." Of this revolt, the Por- 
tuguese, who were in 1636 removed from Nagasaki proper 
to the outer harbor, called Deshima, were regarded as the 
chief instigators, and for this reason they were by the 
famous edict of 1638 ordered to leave Japan forever. By 
the same edict, the Japanese were also prohibited from go- 
ing abroad. So great is the historical interest of this meas- 
ure that it should be quoted at length : 

No Japanese ship nor boat whatever, nor any native of Japan, 
shall presume to go out of the country : whoever acts contrary 
to this shall die, and the ship with the crew and goods aboard 
shall be sequestered until further orders. 

All persons who return from abroad shall be put to death. 
Whoever discovers a priest shall have a reward of 400 to 500 
shuets of silver, and for every Christian in proportion. 

AJl persons who propagate the doctrine of the Catholics, 
or bear this scandalous name, shall be imprisoned in the Omra, 
or common jail of the town. 

The whole race of the Portuguese, with their mothers, 
nurses, and whatever belongs to them, shall be banished to 

Whoever presiunes to bring a letter from abroad, or to re- 
turn after he hath been banished, sfhall die with all his family ; 
also whoever presumes to intercede for him shall be put to 
dearth. No nobleman nor any soldier shall be suffered to pur- 
chase anything of a foreigner.* 

^ Kampfer, The History of Japan, pp. 318-319. See also Woolsey, 


The Dutch traders, who thoroughly understood Japanese 
prejudices and the traditional policy of the Tokugawa gov- 
ernment, not only renounced the Christian faith, at least in 
appearance, but also furnished the Shogun much document- 
ary evidence of the recent conspiracy of the Portuguese. In 
consequence the Dutch alone were allowed to trade in Japan, 
and their commercial agent (Cape Merchant) was author- 
ized to furnish the government an annual report on foreign 
events.^ In 1641 the Dutch merchants were ordered to re- 
side only at Deshima, where they continued to enjoy a com- 
mercial monopoly until the reopening of Japan in 1858. 

From what has been related it is evident that the Japanese 
were not originally " anti-European " or " anti-Christian," 
nor governed by " race-prejudice " or " hermit " propen- 
sities. On the contrary, they welcomed foreigners without 
regard to nationality, race or religion, and treated them with 
the greatest liberality, granting them freedom of commerce 
and religion and in addition the privilege of extra-territori- 
ality. What their statesmen opposed was the religious ac- 
tivity of the Catholic nations, which endangered the exist- 
ence of the " Land of the Rising Sun^" It was for " the 
tranquillity of the country," that the " Christian nations " 
were forced to depart. That for which Japan contended 
was the development and preservation of the " national 
state," for which the Teutonic nations were also struggling 
at the same time in Europe. The idea of the national state, 
or nation, rising against emperor and Pope was the same in 
the Far East as in Europe. There is, however, a striking 
divergence between the paths by which in the Orient and 

" History of Nagasaki/' Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 
vol. 9, part ii, p. 125. The Japanese text is in Suganuma's Commercial 
History of Japan, p. 568. 
^ GaikO'Shiko, p. 802. 


in Europe the principle of national sovereignty was attained. 
In Europe, the Teutonic nations compelled the Catholic 
empires to recognize the Protestant states as sovereign 
equals, and laid the basis of the modem international so- 
ciety by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In the Orient, 
Japan instituted by positive law ten years before the Peace 
of Westphalia, an "inclusive and exclusive" policy, and 
preserved her sovereignty by remaining isolated from the 
society of the West. 


Reopening of the Sealed Japan, 1643-1868 

Attempts to Reopen the Empire by European Powers. — 
The policy of non-intercourse maintained by Japan would be 
justified from the national standpoint if it had been neces- 
sary to her existence; but, from the international point of 
view, the isolation of a nation from the rest of the world 
is opposed to the interests of mankind, and is considered 
inadmissible. European nations did not protest against 
Japan's edict of exclusion, nor did they attempt to reopen 
the country by force, for in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries they possessed no adequate means of communi- 
cation for such a purpose; but they neglected no opportun- 
ity to regain access to the hermit nation. 

In 1643, five years after the edict of exclusion, two Portu- 
guese men-of-war arrived at Iwo Island, in Satsuma Bay, 
and besought the Daimio Shimazu to restore the former 
intercourse, apologizing for the religious abuses of the 
past; but they were not listened to.* A like failure at- 
tended the visit of two Portuguese men-of-war to the har- 
bor of Nagasaki, in 1647.^ I" 1673, ^he English ship 
" Return " came to Nagasaki with a royal letter and de- 
manded the renewal of commerce on the basis of the old 
agreement; but the governor answered in the negative," 

1 GaikoShiko, p. 804- * ibid., p. 153. 

* Ibid., p. 806. See also Hildreth, Japan as it Was and Is, p. 205. 
104 [336 


pointing to the marriage of CJharles II to a daughter of the 
Catholic sovereign of Portugal, intercourse with whom was 
prohibited by the positive law of the empire. 

France and Russia, though they had previously had no 
intercourse with the Japanese, made attempts to open the 
empire. In the reign of Louis XIV, Colbert, who had un- 
dertaken to restore the financial administration of France, 
founded the French East India Company and projected the 
establishment of commercial intercourse with Japan. As 
his agent for this purpose he chose Francis Caron, who had 
once served in the Dutch factory in Japan. Colbert was 
especially solicitious to avoid the political and religious en- 
tanglements into which the Portuguese had fallen.* A let- 
ter * from Louis XIV to the emperor of Japan, and an in- 
struction to Caron, were prepared in 1666, but the project 
was not carried out. Russia was the first country to 
attempt to enter Japan from the North. Catherine II took 
advantage of the opportunity afforded by the sending home 
of a Japanese wreck by the governor of Siberia, Lieutenant 
Laxann. The governor arrived at Yezo in September, 
1792, and asked the feudal lord of Matsumaye to enter into 
diplomatic and commercial relations. The latter answered 
in the negative, but suggested that commercial intercourse 
might be opened at Nagasaki, the only port to which for- 
eigners were admitted.* Lieutenant Laxann did not, how- 
ever, proceed to Nagasaki. The Emperor Alexander re- 
newed the effort initiated by Catherine. ResanofF, a special 
" envoy of the czar, landed at Nagasaki in 1804, but after 
tedious conferences with the governor, was informed that 
" cet Empire entretenait des rapports avec beaucoup de na- 

* Fraissinet, Le Japon, vol. ii, p. 5. 

' The letter is found in HiWrcth, op. cit., p. 57 1- 

• Ihid.y p. 445. Also Gaiko-Shiko, p. 815. 


tions ; mais Texperience a fait adopter le principe oppose." * 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, especially 
after the opium war in China, numerous attempts to open 
Japan were made by naval officers of England, France, 
Russia and the United States; but Japan did not listen to 
their demands till Commodore Perry appeared in Yedo Bay. 
American Mission to Reopen Japan and Treaty Relations 
with Occidental States. — The United States had no inter- 
course with Japan in the eighteenth century, apart from the 
appearance of two ships in Japanese waters.* It seems at 
one time to have been in contemplation to send thither Com- 
modore Porter, who, in 181 5, addressed to Mr. Monroe, 
secretary of state, a letter concerning the country, but noth- 
ing was done.* Sul>sequently, John Quincy Adams declared 
it to be " the right and even the duty of Christian nations 
to open the ports of Japan, and the duty of Japan to assent, 
on the ground that no nation has the right," any more than 
has a man, to withdraw " its private contribution to the 
welfare of the whole." * The appointment of Edmund 
Roberts by President Jackson, in 1832, as a special agent to 
negotiate treaties with the Asiatic nations, was the first 
official step taken by the United States toward such open- 
ing." Roberts died, however, before reaching Japan; and 
in 1845 Commodore Biddle was instructed, after conveying 
to China the ratified treaty of commerce and amity, con- 

* Fraissinet, Le Japon, vol. ii, p. 24. 

2 The " Eliza " and " Franklin," though they were Dutch ships, came 
to Nagasaki in 1797 and 1799, respectively, under the American flagr 
and with American crews, in order to avoid captisre by English cruisers. 
Hildreth, Japan as it Was and Js, pp. 446-447. 

* Nitobe, The Intercourse between Japan and the United States, p. 34. 

* North American Review, vol. Ixxxiii, p. 258. 

B Senate Doc, ist session, 3ad Congress, vol. ix, p. 63. Instructions 
of the secretary of state to Edmund Roberts. 


eluded in 1844, to call and test the sentiments of the Japanese 
government. He was particularly csautioned not to " ex- 
cite a hostile feeling, or a distrust of the United States." 
When he at length arrived, in 1848, his advances were re- 
pulsed, and he withdrew. In the following year Commo- 
dore Glynn, who had been sent to Japan to look into the 
case of certain wrecked American whalers, submitted to 
President Fillmore a report in which he strongly urged the 
necessity of opening the coimtry.^ 

During Fillmore's administration, the subject of inter- 
course with Japan excited great interest. Of this interest, 
one of the main causes was the industrial and commercial 
growth of the Pacific coast.* The discovery of gold in 
California, the increasing trade with China after the estab- 
lishment of treaty relations, and the development of steam 
navigation, made the United States fed more and more 
the necessity of using Japanese harbors and obtaining 
Japanese coal. Hospitality and protection were also de- 
sired for shipwrecked whalers; and it was besides felt that 
to succeed in a task in which European powers had failed, 
would redound to the glory of the American republic 
Moved by these considerations, the government of the United 
States determined to adopt vigorous measures. Commo- 
dore Aulick was directed to proceed to Japan with a naval 
force. He was intrusted with a letter from President Fill- 
more to the Emperor of Japan, accrediting him as an envoy, 
and was furnished with instructions by Daniel Webster, 
who was then secretary of state. His credentials and in- 
structions bore date July 10, 1851." His sailing, however, 
was delayed, and he was eventually replaced by Commodore 

» Senate Doc, ibid., pp. 74-78. * Murray, Japan, p. 3"- 

« Senate Doc., ibid., pp. 80-82, for the text of the letter of the presi- 
dent to the Mikado and the instructions. 


Matthew C. Perry. Meanwhile, Mr. Webster had died, 
and had been succeeded as secretary of state by Edward 
Everett. The president's letter to the Emperor of Japan 
was modified and enlarged.* It contained the following 
declaration : " I have no other object in sending him [Com- 
modore Perry] to Japan, but to propose to your Imperial 
Majesty that the United States and Japan should live in 
friendship and commercial intercourse with each other." 
Perry was instructed to effect a permanent arrangement as 
to the treatment of shipwrecks; to obtain permission for 
American vessels to procure supplies and provisions ; and to 
secure if possible the establishment of a coal depot and the 
privilege of trading at one or more ports. ^ Commanding 
the steam frigate " Mississippi," and several other vessels, 
he sailed for Japan at the end of November, 1852, by way 
of the Cape of Good Hope. 

The Tokugawa government was more than thrice fore- 
warned by the Cape Merchant, the Dutch factory at 
Nagasaki, of the coming of the American expedition,* 
but it paid so little attention to the report that the 
appearance of the " black ships " at the entrance of Yedo 
Bay on July 8, 1853, caused intense surprise and em- 
barrassment among the Japanese, sleeping in the " tranquil 
epoch of the Tokugawa regime." Commodore Perry, when 
asked by the governor of Uraga for the reasons of his com- 
ing, replied that " he had been sent on a friendly mission to 
Japan, with a letter from the President of the United States 
for the Emperor," and that he desired a personal interview 

1 Senate Doc, 2d session, 33d Congress, no. 34, p. 9. 

* Ibid., p. 6. Letters from the department of state to that of the navy. 

• For documents of warning by the Cape Merchant, sec Kaikoku- 
Kigen (The Origin of the Opening of the Country) , compiled by the 
Departiment of the Imperial Household, vol. i, pp. 45-46, 55*58, and 


with an official of the highest rank, in order to arrange for 
the formal presentation of the letter.^ The governor de- 
clared that the law of the land forbade any communication 
with a foreign country to be held elsewhere than at Naga- 
saki, through Dutch or Chinese agents, and that the 
squadron should proceed thither. Perry, however, refused 
to go and firmly insisted that, unless he was allowed to de- 
liver the president's " friendly letter " either to " the Em- 
peror of Japan or to his Secretary of Foreign Affairs " in 
person, he should " consider his country insulted." * The 
Yedo government, embarrassed by his determination and 
his " formidable black ships," appointed Toda, lord of Idzu, 
as a commissioner to receive the letter; and on July 14, 
credentials having been exchanged on the preceding day,' 
the Japanese commissioner reluctantly received the presi- 
dent's letter at Kurihama, two miles from the town of 
Uraga, where a building was specially erected for the re- 
ception of the American envoy. The preliminaries were 
thus happily closed without a conflict ; but an apprehension 
was felt by the Japanese that, if the country should be 
opened, a " war-like nation " might again appear as in the 

I time of the Mongol invasion. Perry went away, announc- 

ing that he would return in the ensuing spring to Yedo Bay 

! for an answer,* and intending to augment his squadron with 

ships which were then employed in protecting American in- 

I terests in China. 

After Perry's departure, the Shogun government sent out 
a circular, accompanied with a translation" of the president's 

* Senate Doc, 2d session, 33d Congress, no. 34, p. 46. 
2 Ibid., p. 49. 

' Ibid., p. 50. Text of credentials of the Japanese commissioner. 
I * Ibid., p. 54. For the Japanese account, see Kaikoku-Kigen, vol. i, 

I P- 96. 

B Ibid., pp. 85-89. 


letter for the consideration of the feudal lords, in order to 
ascertain their preference as to the maintenance or aban- 
donment of the exclusion law, the prosecution of war or the 
maintenance of peace. The daimios almost unanimously 
advised a policy of seclusion; the celebrated memorial of 
Prince Mito especially manifesting " the spirit of the 
times." ^ While the whole nation was in confusion, Com- 
modore Perry reappeared in the bay of Yedo on February 
13, 1854, with a formidable squadron of eight ships. 
Whatever the " fundamental law of the country ** or public 
opinion might be, the statesmen actually attending to public 
affairs better understood what would be the result of their 
refusal to enter into the negotiation demanded by the United 
States, when Perry returned with the additional force. 
Lord Abe Masahira and the other chief officials of the 
Shognn government were keen enough to see that such a 
" traditional " policy could not be successfully maintained. 
They therefore decided to listen to Perry's demands. After 
repeated conferences and discussions, proposals and amend- 
ments, banquets and exchange of presents, a treaty contain- 
ing twelve articles was finally signed and exchanged on the 
last day of March, 1854. This was the first formal treaty 
ever concluded by Japan with an occidental state; but other 
nations hastened to obtain similar treaties. Rear Admiral 
Sir James Stirling, cruising in Pacific waters during the 
Crimean war, came to Nagasaki and demanded the conclu- 
sion of a convention for opening Japanese ports to English 
ships; it was signed on October 15, 1854. Admiral Pontia- 
tine negotiated a treaty for the settlement of boundaries and 
the opening of Japanese ports to Russian ships, which was 
concluded at Shimoda, February, 1855. The Netherlands, 

* Translated into English by Nitobc, Th€ Intercourse between the 
United States and Japan, pp. 49-50. 


though they had enjoyed a monopoly of trade at Nagasaki, 
concluded their first formal treaty in January, 1855.* These 
treaties, however, were merely in the nature of preliminary 
arrangements for the opening of the country. They stipu- 
lated for access to the ports of Shimoda, Nagasaki and 
Hokodate, for the purpose of obtaining necessary provi- 
sions ; for hospitality in case of shipwreck, and for shelter in 
case of distress. None of them was in the usual sense a 
treaty of amity and commerce. No provision was made 
for general trade and its r^^lation, nor for diplomatic re- 
lations, though the western powers were eventually to be 
allowed to be represented by a consul or commercial agent. 
Indeed, the Perry treaty was somewhat of a disappointment 
to the United States ; * but, as it served as a preliminary to 
the opening of a country which had been tightly closed for 
more than two centuries, it should be regarded as a remark- 
able achievement. 

The United States lost no time in completing what Perry 
had left unfinished. In August, 1856, Townsend Harris 
was sent out as consul-general "to reside at Shimoda;" but, 
though officially only a consular officer, he was " clothed by 
his government with diplomatic powers." * He took with 
him as interpreter Hency C. J. Heusken, a native of Hol- 
land.^ Harris was a man of g^eat tact and patience, and so 
thoroughly versed in oriental affairs that he knew how to 
gain the confidence of eastern princes. When he reached 

^ The text of all these preliminary treaties is found in British and 
Foreign State Papers, and also in Treaties and Conventions between 
Japan and other Powers, compiled by the foreign office of Japan, 1884. 

' Nitabe, The Intercourse between the United States and Japan, p. 61. 

• Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 174. 

^Harris took a Dutch gentleman for the reason that the Japanese 
officials who had to do with foreign intercourse understood that lan- 


Japan, anti-foreign feding was raging among individuals 
and officials, and a permanent residence at Simoda was at 
first denied him. For ten months he wrestled with the 
question of an audience with the Shogun, at Yedo, where he 
insisted ondelivering the president's letter in person.^ Hewas 
repeatedly informed that the law of the land forbade the 
entry of any foreigner into that city, and that negotiations 
with foreign states should be conducted at Shimoda through 
the governor; but he quietly persisted and patiently urged 
his suit till at length, on September 25, 1857, he was per- 
mitted to proceed to Yedo. Escorted on his joumey by 
a " train nimibering some three hundred and fifty persons," 
the "American ambassador " ' was received on December 
7, with elaborate ceremony, in the first audience granted 
to a foreign mission at the Shogun's court since the ex- 
clusion edict of 1638. Harris presented a letter from the 
president, to the Shogun lyesada, and, while assuring tJie 
latter of the president's good wishes, expressed appreciation 
of the honor bestowed on himself by the royal reception. 
The Shogun briefly responded : " Pleased with the letter 
sent with the ambassador from a far distant country, and 
likewise pleased with his discourse. Intercourse shall be 
continued forever."* This rupture of the traditional usage 
of the Tokugawa government, which denied audience to a 
foreign embassy, was a great diplomatic victory for Harris. 
After his reception, Harris concentrated his efforts upon 
the n^otiation of a commercial treaty. In a conference 

1 Griffis, Townsend Harris (Diary of Mr. Harris), pp. 161-162. 

' In those <lays the Japanese did not distinguish between a diplo- 
matic officer and a consul. Whoever came to Japan with a letter from 
a foreign ruler was called an " ambassador." 

* The " letter from the president " was the letter of credence ; a 
Japanese translation is given in Kaikoku-Kigen, vol. i, p. 442. 

* Griffis, ibid.f p. 229. 


on December 12/ at the residence of Hotta, lord of Bitchu, 
who was minister of foreign affairs, Harris explained the 
impossibility of an exclusive policy in the days of steam 
and commerce, and made known "the true and frank 
wishes " of the president of the United States for the es- 
tablishment, by peaceful negotiation, of commercial inter- 
course not only between Japan and the United States, but 
also between Japan and all other countries, as well as for 
the establishment of diplomatic relations through a min- 
ister residing at the capital. He adverted to the example of 
China, and the forcible measures directed against her by 
England, France and Russia, with resulting or concomitant 
territorial encroachments and other complications, and inti- 
mated that, if those powers should open Japan by force, the 
results would be the same as in China. He further declared 
that the United States was different from Europe; that it 
did not aim at religious propagandism, as did the Spanish 
and Portuguese in Japan, nor participate in the territorial 
and commercial abuses which the European powers had per- 
petrated in China. He remarked, in conclusion, that " if 
Japan makes a treaty with the United States, all other for- 
eign countries will make the same kind of a treaty, and 
Japan will be safe thereafter." Harris also explained to 
the minister how to raise state revenue by customs, and 
spoke of the willingness of the president to act as " media- 
tor" and use his good offices "in case Japan may have 

1 An interesting account of the conversations between Harris and 
Hotta upon the preliminary arrangements for the treaty negotiation is 
Sfiven in Foreign Relations of the United States^ 1879, part i, pp. 624- 
626. The Japanese version was obtained by the American legation at 
Tokyo from the successor of Prince Hotta, was translated by Mr. 
Thompson, and was reported by Mr. D. W. Stevens. The Japanese 
te3ct is given in KaikokuhKigin, voL ai, pp. 445-4^* See also GriB^ 
op, cit., pp. 237-240. 


difficulty with other powers." On December 21, in an in- 
terview * at Harris's hotel, the commissioners of foreign 
affairs inquired concerning the ceremonials and needs of a 
resident minister, his rights, duties and rank, and in what 
respect he differed from a consul. When Harris replied 
that all these things were regulated by " the law of nations," 
the commissioners curiously asked, " What is the law of 
nations?" Numerous questions were also put as to the 
opium trade in China, and as to foreign trade, the principles 
and practice of tariff and customs administration, and the 
procedure of treaty negotiations. The commissioners con- 
fessed that they were in the dark and as " children " in re- 
gard to these points, which he explained to "their full 
satisfaction." * It has been remarked that Harris acted as 
" professor " to the Japanese commissioners on the ele- 
ments of international law, diplomacy and political economy. 
By kind advice and tender treatment, seasoned with polite 
menaces, he gained more and more the confidence of the 
Shogun government and finally induced it to enter into treaty 
negotiations on January 18, 1858, in spite of the opposition 
of the imperial court at Kyoto and the daimios. Confer- 
ence after conference was held, the negotiations proceeding 
smoothly; and on the basis of the draft drawn by Harris, 
with slight modifications, a treaty of amity and commerce 
was concluded on February 9, 1858.* 

With regard to the ratification of the treaty, the Japanese 
requested a certain delay for " consultation with the daimios 
and for the Imperial sanction." Hitherto, the Bakufu, the 
Shogun government, had assumed the exclusive conduct of 
foreign affairs. The Bakufu had closed Japan at its own 

^ An account of the second interview is given in Kaikoku-Kigen, vol. 
i» pp. 465-483- Also Griffis, op. cit,, pp. 243-244. 
s Ibid^ p. 244. ' Ibid,, p. 28s 


pleasure, and would at its own pleasure re-open it. The 
preliminary treaties were concluded by the Bakufu govern- 
ment, in the name of Taicoon,* without reference to the 
Mikado and the daimios. Historically, the treaty-making 
power (diplomatic power) was vested in the Shogun alone.* 
Anti-foreign feeling and zxiti-Bakufu movements were now 
prevalent throughout the country, however, and public opin- 
ion censured the Bakufu policy. The Yedo government 
was no longer able to control the feudal lords, and it was 
decided to obtain the imperial sanction of the new treaty and 
also the daimios' consent, in order to share with them the 
responsibility. The majority of the daimios, of course, 
declined to give their approval. The imperial throne was 
then occupied by the Emperor Komei, father of the present 
Mikado. His court was opposed to opening the country, 
and he withheld his sanction, in spite of the fact that the 
Bakufu often despatched missions to Kioto to obtain it.* 
On the other hand, Harris pressed for action, and declared 
that, unless the matter was disposed of, he " would proceed 
forthwith to Kyoto and arrange it himself." But a further 
complication presented itself. The Shogun lyesada, whose 
health was precarious, had no son ; and friction arose among 
the feudal lords of the Tdcugawa families in r^^ard to the 
selection of his heir. These difficulties, combined with the 
anti-foreign and anti-Shogun movements, produced a crisis 
in the affairs of the Shogunate. Amid the confusion, 

^History of the Empire of Japan, p. 304. "In those days of the 
Ashikaga fasrily it had been customary for the Shogun to assume the 
title of King of Japan in his communication with other sovereigns. 
The Tokugawa discontinued this, on the ground that it was an infrac- 
tion of the imperial dignity, and adopted instead the title Taicoon, or 
Great Prince." 

*Ariga, Kokuko-Gaku, vol. i, p. 131. 

* Kaikoku-Kigen, vol. iii, pp. 2279 et seq. 


lyesada appointed li, lord of Hikone, a statesman of deter- 
mination, as Kampaku (regent of the Shogun) and Tairo 
(prime minister), and invested him with the highest au- 
thority, in order to enable him to solve the critical ques- 
tions at issue.* Meanwhile, American and Russian men-of- 
war came to Yedo Bay, and reported that the British and 
French squadrons, which had been engaged in hostilities with 
China, were sailing for Japan. Greatly worried over the 
delay attending the ratification of the treaty, Harris took 
advantage of this information to press the Shogunate to 
affix its signature; * and li-Kamon, considering that further 
delay would bring upon Japan misfortunes similar to those 
of China, decided to assume the entire responsibility, and 
on July 29, 1858, signed the treaty without the im- 
perial sanction.* When the British, French, Russian and 
Dutch envoys sailed into Yedo Bay, escorted by formid- 
able fleets, they found that the most laborious part of their 
task had already been accomplished. Treaties, like that 
with the United States, were soon concluded by England, 
France, the Netherlands and Russia. Harris gave his as- 
sistance and the services of his interpreter, Mr. Heusken, to 
Lord Elgin, viceroy of India, in the n^otiation of the 
British treaty.* The new agreements were called by the Japa- 
nese "the Ansei treaties," because they were negotiated in the 
Ansei era. The Ansei treaties made provision for dipIcHnatic 
agents at the capital, and for consuls at all the open ports. 
The ports of Shimoda,Hokodate, Nagasaki, Kanagawa, Nei- 

^Shiniada» Kaikoku-Shimatsu, p. 152. 

*Grifiis, op. ciL, p. 319. In a letter to Prince Hotta, minister of 
foreign affairs, July 24, " Mr. Harris, after epitomizing the news, urged 
the very great importance of having the treaty signed without the loss 
of a single day." 

* Kaikoku-ShimatsUt p. 147. 

* Grifiis, op. cit, p, 322. 


gata and Hiogo were to be open for foreign trade and re- 
sidence; Tokyo for foreign residence only, and Osaka for 
trade only. By these treaties the powers obtained the right 
to use their own coin in Japan and to exercise consular juris- 
diction over their citizens. They also secured freedom of 
worship. The treaties imposed restrictions upon foreign- 
ers (except the diplomatic agents), so that they could 
neither travel into the interior of the empire without pass- 
ports nor reside outside the foreign settlements. For pur- 
poses of trade, any article except opium was admitted ac- 
cording to the tariff regulations. The most-favored-nation 
provision was applied not only to commercial privileges but 
also to judicial concessions. The provisions above men- 
tioned are common to the Ansei treaties with the five 
powers. The treaty with the United States contained the 
further stipulation that the president would act as "a 
friendly mediator," in case of a difference between Japan 
and " any European power." Later on, the Shogun gov- 
ernment concluded treaties of amity and commerce with 
Prussia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Belgium, Swit- 
zerland, and Sweden and Norway. Treaties with Austria- 
Hungary and Hawaii in 1871, and with Peru in 1873, were 
concluded by the imperial government ; but their provisions 
were substantially based upon the Ansei treaties.^ 

The bringing of Japan into relations with the outer world 
must to a great extent be ascribed to the patient and sin- 
cere toil of the American envoy, Townsend Harris, and to 
the self-reliant determination of li-Kamon. The western 
nations were satisfied, and Japan was rescued from a grave 
national crisis. 

1 The text of ill these treaties may be found in the British and Por- 
eign State Papers, and in the Treaties and Conventions between Japan 
and Other Powers, edition of 1884. 


Restoration of the Imperial Sovereignty. — The course of 
Lord li-Kamon aroused the indignation of the imperial 
court and the loyal party, and excited the anti-foreign party. 
It was one of the proximate causes of the downfall of the 
Shogunate and of the ascendency of the imperial power. 
In reality it was the forerunner of the revolution of 1868. 
But the ultimate cause of the imperial restoration had, for 
more than two centuries, been operating upon the Japanese 
mind. As has been shown, the Mikado was originally the 
supreme authority, the fundamental source of all the ruling 
powers. The imperial power was, in course of time, ab- 
sorbed by the Soga family, and then restored by the Taika 
reformation. It was again usurped by the Fujiwara and 
Taira families, and was eventually overshadowed by the 
Shogun Yoritomo of the Minamoto family, leaving to the 
imperial court at Kyoto only religious and ceremonial af- 
fairs. The Minamoto, Hojo, Ashikago, Oda (Nobunaga), 
and Toyotomi (Hideyoshi) families successively occupied the 
Shogunate for centuries, and, after lyeyasu Tokugawa be- 
came Shogun in 1603, he and his descendants ruled all Japan 
until the imperial restoration of 1868. Under the Toku- 
gawa regime, as the result of excluding foreigfners and 
checking the powers of the provincial daimios, the country 
for many generations enjoyed " absolute tranquillity," 
with no civil war and no foreign complications. The study 
of literature grew apace in the eighteenth century, and it was 
mainly this study that led to the destruction of the Shogun- 
ate and of the feudal system.^ Chinese literature, whidi 
was largely read, fully explains the doctrine of " imperial 
sovereignty " and of " centralization of administration " 
and makes clear the distinction between "emperor" and 
" vassal." With the abrogation of the law prohibiting the 

^ Fukuchi, Bakufu-Subo^on (Essay on the Ruin of the Bakufu), p. & 


importation of foreign books, Dutch works also found their 
way into Japan and infused the European theory of mon- 
archy and its centralization into the native mind/ Japanese 
ethics, philosophy, history and poetry, naturally lamenting 
the decline of the imperial power, reiterated the doctrine of 
Shintoism and emphasized the spirit of reverence for the 
Mikado. The verses of'Moto-ori, Kamq, and Nida in- 
spired nothing but loyalty tp the " divine personage." Al- 
though Komon, lord of Mi to, and Rai Sanyo * were not so 
radical as Montesquieu and Rousseau, the influence of 
Dai-Nihon-Shi and Nthon-Gaishi upon the imperial restora- 
tion is comparable to the influence of Esprit des Lois and 
Du Contrat social upon the French Revolution. The re- 
naissance of royalism was sooner or later to be transformed 
into a reformation. "Anti-Shogunism," however, did not 
openly burst forth until the Shogun government concluded 
the treaty with Commodore Perry. When Perry came to 
Japan, the anti-foreign feeling which had been excited by 
Japanese historians against the Spanish and Portuguese, 
was revived. The exclusion party, though some of them 
were friends of the Shogunate, began to attack its foreign 
policy. On the other hand, the loyal party, though not 
wholly anti-foreign, attacked the treaty in order to embar- 
rass the Shogunate. And when, later, Tairo li signed the 
Ansei treaties without the imperial sanction, the loyal party 
and the exclusionists combined and openly directed their 
attacks against the Shogun's government. 

In vain Tairo li sought to explain to the imperial court 

^Ibid,, p. 14. The eighth Shogun, Yoshimune (1716-1745), abro- 
gated the law prohibiting the importation of western books. 

* Prince Komon's work, Dai-Nihon-Shi (The History of Great Japan), 
was published in 1715, and Rai Sanyo's work, Nihon-Gaishi (History 
of Japan), in 1737. 


and the daimios the emergency in which he had acted.* He 
was not listened to. On the contrary, a secret imperial 
rescript was issued to Lord Mito, who, though he belonged 
to the Tokugawa clan, was yet the champion of the exclus- 
ionists at Yedo, to advise the Shogun government to ex- 
pel foreigners from the country.* Convinced that this ad- 
vice could not be followed without a dangerous collision 
with the treaty powers, Tairo li adopted a decisive meas- 
ure. Lord Mito was not only compelled to leave Yedo, 
but was also confined to his private palace in his own pro- 
vince. Many other daimios and officials who had advised 
Tairo to adopt anti-foreign measures, were deposed from 
their offices ; and there followed the wholesale imprisonment 
of the " Samurai," who were suspected of inciting the anti- 
foreign agitation. This arbitrary proceeding, known as the 
"Ansei Imprisonment," excited the anti-foreign party and 
the loyalists as well, and the members of the Mito clan were 
especially indignant. Tairo li-Kamon was, on Mardi 23, 
i860, assassinated by one of the Mito Samurai while en 
route to the palace of the Shogun government. But the 
killing of Tairo did not end the anti-Shogun agitation, nor 
did the proposed marriage of the new Shogun, lyemochi, 
to the sister of the emperor, restore harmony between the 
courts of Yedo and Kyoto. 

On the contrary, the Ronin (agitators) of the anti- 
Shogun clans, partly to further the exclusion policy, but 
chiefly to increase the embarrassment of the Yedo govern- 
ment, b^^an to attack the foreigners as soon as the diplo- 
matic agents and merchants of the treaty powers appeared 
at the capital and at the treaty ports. On January 14, 1861, 

^ Shimada, Kaikoku-Shimatsu^ pp. 154 ^f seq.^ for the text of the ex- 
planations given to the imperial court an<l the daimios. 

* Satorw, Translation of the Kinsei Shiriaku, p. 11, for the text of 
the English translation of the imperial rescript. 


Mr. Heusken, the secretary and interpreter of the American 
legation, was, while on his way home from the Prussian 
legation, assassinated, because he was regarded as one of 
the conspicuous promoters of foreign intercourse. Through 
Harris's efforts, an indemnity of $10,000 was paid to his 
mother, who was then living at Amsterdam, in Holland.* 
Six months later, the British legation was attacked at night 
and several guards were mortally wounded; a second at- 
tack was made on Jime 26, 1862. Subsequently, the sum 
of £10,000 was paid to the families of the murdered guards.* 
Three months later there occurred one of the celebrated 
cases of assaults upon foreigners, popularly known as the 
" Tokaido case." An English merchant, named Richard- 
son, who, while riding on the Tokaido highway, crossed the 
train of Lord Shimazu, of Satsuma, who was on his way 
from Yedo to Kyoto, was attacked and slain by his lord- 
ship's retainers." Though the case was not so significant as 
the attempt upon the diplomatic agents, the British minister 
demanded the large indemnity of $500,000 from the Shogun 
government, and $125,000 from the daimio.* The Yedo 
government soon paid the sum demanded of it, but the lord 
of Satsuma did not yield until his capital, Kagoshima, was 
bombarded by a British squadron, in August, 1863. On 
the night of May 24, 1863, the American legation was mys- 
teriously burned. The cause of the fire was long unknown, 
but the case was finally settled by the payment of $10,000.* 
Assault by Renin on foreign legations and individuals be- 
came so prevalent in Yedo that all the legations of the 

* U. S. Dip. Cor. (1862), i«rt ii, p. 806. 

* Adams, History of Japan, vol. i, pp. 168 et seq. 

* Under the feudal regime it was lawful to punish one wfio crossed 
the train of a daimio. 

* U. S. Dip. Cor. (1863), part ii, p. 1071. 
» Ibid., p. 1097- 


treaty powers finally removed to Yokohama, where their 
naval forces were stationed. 

Meanwhile, the Samurai, Ronin, and students of the 
loyalist clans, came secretly to Kyoto and submitted a pro- 
ject for the overthrow of the Shogunate. The daimios 
Mori, of Choshu, and Shimazu, of Satsuma, were r^^rded 
as the most enthusiastic of the loyalists. It is said that 
secret commissions from the emperor were given to them.* 
The imperial court, backed now by the consuls of these 
strong daimios, in July, 1862 despatched an envoy, Ohara, 
to the Shogun, demanding his presence at Kyoto to give in- 
formation concerning the question of foreign exclusion.* 
After much hesitation, the Shogun, lyemochi, on June 15, 
1863, repaired to Kyoto. This was the first instance of the 
Shogun being summoned to the imperial court in order to 
confer upon the affairs of the country. A conference was 
held between the daimios and the court nobles ; and an im- 
perial exclusion edict was issued and entrusted to the Sho- 
gun for execution. On June 24, 1863, the foreign repre- 
sentatives were informed by Prince Ogasawara, minister of 
foreign affairs of the Shogunate, that he had been directed 
by the Shogun, following imperial orders, to close all ports 
and to remove foreigners on the ground that the people of 
the country did not desire intercourse with foreign countries. • 
This intimation all the diplomatic representatives promptly 
repelled. The American minister, Mr. Pruyn, replied in 
strong terms that, if such a measure were determined upon 
and carried into effect by the Mikado and Taicoon, it "must 

1 History of the Empire of Japan^ p. 356. 

' For the full text of the imperial message to the Shogun, see Kai- 
koku-Kigen, vol. iii, p. 2416. 

* Dip, Cor, (1863), part ii» p. 11 20, note to the American minister. 
A simfllar note to the English minister, in the Japanese text, is given in 
Kaikoku-Kigen, vol. iii, p. 2505. 


involve Japan in a war with all the treaty powers ;" and a 
similar protest was made by the French and English min- 
isters.^ While the Shogun's government was thus caught 
between the pressure of the imperial court and the protests 
of the foreign representatives. Prince Mori, the daimio of 
Choshu, took steps to execute the exclusion edict by closing 
the strait of Shimonoseki; and in June and July, 1863 the 
" Pembroke," an American merchant steamer, the French 
Gunboat " Kienchang," and the Dutch warship " Medusa," 
were fired upon from the adjacent batteries. These attacks 
were answered in September, 1864, by the bombardment 
of Shimonoseki by the allied forces of Great Britain, France, 
Holland and the United States. The daimio of Choshu 
yielded and pledged himself to grant free passage to for- 
eign ships, and to make indemnity to the amount of $3,000,- 
000, which the Shogun's government subsequently agreed 
to pay.* Notwithstanding these attacks upon foreigners, the 
policy of the United States toward Japan was so generously 
and so wisely conducted by Secretary Seward, on the basis 
of accepting " no exclusive advantage," but of acting in co- 
operation with the other treaty powers, that Japan was led 
to look with favor upon the western civilization.* 

The representatives of the treaty powers gradually be- 
came conscious that the treaties negotiated with the Sho- 
gun's government would not be respected by the Japanese, 
unless they were sanctioned by the imperial sovereign.* 

^Dip. Cor, (1863), pp. 1121-24. 

« See the convention for the payment of the Shimonoseki indemnities, 
4:onclu<ied on Oct. 22, 1864. The United States, however, refunded a 
part of its share to Japan, by the act of Feb. 22, 1883. For deUils of 
the Shimonoseki affair, see Nitobe's The Intercourse between the United 
States and Japan, pp. 86-88. 

•Dip. Cor. (1862), part ii, p. 8x8; ibid. (1863), part ii, pp. 1037-39; 
and ibid. (1864), part ii, p. 594. 

^Ibid. (1863), p. 1125. 


When therefore the Shogun was again summoned to Kyoto 
to confer with the Mikado upon public concerns, and for 
that purpose was occupying- Osaka castle, the foreign repre- 
sentatives caused their naval forces to be mobilized nearby, 
at Hyogo, in order to induce him to obtain imperial ap- 
proval. Thus menaced, he humbly sued for the imperial 
sanction and at the same time tendered to the emperor his 
resignation from office, thus assuming personal responsi- 
bility for his mal-administration. The foreign policy of the 
imperial court, however, had already been greatly modified, 
owing to the fact that its counselors, the lords of Satsuma 
and Choshu, had, by the forcible exaction from them of 
the recent indemnities, been made to feel the superior energy 
of the western civilization. The Mikado did not accept the 
Shogun's resignation, but gave his sanction to the treaties 
on October 23, 1865.^ 

Anti-foreign agitation ceased with the imperial approval 
of the Ansei treaties, but the anti-Shogun movement still 
continued. The Choshu clan was openly hostile to the Yedo 
government, while the Satsuma clan sought to reconcile the 
courts of Kyoto and Yedo. In reality, these two clans 
were competitors for supremacy at Kyoto ; but many men of 
both perceived that in the co-operation of the two great 
clans lay the only hope of unifying and consolidating tiic 
empire. Foremost among these far-seeing statesmen were 
Saigo Takamori, of Satsuma, and Kito Koin, of Choshu, 
who were strongly convinced that dual government had 
become impossible and that the only solution of existing 
difficulties lay in the overthrow of the Shogunate. After 
frequent interviews, they finally drew up the " alliance " of 
the two powerful clans. Meanwhile, the Shogun lyemochi 
died in September, 1866, and was succeeded by his regent, 

iDf>. Cor. (1866), p. 194. 


Hitotaubashi Keiki. A few months later, on Febru- 
ary 3, 1867, the Emperor Komei also died of smallpox. 
The Crown Prince Mutsuhito, then in his fifteenth year, as- 
cended the throne, and is now the reigning- emperor, the 
one hundred and twenty-first of the imperial line. When 
the new Shogun assumed office, he found that his govern- 
ment was powerless. It possessed no control over the pro- 
vincial daimios ; its officials were no longer able to manage 
the complex domestic and foreign relations; and even the 
Shogun's further tenure of his own office had become doubt- 
ful. Lord Yamanouchi, the daimio of Tosa, one of the 
loyal party, frankly advised the Shogun to " restore the 
governing power into the hands of the sovereign and so lay 
a foundation upon which Japan may take its stand as the 
equal of other countries." ^ Deeply impressed with this 
timely advice, the Shogun drew up a document addressed 
to his vassals, asking their opinion of the advisability of his 
resignation. He declared: 

It appears to me that the laws cannot be maintained in face of 
the daily extension of our foreign relations, unless the govern- 
ment be conducted by one head, and I propose, therefore, to 
surrender the whole governing power into the hands of the 
imperial court. This is the best I can do for the interests of 
the Empire.* 

As there was no open opposition on the part of his vassals, 
the Shogun, on November 19, 1867, offered to restore his 
power to the Mikado. This surrender was graciously ac- 
cepted by the emperor, and the imperial guards, composed 

^ Kaikoku-Kigetif vol. iii, p. 2925, contains the Japanese text The 
English translation is in Satow's Kensei-Shiriaku, p. 79. 

* The text of this document may be found in Horei-Zensho (annual 
series of laws and ordinances of the imperial government), vol. of 1868. 
For the English translation* see KenseiShiriaku, p. 80. 


of trcx)ps of the Aizu clan, under the direction of the Sho- 
gun, were replaced by those of Satsuma, Tosa, Choshu, etc. 
The imperial government was organized by the Kuke princes 
(imperial princes), under the presidency of Prince Arisu- 
gawa. Prince Higashi Kuze was despatched to Yedo, and 
on February 8, 1868, he formally notified the foreign rep- 
resentatives that the supreme power had been restored to 
the Mikado and that the " title of Emperor should be sub- 
stituted for that of Tycoon, which has been hitherto em- 
ployed in the treaties." * This radical transformation was 
effected without a struggle with the pro-Shogunate daimios. 
The Shogun, however, desired to retain the post of " Lord 
Keeper of the Privy Seal" (Nai-dai-jin), but he was pri- 
vately instructed to resign the office and to surrender the 
greater part of " the provinces hitherto forming his 
fief." * Moreover, the forcible procedures of the Sat- 
suma and Choshu clans aroused the indignation of the 
lords of Aizu and Kuwana, the family daimios of the 
Shogun, which finally resulted in the battles of Fushimi 
and Toba. The Shogun, who was then in Osaka, 
retired to Yedo by sea, accompanied by the forces of Aizu 
and Kuwana. The foreign representatives were informed 
on February 14, 1868, by the imperial government, that 
Keiki, ex-Shogun, and the lords of Kuwana and Aizu were 
in revolt, and were requested to maintain strict neutrality.* 
The representatives duly recognized the existence of 
hostility and maintained neutrality.* The ex-Shogun's 
party, in May, 1868, surrendered to the imperial forces 
at the battle of Yedo, and all the governing powers 
whic^ had been usurped by the Shogun since the day of 

» Dip, Cor. (1868), part i, p. 659. 

* Fukuchi, BakufU'Subo-ron, p. 323. 

•Dip. Cor. (1868), no. ijB, p. 672. *Ibid„ vol. i, pp. 673-675. 


Yoritomo (1186) were completely restored to the em- 
peror, while the seat of the imperial court was removed to 
Yedo, the name of which was changed to Tokyo (the east- 
em capital). The reorganization and reformation of the 
administration and of the army and navy, were continued. 
These revolutionary events, dating from the conclusion of 
the Harris treaty in 1858, have been termed OseirFukko, 
or the imperial restoration. 

The new imperial regime was by no means the "Asiatic 
paganism " prevalent during the old Shogun regime. The 
new government was not absolute and exclusive, as was the 
old military and feudal system. On April 6, 1868, when 
the emperor was still in Kyoto, he took a solemn oath of 
five items,^ in the presence of the imperial princes and 
daimios, which is regarded as one of the germs of the 
modem constitutional law of Japan. In this charter oath 
he manifested his eagerness to adopt western civilization. 
It declared that a deliberative assembly should be estab- 
lished, that all state affairs should be decided by public opin- 
ion, and that justice and impartiality should be the basis of 
the laws, without prejudice to ancient customs. As the first 
step under the charter oath, the Kogisho (public assembly) 
was established in December,^ the members being represen- 
tatives of the clans, appointed by the daimios. Its .chief 
function was to give advice to the iniperial government. In 
1871 the clanship system of the daimios was abolished, and 
the system of prefectures, with governors, established in 
its place.' The Genroin* (senate of elders) was estab- 
lished in 1875, ^ ^^ advisory and l^islative body. Its 
members were appointed by the emperor. By the suc- 
ceeding laws and ordinances, " feudal prerogatives," family 

^ Horei'Zensho (1868), p. 64. * /Wrf. 

•/Wi. (1871), p. 284. *Ihid, (1875), p. 18. 


privileges, estates and serfdom were all abolished. Every 
individual came to participate in the public service according 
to qualifications prescribed by law. Numerous statutes se- 
cured the rights of the individual, so far as his person and 
property were concerned. In short, all Japanese are equal 
before the law, and every Japanese subject, official or in- 
dividual, owes direct allegiance to the emperor. 

The modem constitution of Japan, which was promul- 
gated twenty-one years after the restoration, in 1889, ^^ 
nothing more than " a subtle organism," the outgrowth of 
the political history of Japan.* It was, however, framed in 
the legal forms of western jurisprudence, the constitutions 
of the German states (not the constitution of the German 
Empire) having been especially followed. According to 
the Japanese constitution, the rights of sovereignty belong 
exclusively to the emperor, who inherited them from his 
" Imperial Ancestor;" he himself is the constitution 
maker." It is said that " the amending clause " in " a com- 
plete constitution " is a test of the sovereignty or organ- 
ization of the state.* In amending the Japanese consti- 
tution, the emperor alone has the initiatory power, but he 
must obtain the consent of two-thirds of the legislative 
body, which, however, cannot modify his original draft. 
So far as the amending clause is concerned, the sovereign 
power is limited. It seems that the Japanese constitution 
has, as to the sovereignty, adopted a confused theory of cer- 
tain German publicists, who " see danger to individual lib- 
erty in recognizing an unlimited power in the government; 
and" who "immediately conclude that the same danger exists 

^ Ariga, Kokuho-gaku, vol. i, pp. 140-161. This author's 'historical 
account of the Japanese constitution is most comprehensive. 

' See imperial speech on the promulgation of the constitution, and 
arts. I and 4. See also S. Hozumi, op. cit, pp. 36-39. 

■ Burgess, op, cit, vol. i, p. 137. 


if the sovereignty of the state be recognized." ^ But sover- 
eignty in the constitution, instead of antagonizing, protects 
individual liberty. The power of sovereignty, in making or 
amending a constitution, should be absolute and unlimited, 
since it operates not only as an initiative and preventive, 
but creates positively whatever it wishes. The theory of 
unlinrited sovereignty has been maintained by progressive 
publicists, like Professors Burgess, Laband, Goodnow, and 
Hozumi.* Whatever the theory of sovereignty may be, the 
emperor alone has this supreme power in Japan. He also 
possesses all governmental powers, l^slative, administra- 
tive and judicial, but exercises them with " self-limdtations " 
according to the constitutional provisions. For example, 
the " civil liberty " of the people is constitutionally guaran- 
teed against governmental encroachment ; " every law " and 
^* the expenditure of funds and the raising of revenue of the 
state " require " the consent of the imperial Diet ;" " the 
imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rate 
shall be determined by law." * In the exercise of admin- 
istrative power, the emperor obtains the advice of the 
cabinet ministers and Ihe privy council, and the ministers are 
responsible to the emperor.* Moreover, he obtains "the 
counter-signature of a minister " for all laws and imperial 
ordinances. Though " the judicature shall be exercised by 
the courts of law according to law, in the name of the em- 
peror," the courts of justice are independent of the execu- 
tive, and are organized under a law enacted by the legisla- 

^ Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law^ vol. 

i, p. 57- 

' Ibid.t i>p. 53-56. Lftband, Staatsrecht des deutschen Reicks. Good- 
aow, Political Science Quarterly, vol. iv, p. 702. Hozumi, Kenpo-tai, 
pp. 15-18. 

* As to indivklual liberty, see the articles of chapter ii of the Consti- 
Jutional Provisions of Japan. Also, articles 5, 57, 62, 64. 

^ Constitution of Japan, articles 55 «nd 56. 


ture, not under imperial ordinances or any other adminis- 
trative decree.^ Like continental Europe, Japan has a 
special administrative court, which is independent of t4ie 
ordinary courts of law ; yet it is an effective institution for 
the remedy of executive abuses.* As to foreign affairs^ 
the emperor alone " declares war, makes peace, and con- 
cludes treaties," despatches and receives diplomatic agents^ 
with the assistance of the cabinet ministers, without con- 
sulting the imperial diet.' In the matter of concluding 
treaties and conventions with foreign countries, the Sumii- 
suin (the Privy Council) may be consulted by the emperor.* 
The present Japanese legislature, like those in occidental 
countries, is in structure based on the " bicameral system," 
consisting of the Kizokuin (the House of Peers) and the 
Shugiin (the House of Representatives) ; but it has no 
powers other than those enumerated in the constitutional 
provisions, nor any power to control the executive, as the 
cabinet is quite independent.* In the matter of local gov- 
ernment, r^^lations as to prefects, districts and comnrnnes 
were enacted in 1878, and prefectural assemblies were estab- 
Issbed in the same year.* About ten years later, in 1889, 

1 Constitution of Japan, arts. 57 and 58. 

' Ibid., art. 61. As to the la'w relating to the organization, jurisdic- 
tion and procedure of the administrative court, see Horei-Zensho^ 
(1890), vol. vi, law no. 48. For general account, and principles of the 
administrative courts in France and Germany, see Goodnow, Compara- 
tive Administration, vol. ii, pp. 217-256. 

* Constitution of Japan, art. 13. See also Count Ito, Teikoku-Kenpo- 
Kaigi, pp. 25 et seq. 

* Imperial ordinance (1888), no. 22, art. vi; see also its amendment 
in Imperial ordinance (1890), no. 26. 

B Constitution of Japan, arts, of chap. iii. The law relating to the 
Imperial Diet is found in Horei-Zensho (1889), vol. 2, laws nos. 2-3. 
Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, vol. ii> 
pp. 106 ct seq. Hozumi, Kcnpo-Tai, pp. 53 and 62. 

^Horei'Zensho (1878), pp. 10 et seq. 


a law providing for local self-government for cities, towns 
and villages was enacted, whidh was very comprehensive in 
its scope. The law concerning prefectures was re-enacted 
in an amplified form in 1899. By a law of the same year 
the several districts within, the prefectures were endowed 
with powers of local self-government, and district diets were 
instituted. The Japanese system of local government, how- 
ever, like the French and the Prussian, but unlike the Ameri- 
can, is somewhat controlled by the central administrative 
authorities in order to prevent unwise conduct on the part 
of the localities, althougti there is very little interference on 
the part of the central legislature.^ 

In organization and in power the Japanese administration 
is very strong and effective, and in fact may be termed 
bureaucratic. On the other hand, the l^lislature is still in 
its infancy, and the security for individual rights as against 
acts of government is still inadequate. Japan should learn 
more from the Occident, especially from the English-speak- 
ing countries, concerning the ample guarantee of individual 
rights, and the adequate but sober participation by the l^s- 
lature in the exercise of governmental power, in order fully 
to develop the political, economic and social activities of 
the people. 

In a word, the empire of Japan is a monarchial sover- 
eignty, in the form of a state having a constitutional govern- 
ment, with a cabinet responsible to the emperor, a popular 
legislature and independent courts of justice, and with a 
centralized administration modified by local self-government. 

* For the law of local government of city, town or village, see Law 
(1888), no. I ; for those of the prefect and district, Law (1899), nos. 64 
and 65. For a treatment of Japanese local self-government, see Mr. 
Qement^s paper in the Political Science Quarterly, vol. 7. See also 
Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, vol. i, p. 336; and his 
Mumicipal. Home Rule, 


Japan's Entry into the Comity of Nations, 1868-1899 

Consular Jurisdiction and Tariff Questions under the old 
Treaties. — ^When the western nations entered into treaty 
relations with Japan, they secured judicial functions for 
their consuls. Ordinarily, consuls are concerned principally 
with matters of commerce, but in certain countries, mostly 
in the Orient, they exercise an extensive jurisdiction over 
their fellow-countrymen. It is true indeed that in early 
times, under the system of " personal law " that then pre- 
vailed, consuls, even in Christendom, exercised judicial 
powers ; ^ but, with the growth of the idea of nationality 
and territorial sovereignty, and the fair application of muni- 
cipal law to citizens and aliens alike, the judicial powers of 
consuls declined and were for the most part done away 
with.* In oriental countries, however, tliey still retain sudi 
powers, the reason assigned being that the 1^^ and moral 
standards of the Orient are materially different from those 
of countries of European civilization. Besides, oriental na- 
tions have been content rather to allow foreigners to be con- 
trolled by their own law than to assert jurisdiction over 
them.* The Chinese, however, persistently maintained 

^ Warden, The Origin, Nature, Progress and Influence of Consular 
Establishments, chap. iv. See also Savigny, Private International Lam, 
pp. 15, i6 and 20. 

^ Tarring, British Consular Jurisdiction in the East, p. 4. 

» Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown, p. 133. " To the 
oriental mind a personal law is more familiar and appears more nat- 

IJ2 [364 


jurisdiction over crimes committed by foreigners before the 
establishment of treaties with western nations.* But, in 
many cases, the judicial powers of consuls in the Orient 
were originally accorded by a grant or charter to the mer- 
chant or commercial companies of European nations, and 
were eventually confirmed by treaty stipulations, as in the 
case of the " capitulations " of the Ottoman Empire.* 

The Shogun's government, in the beginning of the seven- 
teenth century, left the Portuguese, Spanish, English and 
Dutch traders to their own law. This privilege, which was 
granted to them by letters-patent, was held at the pleasure 
of the Shogun, and was liable to be annulled. The Japanese, 
however, were more familiar with the idea of personal than 
of territorial law; and when-, in a later age, they formed 
treaty relations with the West, they seem not to have in- 
sisted upon the principle of territoriality. Harris states 
that, when he proposed that Americans should be subject to 
the jurisdiction of their consuls, " to my great and agree- 
able surprise this was agreed to without demur."* Article 
rV of the treaty of 1857, as concluded by Harris, runs as 
follows : "Americans committing offences in Japan shall be 
tried by the American Consul General or Consul and shall 
be punished according to American laws." * 

It is not certain that this provision covered civil actions ; 

ural than a territorial law.*' For an historical account of consular 
jurisdiction, see Martens, Das ConsularweseH im Orient, pp. 44 et seq. 

^ See the report of Mr. Gushing, Commissioner of the United States, 
to negotiate a treaty with China, U. S. House Ex, Doc, 28th Congress, 
dd Session, no. 69, pp. 1-15. 

* See Van Dyck, Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire since the Year 

* Griffis, The Diary of Townsend Harris, p. 124. 

* Treaties and Conventions of the United States since 1776, edition of 
1873, p. 515. 


but, by the treaty of 1858, the grant of consular jurisdiction 
was enlarg-ed, and it was still further increased by the 
British treaty of the same year. The treaty with Austria- 
Hungary, in 1869, still further expanded the jurisdiction, 
as follows: 

All questions in regard to right, whether of property or of 
person, arising between Austro-Hungarian citizens residing in 
Japan shall be subject to the jurisdictions of the Imperial and 
Royal authorities. In like manner the Japanese shall not in- 
terfere in any question which may arise between Austro-Hun- 
garian citizens and the subjects of any other Treaty Power. 

Austro-Hungarian citizens, who may commit any crime 
against Japanese subjects or the subjects of any other nation, 
s-hall be brought before the Imperial and Royal Consular Offi- 
cer, and punished according to the laws of their country. 

Any case involving a penalty or confiscation by reason of 
any breach of this Treaty, the Trade Regulations, or the Tariflf 
annexed thereto shall be brought before the Imperial and Royal 
Consular authorities for decision.^ 

The other treaty powers of the West were accorded the same 
concessions by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause. 

Analyzing the treaty provisions, we find that the juris- 
diction belonging exclusively to consuls embraced, in civil 
matters : ( i ) cases in which a citizen of a treaty power was 
liable to a Japanese subject; (2) actions between citizens of 
the same treaty power; (3) actions between citizens of dif- 
ferent treaty powers; and, in criminal matters: (i) offences 
conunitted by citizens of treaty powers against Japanese 
subjects; (2) crimes committed by subjects of treaty pow- 
ers against foreigners (including citizens of non-treaty 
powers, such as Turks, Persians, Chilians, Colombians, 
Venezuelans or Argentines) ; and (3) offences committed 
by citizens of treaty powers in violation of treaty provisions 

^ See articles 5, 6 and 7. State Papers, vol. 59, pp. 531-53^. 


and trade regulations.^ The residuary jurisdiction, which 
might be claimed for the Japanese courts, embraced, in civil 
matters : ( i ) cases in which a Japanese was liable to a 
citizen of a treaty power; (2) cases in which a foreigner 
was liable to the Japanese sovereign or government; (3) 
cases in which a citizen of a non-treaty power was liable to 
a citizen of a treaty power ; and, in criminal matters : ( i ) 
offences committed by a Japanese against a foreigner; (2) 
crimes committed by a foreigner against the imperial House 
or government of Japan; (3) violations by a citizen of a 
treaty power of a law or ordinance on a subject not cov- 
ered by the treaty (sucJi as games, lottery and sanitary laws, 
and regulations of the coasting trade). This residuary 
jurisdiction, however, was not successfully claimed for the 
Japanese courts, because the treaties were not strictly con- 
strued as legal documents.^ Taking historical conditions 
into consideration, it was natural that the western nations 
should wish to make their jurisdiction as extensive as pos- 
sible, so long as Japan remained in the old civilization. But 
it was ludicrous that, when the Japanese administration of 
justice had become efficient and trustworthy, the treaty 
powers sftiould claim extra-territorial jurisdiction to the ex- 
tent of extraditing fugitive criminals, and supervising har- 
bor and pilotage regulations, the opium trade and quaran- 
tine, all of which undoubtedly belonged to Japan.* Under 
this system, the actual condition of consular jurisdiction 

* Nakamura, Shin-Joyaku-ron (Essay on the New Treaties), p. 34!!>. 

* Pigott, Consular Jurisdiction and Residence in Oriental Countries, 
p. 85. 

* Wiiile the treaty powers, except the United States, claimed that 
these regulations came within their extra-territorial jurisdiction, Japan 
maintained that they were <within her discretion and incorporated them 
into her national legislation. For. Rel. of United States, vols, for 
1874, 187s and 1878. As to extradition, see Moore, Extradition, vol. i, 
sections 93, 487 and 488. 


could not be defined, without consulting the legislative acts 
of the treaty powers, the diplomatic correspondence, the 
decisions and procedure of the consular courts, and the 
works of publicists.* 

The Japanese were originally ignorant of the method of 
raising state revenue by means of a tariff. Shogun lyeyasu 
gave free entry to the imports of European traders in the 
seventeenth century. In the feudal regime, the land tax 
was the government's main source of revenue. It was 
Harris who first taught the Japanese to lay customs duties. 
In the r^^lations attached to the commercial treaty of 
1858, articles of importation were arranged in schedules.^ 
" Class I " included articles free of duty, such as silver and 
gold, wearing apparel in actual use, household furniture and 
printed books for private use. " Class II " embraced 
articles used in the building, rigging or fitting out of ships, 
salted provisions, bread-stuffs, living animals, coal, rice, 
paddy, steam machinery, etc, paying a duty of five per cent. ; 
and " Class III," all intoxicating liquors, which were sub- 
ject to a duty of thirty-five per cent. " Class IV " imposed 
a duty of twenty per cent on articles not mentioned in any 
preceding class. All Japanese products, except gold and 
silver, coins and copper in bars, were dutiable at five per 

1 Hall maintains that even the " territorial sovereign, if he chooses 
to bring an action, [may] submit himself" to an English court in his 
territory. See his Foreign Jurisdiction, p. 193. In 1892 the Japanese 
cruiser "Chitose" collided with the English merchantman "Revana" 
in the territorial waters of Japan and the former was sunk. The Japa- 
nese government brought an action in the British consular court at 
Yokohama. For special treatment of consular jurisdiction in Japan, 
see Sheppard, Extraterritoriality; Senga, Gestaltung und Kritik der 
heutigen Konsulargerichtsharkeit in Japan; and Scidlmore's Lecture on 
the Consular Courts of the United States in Japan. 

' Treaties and Conventions of the United States since 1776, edition 
of 1873, p. 524. Treaty with England (1858), State Papers, vol. 48, pp. 



cent on their exportation. These tariflf regulations, though 
arranged by convention with the treaty powers, were re- 
markably well conceived from the economic as well as fiscal 
point of view. They were not protective, but permitted vir- 
tual free trade, which is desirable for a nation " politically 
independent, but economically in a very low stage;" * they 
were not so indulgent as to fail to produce an adequate re- 
venue. Subsequently, however, when the Shogun's gov- 
ernment was embarrassed by the anti-foreigti movement, the 
treaty powers took advantage of the opportunity to con- 
clude on June 25, 1866, a treaty by which the tariff was 
revised and reduced.^ All food-stuffs, including grain and 
meat, were admitted free of duty, while tobacco, sug^ar and 
all manufactures — woolen, cotton and metallic — were 
charged a fixed duty of five per cent; and even articles of 
luxury — jewels, diamonds and gold, perfumes and cham- 
pagnes — could not be taxed more than five per cent ad 
valorem. Under such a S3rstem, Japan largely lost the fiscal 
value of her tariff. 

The Revision of the Treaties and Present Treaty 
Relations, — Thus was Japan, though an independent state, 
subjected to grievous disabilities by the treaties, both in re- 
spect of revenue and of jurisdiction. It is therefore not 
strange that, after the imperial government had restored or- 
der, the revision of the treaties, so as to recover judicial 
and fiscal autonomy, became a burning question among 
officials as well as among the people. The government, 

^ Roscher, Political Economy, vol. ii, p. 434. Entire freedom of trade 
with the outside world "<:au5es the influence of the incentives, wants 
and means of satisfaction of a higher civilization to be felt soonest in 
the country." 

> A convention with the United States, England, France and Holland. 
State Papers, vol. 58, p. 317. For the diplomatic correspondence con- 
cerning this tariflf revision, see Pari. Papers, Japan, no. i (1867). 


perceiving that, so long as the country adhered to its 
Asiatic traditions, the treaty powers would not relinquish 
their jurisdictional privil^fes, eagerly introduced western 
civilization, especially in judicial institutions. The evolu- 
tion of modem Japanese jurisprudence thus bears a close re- 
lation to the subject of treaty revision. Immediately after 
the Restoration, a separate administration of justice was 
instituted by the establishment of a department of justice 
and courts of law.* The Kaitei-Ritsur-rei, a criminal code, 
was promulgated in 1871, which, though framed upon a 
Chinese model, contained an infusion of European prin- 
ciples. Shinpai Yeto, minister of justice, as a step towards 
introducing western jurisprudence, invited to Japan a num- 
ber of European jurists, among whom was M. Boissonade, 
a famous French barrister. By his eight years* labors im- 
portant reforms were effected in the Japanese law. In Jan- 
u^y, 1879, torture was abolished, and in 1880, the regula- 
tions relating to legal practitioners and to evidence were im- 
proved and modernized.* Crimiinal law and procedure were 
also revised, on the model of the French codes; the revision 
was prcwnulgated in 1878 and came into operation in 1882.* 
The third article of the criminal code prohibits the applica- 
tion of ex post facto laws ; capital punishment by beheading 
was, by the twelfth article, changed to that by hanging, and 
was limited to murder, high treason and arson.* 

\\^iile judicial reform was in progress the department of 
foreign affairs lost no time in pressing the work of treaty 
revision. Iwakura, minister of foreign affairs, the first am- 
bassador plenipotentiary ever commissioned by the imperial 

* Sec Dr. Okamura's paper, " Tlic Progress of the Judicial System of 
Japan," Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation (1899), p. 49. 

« For. Rel. of U. S, (1879), p. 696. » Okamura, loc. cii. 

* Criminal Law of Japan, arts. 116, 121, 129, 130, 292, 380, 402 and 415. 


government, was in October, 1871, sent to the United States 
and Europe in order to sound the governments of the treaty 
powers. He was courteously received, but his mission was 

The old treaties not only grieved the Japanese, but also 
hampered the foreigner. Foreigners could travel into the 
interior only with passports issued by the foreign office, and 
were permitted to reside only in the foreign settlements. 
Owing to the restrictions on travel, which had seriously in- 
convenienced a number of Italian merchants who were en- 
gaged in buying silk-worms' eggs, the Italian government, 
in 1873, negotiated a revised treaty, by which those re- 
strictions were to be abolished and Japan's judicial autonomy 
was to a certain extent to be recognized ; * but, because of 
the protest of the other powers, the Italian measure was not 
carried into eflfect. Count Soyejima, minister of foreign 
affairs, endeavored in 1874 to secure a revision of the 
treaties by means of a " joint conference " with the rep- 
resentatives of the treaty powers at Tokyo. The Korean 
question, the Formosan controversy, and the Saigo rebellion 
subsequently hindered the work ; and little progress towards 
revision was made till Count Terajima took up the task 
in 1878. 

As agreement in the joint conference had depended upon 
the unanimous consent of all the representatives in it, Min- 
ister Terajima, upon the advice of Mr. Smith, an American 
counsellor of the foreign office,* adopted the plan of negotia- 
ting separately with each treaty power, and in this way suc- 
ceeded in concluding a commercial convention with the 
United States in July, 1878.* By this convention, the 

* The text of the draft is given in For, Rel. (1873), P. 272. 

* Ozawa, Revision of Treaties^ p. 16. 

* Treaties end Conventions of the United States since i77^j edition 
of 1889^ PP- ^ ^' ^Q' 


United States recognized the exclusive right of Japan to 
regulate its tariff and coasting trade, while Japan undertook 
to open two additional ports and to abolish export duties ; 
and in order to induce other treaty powers to enter into 
similar arrangements, it was stipulated that the compensa- 
tions granted to the United States should not be extended 
to a third power unless it should make the same concessions. 
The convention, however, accomplished no practical result, 
since it was to become effective only on the conclusion of 
similar treaties by other powers, none of which followed the 
example of the United States. 

The next foreign minister was Count Inouye, who occu- 
pied himself chiefly with treaty revision. He sought in a 
measure to recover Japan's judicial and fiscal autonomy, by 
conceding to foreigners the right to hold real property and 
to reside and trade throughout the empire.^ Adopting the 
plan of a joint conference at Tokyo, Count Inouye opened 
preliminary negotiations in 1882. The foreign representa- 
tives generally were unwilling to concede the Japanese 
claims, but were very anxious to obtain the privileges of 
trading and traveling. In Japan, on the other hand, public 
opinion demanded the recognition of the full jurisdictional 
rights of the country as an independent nation, but ob- 
jected to the proposed concessions to foreigners, whose 
business activities were viewed with apprehension. Under 
such circumstances, treaty revision was a difficult task. Con- 
ferences were held, but nothing definite was accomplished 
till 1886, when, by the compromise known as " the Anglo- 
German project," * the conclusion of an agreement appeared 
to be rendered possible during the next year, after a radi- 
cal modification should have been introduced into Japanese 

^ Essay on Treaty Revision, Dobunkan's edition, p. 7. 
* SieboW, Japan and the Comity of Nations, pp. 83-84. 


judicial procedure, by the establishment of mixed courts, as 
in Egypt, with prosecuting attorneys of foreign birth. 
When, however, tlie purport of the draft-treaty became 
known, through its publication in an English paper at Ydko- 
hama, popular opinion loudly censured Count Inouye; sev- 
eral outrages were committed upon him; and even Count 
Toni, the minister of the interior, and M. Boissonade ad- 
vised the emperor that such a treaty would be inconsistent 
with the sovereign rights of the empire. In consequence 
the minister of foreign affairs, in June, 1887, notified the 
foreign representatives that the treaty negotiations were 

Count Inouye was immediately succeeded by Count 
Okuma. The new minister's prospects were brightened by 
the strong support of the political party called the Kcashm- 
To (Progressive party), without whose aid his predecessor 
had failed. His policy was to consult separately with each 
treaty nation, as Count Terajima had done in 1878. As a 
preliminary test, he concluded the treaty * of amity and 
commerce with Mexico in February, 1887, which fully re- 
cognized Japan's judicial and fiscal autonomy, and which 
was the first treaty ever concluded by Japan with a western 
state on terms of perfect equality. As it also granted to 
Mexicans freedom of travel, residence and trade throughout 
the empire, the most-favored-nation clause was inserted in 
the treaty in the conditional form, in order to preclude any 
third power from claiming the privileges granted to Mexi- 
cans without making the reciprocal concessions secured to 
Japan. As a matter of fact, most of the European powers 
claimed most-favored-nation treatment without giving Japan 
any compensation for it; but Count Okuma obtained the 

1 For. ReL, 1887, p. 665. 

' British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 79, pp. i2g et seq. 


concurrence of America, Germany and Russia, and then 
entered into negotiations with England.^ The principal 
points of the Japanese proposal for a treaty with Great 
Britain, which was forwarded to London in December, 
1888, were as follows : First, the Japanese government was 
to open the entire country to foreigners, and to concede to 
them the right to hold real as well as personal property. 
Secondly, five years after the ratification of the treaty, con- 
sular jurisdiction was to be abolished. Thirdly, foreign 
judges were to be appointed to sit as associates in the 
" Dai'Shinrin " (supreme court), in case the defendant was 
a foreigner. Lpastly, although a majority of imported com- 
modities were to be subject to the statutory tariff of Japan, 
certain duties on English goods were to be fixed by the con- 
vention. ' An outline of the proposed treaty was published 
in the London Times of April 29, 1889. It met with dis- 
approval in Japan, especially by reason of the provisions for 
the appointment of the foreign judges and the ownership 
of real estate. The constitution of the empire had been 
promulgated in the preceding February, and it provided that 
" Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications deter- 
mined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or mili- 
tary offices equally, and may fill any other public offices." 
By this, foreigners were not regarded as competent to hold 
public office in Japan. The party in opposition to Count 
Okuma declared his treaty measure to be unconstitutional. 
As to the ownership of real estate by foreigners, conserva- 
tive Japanese regarded it as having the effect of mak- 
ing Japanese territory a foreign domain. The popu- 
lar agitation against the treaty became so intense that on 

> Annual Register (1889), pp. 397 et seq. 

« Parliamentary Papers^ vol. xcvi, Japan no. i (1894), pp. 2-12. Text 
of the drzth. 


October 19, 1889, a fanatic threw a bomb at Minister 
Qkuma, and the imperial government again suspended the 
work of revision. 

Viscount Aoki, the next foreign minister, took up the 
unfinished task with some modification of the draft of 
his predecessor. He proposed the absolute recognition of 
Japan's judicial autonomy, without the intervention of any 
foreign judges, but adhered to the concession of the right 
to own real estate.^ The completion of his work was pre- 
vented by the cabinet crisis of 1891, and he was succeeded 
by Count Encxnoto, who sought to finish what he had 
left undone. Count Enomoto believed that, if Japan had 
satisfactory civil laws and civil procedure, the treaty powers 
would soon recognize her jurisdiction. Hence he made 
strenuous efforts to induce the imperial diet to approve the 
project of a civil code which was then under discussion. He 
declared in the Lower House, in 1892, that the postpone- 
ment of the completion of the codes would mean the post- 
ponement of treaty revision. In the previous year, the civil 
ocxle, the code of civil prcxredure, the commercial code, and 
tfie code of the constitution of courts were promulgated; 
but, although the code of the constitution of courts, the code 
of civil procedure, and a part of the commercial code, tna., 
tiie diapters on companies, partnership, bankruptcy, bills, 
commercial r^istration and trade books — were put in force 
with the sanction of the Diet, the operation of the civil code 
and of the main parts of the commercial code was postponed 
until 1894.^ When Portugal happened to withdraw her 
consuls from Japan, without sending new ones in their 
places. Count Enomoto promptly took steps to assert 
Japanese jurisdiction over Portuguese residents, and by an 

^ Pari. Papers, Japan no. i (1894)1 PP- ^-^• 
' See Okamura, loc, cit. 


imperial ordinance of July 17, 1892, all treaty provisions 
with Portugal relating to consular jurisdiction were de- 
nounced.* Treaty revision, however, was again hindered 
by the cabinet crisis at the end of 1892. 

The foreign office was next occupied by Mr. Mutsu, an 
able and clear-headed man, who had once been minister of 
Japan at Washington and who had n^otiated the com- 
mercial treaty with Mexico in 1887. He conceived the 
idea that treaty revision might be accomplished if Japan, 
in the first instance, consulted the power whose interests in 
the country predominated over those of any other. Most 
of his predecessors had, in the first instance, treated with 
the United States, which always manifested a readiness to 
grant Japan's wishes, or with some of the minor countries, 
and the possibility of revision was in the end usually de- 
stroyed by Great Britain. Mr. Mutsu therefore decided to 
deal first with Great Britain. To this end he availed him- 
self of the opportunity afforded by the presence in London 
of Mr. Fraser, British minister to Japan, who was then on 
leave. On August 18, 1893, Viscount Aoki, who was then 
Japanese minister at Berlin, and who had known Mr. Fraser 
in Tok3ro, was instructed to proceed to London and discuss 
with him " the basis of a negotiation for treaty revision." * 
With a view to such a negotiation, Mr. Mutsu, desirous of 
placing Japan's treaty relations on the basis of absolute 
equality, had drawn up a draft on the model of the Anglo- 
Italian treaty of 1881, whidi was formed on that basis. 
This draft was sent to Viscount Aoki, and, after an informal 
discussion between him and Mr. Fraser, was submitted to 
the British foreign office on December 27, 1893.* Negotia- 
tions between Count Aoki and Lord Kimberley, who was 

^ Horei'Ztnsho (1892), vol. vi, p. 147. Imperial ordinance no. 65. 
« Pari. Papers, Japan no. t (1894), p. 75. ■ Ibid,, pp. 76-83. 


then secretary for foreign affairs, soon ensued. While they 
were pending, the British charge d'affaires at Tokyo sent 
to London translations of speeches made by Count Ito, 
prime minister, and by Mr. Mutsu, in the Upper House, 
in which they seem to have intimated that Japan would re- 
pudiate the existing treaties, in case the powers should dis- 
r^rard her wishes for revision. This report caused ill- 
feeling in London, and Lord Kimberley declared that such 
language would " retard rather tfian advance the revision " 
which Japan desired.* The incident was in fact due to a 
sensational translation, the meaning of the original being 
that Japan could no longer bear up under the weight of 
the old treaties. On Mr. Eraser's return to Tokyo, all 
misunderstanding was removed. While negotiations with 
Great Britain were in progress, Mr. Mutsu on April 10, 
1894, seized an opportunity to obtain from the Hawaiian 
government by exchange of notes the recognition of 
Japanese jurisdiction over citizens of Hawaii in the empire." 
Happily for Japan, the question of treaty revision, which 
was so long under discussion, finally came to a definite so- 
lution with Great Britain. On July 16, 1894, a treaty of 
commerce and navigation was sig^ned without any sigfni- 
ficant departure from the original draft.' Japan, by her 
civilized conduct during the war with China, had gained 
much reputation and credit, and other powers were not slow 
to imitate the example of Great Britain. New treaties were 
signed with other powers as follows: the United States, 
November 22, and Italy, December i, 1894; Russia, June 
8, Denmark, October 19, and Peru, March 22, 1895; Ger- 

* Pari. Papers, Japan no. i (1894), pp. 98 and 99. 

* British and Foreign State Papers^ vol. 86, pp. 1185 et seq. Also 
Imperial Ordinance no. 41, April 11, 1894, Horei-Zensho (1894), vol. 

tv, p. III. 

* Pari Papers, Japan no. i (1894), pp. 129 et seq. 


many, April 4, Sweden and Norway, May 2, Belgium, June 
22, France, August 4, the Netherlands, September 8 and 
Switzerland, November 16, 1896; Spain, January 2, Portu- 
gal, January 26 and Austria-Hungary, December 5, 1897; 
Siam, February 25, 1898. The ratifications of all these 
treaties were completed in 1898. The treaty with Mexico 
of 1887 required no revision; but the Anglo- Japanese treaty 
of 1894 was adopted as the basis of all these revised 
treaties.^ Beside these revised treaties, Japan concluded 
treaties for the first time with Brazil, November 5, 1895 ; 
Argentine Republic, February 3, 1898; and Greece, May 20 
and June i, 1899. On January 17, 1900, Japan and the 
Congo Free State entered into a declaration mutually to 
extend most-favored-nation treatment in regard to com- 
merce and navigation.* 

By the revised treaties, Japan not only recovered her 
judicial autonomy, but also secured equal treatment for her 
people in the western countries. The old treaties were one- 
sided arrangements, designed to secure certain rights and 
privil^es to aliens in Japan. They did not provide for the 
reciprocal protection of Japanese abroad, and in reality few 
Japanese ever appeared in western lands in those days. 
Subsequently, however, the number of Japanese going 
abroad for travel, trade and education steadily grew; and 
the new treaties were therefore necessarily founded in this 
respect on the principle of reciprocity. Their main pro- 
visions may be summarized as follows: The subjects of 
each contracting party are to enjoy in the dominions of the 
other freedom of travel, residence, commerce, navigation 

^ The texts of all these revised treaties of Japan are found in Treaties 
itnd Conventions between Japan and Other Powers (edkion of 1898), 
and in the British and Foreign State Papers. 

3 These treaties and declarations are found ihid., vol. 92. 


and religion, and of access to the courts of justice, together 
with national or most-favored-nation treatment in respect 
to the possession of goods, succession to personalty, dis- 
posal of property and taxation. The houses of aliens in 
each country are protected from search and domiciliary 
visits except according to law. Foreigners are exempt from 
military services and compulsory contributions. Most- 
favored-nation treatment is preserved in commerce and navi- 
gation; and particularly in respect to imports and exports, 
tonnage and other shipping duties, consular officers, and the 
coasting trade, although tfiey are mostly subject to national 
law. As regards warehouses, bounties, drawbacks, shipping 
facilities, patents and trade marks, foreigners are to enjoy 
the same rights and privileges as natives. The revised 
treaties all came into operation in July and August, 1899. 
From that moment the system' of foreign settlements ( which 
had hitherto enjoyed extra-territoriality) was abolished and 
the settlements were merged into the general municipal sys- 
tem. Consular jurisdiction also ceased. 

In the matter of trade, Japan made liberal concessions to 
England, France and Germany upon their principal im- 
ports. By the conventional tariffs appended to the treaties 
with those countries, their imports were taxed only from 
five to fifteen per cent ad valorem, while the statutory tariflf 
of the empire fixed, in all other cases, rates running from 
five to forty-five per cent ; ^ nor was the large reduction 
made on imports from those countries compensated by any 
concession in favor of imports from Japan. The conven- 
tional tariff with Austro^Hungary, however, was more 

1 The conventional tariffs are found in Appendix A, Treaties and Con- 
ventions between Jupan and Other Powers (edition of 1899). The new 
statutory tariff is in ibid., Appendix B ; see also HoreiZensho, 1897* vol. 
iii, |>p. 13 et seq.; and Consular Reports of U. S., no. 204 (Sept, 1897). 
p. 91. 


nearly reciprocal, that government g^ranting to five classes 
of Japanese commodities reductions in rates in return for 
reciprocal reductions on five classes of Austro-Hungarian 
goods in Japan/ The treaty powers, other than those men- 
tioned, enjoy the benefit of the conventional tariffs by virtue 
of the most-favored-nation clause. By the treaty with Por- 
tugal, the most-favored-nation treatment in that country 
is restricted to thirty-^hree Japanese articles, while twenty- 
two Portuguese articles enjoy like treatment in Japan. ^ 

The articles subject to the conventional tariff in Japan 
number nearly sixty, and, as they include the principal im- 
ports from western countries, embrace the most significant 
part of the foreign trade of the empire. The conventional 
tariff thus holds an important relation to national finance 
and economy. The increasing burdens of a progressive 
nation can be best borne by means of the revenue from 
customs receipts, and, owing to the conventional reductions, 
the tariff of Japan does riot produce an adequate income. 
The customs receipts of Japan in 190 1 hardly amounted to 
6 per cent of the total revenues; while those of France 
yielded 26 per cent; of Germany, 30 per cent; of Great 
Britain, 23 per cent; of Russia, 11 per cent; and, of the 
United States, 40 per cent.* From an economic point of 
view, the promising industries of Japan — ^as yet infant in- 
dustries — such as woolen, cotton, sugar and glass manu- 
factures, cannot be satisfactorily developed, because similar 
manufactured goods from other countries are admitted un- 
der the low rates of the conventional tariff. In these days 
of protective tariffs and of heavy national burdens, Japan 

* British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 89, pp. 991 et seq. See "Ad- 
ditional Convention" between Japan and Atistro-Hungary. 

* British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 89, pp. 970 and 976 et seq. 

■ Tkesc percentages are calculated from the statistics in The States- 
man's Year-Book, 190a. 


must stand at a great disadvantage till 191 1, when the pres- 
ent treaties will expire. The sensational press of Japan 
criticised and denounced the " poor work " of the treaty re- 
visers, but the representatives of Japan did the best they 
could. Great Britain, Germany and France, with* their 
large commercial interests, demanded commercial conces- 
sions as the price of recognizing Japan's judicial autonomy. 
By the revised treaties, concluded with western nations 
on an equal footing, and with the absolute abolition of the 
foreign consular jurisdiction, Japan has been admitted into 
the " family of nations " as a competent member and a 
subject of international law. According to the orthodox 
" law of nations," the " family of nations " was regarded 
as the monopoly of Christendom; but, since the Reforma- 
tion, which destroyed the religious unity of Europe, the re- 
ligious test of international right has gradually fallen into 
disrepute among jurists. At the present day, the accepted 
test is the possession of the modem civilization developed 
in the states of western Europe and their derivatives in 
America. Turkey, though her civilization is not European, 
was formally admitted to participate in " the public law 
and concert of Europe," * chiefly for political reasons, by 
the Treaty of Paris of 1856; but her judicial power over 
aliens is still limited. Although Japan is different, racially 
and religiously, from the Occident, her healthy assimilation 
of western civilization made the occidental states recognize 
her as eligible to the " family of nations." The antipathy 
at first felt by the Japanese towards foreigners disappeared, 
and was quickly replaced by the eager adoption and adapta- 
tion, so far as seemed to be practicable and desirable, of 
European science, ethics, arts, education, military methods, 

1 Article vH of the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856. Hcrtslct, The 
Map of Europe, vol. ii, p. 1250. 


politics, judicial administration and other economic and so- 
cial institutions. Freedom of religious faith is secured by- 
constitutional provision.* The criminal and civil codes, 
and the codes of procedure, which, after long elaboration, 
were completed in 1898 and, with the final revision of the 
commercial code, came into force in 1899, have freely incor- 
porated the judicial principles which prevail in the Occi- 
dent.' So liberal is the civil code to foreigners that they 
can enjoy all the private rights of natives " except as for- 
bidden by law, regulation, or treaty," ' while, under the 
criminal procedure, foreign prisoners are specially provided 
with Euorpean meals and quartered in European buildings, 
because their standard of living is different from that of the 
Japanese.* In a word, under the existing administration of 

^ Art xxviii of the Japanese Constitutional Law. 

^ The code of civil an-d commercial law, which was originally framed 
by Boissonade on the model of the French code, was afterward re- 
placed by a code framed on the German model by e commission of 
native jurists. The reasons for this entire revision of the civil code 
are said to be as follows : The first civil code '' rendered frequent repe- 
tition of the same rules necessary in different parts of the code,'' and 
made the whole work voluminous, so that it contained 1,762 articles. 
In order to avoid diis unnecessary repetition and make "the body of 
the law succinct," the new code followed the forms of the Saxon civil 
code and the draft of the imperial German civil code, and is comprised 
in 1,146 articles. See Hozumi, The New Civil Code, a Study in Can- 
paratvue Jurisdiction, p. 23. 

» Article ii of the Japanese Gvil Law. Ume, Minpoyogi {Interpre- 
tation of the Civil Law), vol. i, pp. 8 et seq. See also Dr. Masujima's 
address delivered before the New York State Bar Association in Jan- 
uary, 1903. " The cases in which foreigners are restricted in enjoyment 
of private rights are, the ownership of land or Japanese ships, the 
rights to work mines, to own shares in the Bank of Japan or the Yoko- 
hama Specie Bank, to be member or broker of exchanges, to engage in 
emigration business, or to receive boimties for navigation or ship- 

* See Report of International Prison Congress, Belgium, 1900, sec. on 


justice, aliens are as secure in person and in property in 
Japan as in any country in the world. 

In her international relations, Japan not only faithfully 
fulfils her treaty obligations, but also 2d)ides by the rules of 
international law. When the Franco-Prussian war broke 
out in 1870, she declared her strict neutrality.^ When a 
Peruvian ship, the " Maria Luz," entered the harbor of 
Yc^ohama in 1872, Japan righteously exercised her terri- 
torial jurisdiction against the slave traffic* Japan has also 
been sedulously observant of the dictates of courtesy and 
comity. In 1885 her troops protected the American lega- 
tion at Seoul against conflagration.* When, in 1888, the 
Turkish man-of-war " Ertugrul," was wrecked on the 
Japanese coast, the survivors, although Turkey was not a 
treaty power, were taken to Constantinople by the "Hiyei" 
and " Kongo," Japanese men-of-war, which were said to be 
the first war vessels that had passed the Dardanelles since 
1856. The Grand Duke Alexis of Russia, the Duke of 
Edinburgh, the crown prince of Germany (the present 
Kaiser), General Grant (ex-president of the United States), 
the king of Hawaii, the crown prince of Russia (the present 
Czar), the Turkish Prince Osman Pasha, and other dis- 
tinguished personages have been received upon their visits 
to Japan by the present emperor and his people, with marked 
hospitality and politeness. The conduct of Japan during 
the Qiino- Japanese war is admitted to have furnished a 
consummate illustration of adherence to international law.* 

^ Far. Rel. (1870), p. 188. 

* The action of the Japanese authorities raised a dispute with Peru, 
which was decided by the Czar of Russia, Alexander II, in favor of 
Japan. See Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. v, pp. 5035-36- 

•For. Rel. (1885), p. 562. 

* As to the naval side, see Takahaski, International Law During the 
Chino-Japanese War. As to the military side, see Ariga, La Guerre 


The " Kowshing " case, which created some ill-feeling 
among neutral powers, was subsequently justified by emi- 
nent authorities on international law.^ Since 1884, Japan 
has become a signatory or adherent of the " universal con- 
ventions " which are regarded as facilitating the social, 
political and commercial life of the international society, 
such as agreements concerning the sick and wounded in war, 
weights and measures, posts, telegraphs, trade-marks and 
patents, and copyrights.* 

It is proper to add that, while Japan has, by reason of 
her healthy assimilation of western civilization, been ad- 
mitted into the " family of nations " as an equal member, 
without regard to religious and racial differences, she has 
retained her consular jurisdiction in China, Korea and Siam. 

^ Letters of Professors Westlake and Holland, in the London Times, 
August 3 and 7, 1894, justif3ring the sinking of the English ship " Kow- 
s>hing," while transporting a hostile Chinese force to Korea, by the 
Japanese man^-of-war " Naniwa." 

' Japan, after becoming a party to the international convention for 
the protection of submarine cables, in 1884, adhered to the Geneva Con- 
vention (Red Cross), the Universal Postal Union, the Convention for 
the Establishment of an International Bureau of Weights and Measures, 
and the Declaration of Paris in relation to Maritime Law. See Treaties 
and Conventions between Japan and Other Powers, ed. 1889, vol. ii, 
** Universal Conventions," pp. 92 et seq. Japan also pledged herself in 
her revised treaties to be bound by the Berne Convention (copyright) 
and the Indtistrial Property Convention. 


International Relations of Japan with Asiatic 

Nations, 1868- 1898 

The First Treaty with China, — ^Although the Asiatic na- 
tions entered, in the middle of the nineteenth century, into 
diplomatic and commercial relations with western nations 
by treaty stipulations, they had no resident embassies nor 
any treaties r^fulating- trade among themselves, until China 
and Japan concluded their first treaty in 1871. Neverthe- 
less, intercourse had previously existed. 

After Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea and China, the Ming 
dynasty in the latter country declined to make peace with 
Japan, although the Shog^n's government often tried to 
bring it about. Subsequently, however, the Ming dynasty, 
when it was about to be overthrown by the Manchus, sev- 
eral times solicited the military assistance of Japan through 
the governor of Nagasaki and the king of Loochoo ; ' but 
the conservative government of the Tokugawa refused to 
become entangled in foreign affairs. The Manchu d)masty 
at length* came in 1659 to rule the whole of China, but 
diplomatic intercourse with Japan was not restored. Never- 
theless, commercial intercourse bewteen the two nations re- 
mained . undisturbed. During Japan's War of Restoration, 
of 1868, China did not, like the western nations, maintain 
neutrality. Chinese traders supplied contraband to the re- 
volted Tokugawa, while Chinese subjects in Japanese ports 
were often guilty of smuggling opium and kidnappii^ 

^ Gaiko-Shiko, pp. 282-283. 
385I 153 


Japanese girls. These outrages showed the importance of 
establishing treaty relations with China. Besides, when the 
Japanese government, soon after the Restoration, sought to 
enter into a treaty with Korea, it found itself thwarted by 
the peculiar relation of Korea to China. It therefore de- 
termined first to conclude a treaty of amity and commerce 
with the latter country. 

Such a treaty was concluded at Peking in July, 1871, on 
absolutely equal terms, " without depreciation on either 
side." ^ It was based upon the most thorough amity. In 
case either contracting party was aggrieved by a third 
power, the other was to render " assistance " or exercise 
" good offices." This stipulation was described in the 
occidental press as an "alliance" of the Asiatic nations 
against the western. Permanent embassies were recipro- 
cally established, and it was expressly provided that the 
ambassadors should bear their own expenses, although it 
had been the custom in Asia to pay all the expenses 
of foreign embassies on the assumption that an ambas- 
sador was the guest of the nation. But, while the treaty 
was made after the western fashion, it still exhibited 
Asiatic peculiarities. It retained the oriental element 
of personal law, the consuls of the contracting parties 
being clothed with jurisdiction over their fellow citizens; 
and both countries agreed to deliver up fugitive criminals 
to the consuls. The treaty further provided for the confis- 
cation of contraband. It contained no most-favored-nation 
clause. The contracting parties were unwilling to extend 
to each other by treaty the large favors and privileges which 
they had granted to western nations. On the contrary, 
they agreed that their imports and exports should be re- 

1 The Japanese text is in Horei-Zensho, 1873, PP- 540 et seq.; the 
English text in British and Foreign State Papers , vol. 62, p. 321, and 
For. Reiy 1872, p. 485. 


gulated by their respective tariff laws. They did not, how- 
ever, enact new tariffs, but adopted the trade regulations 
embodied in their treaties with European nations. It is 
interesting to note that the treaty specifically prohibited the 
export of rice and salt,^ since it was apprehended that, as 
those articles formed an essential part of the diet of the 
people, their exportation would ruin both nations. Such 
were the economic ideas of oriental statesmen at that time. 
The Formosan Question. — In September, 1871, sixty-six 
inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands, which, since their in- 
vasion in 1609 ^y Shimazu, lord of Satsuma, had been 
claimed by Japan,* were wrecked on the southern coast of 
Formosa, and were murdered by the " Boutans," one of 
the savage tribes. Four years before, a similar cruelty had 
been inflicted upon the captain and his wife and the officers 
and crew of the American ship, " Rover." As the Chinese 
government neglected to redress this outrage. General Le 
Gendre, then American consul at Amoy, himself proceeded 
with an expedition to Formosa and obtained from Tooke- 
tc4c, a native chief, a pledge of good bdiavior.' The agree- 
ment, however, proved to be of no avail, and further mur- 
ders of Loochooans were soon committed. The Japanese 
government then seriously took up the matter, the celebrated 
diplomat, Mr. Soyejima, being minister of foreign affairs; 
and General Le Gendre, who happened to pass through 
Japan on his way to America, was, by reason of his ex- 
perience in dealing with Formosan savages, engaged as 
special adviser.* The imperial government eventually de- 
cided, before sending out an armed expedition, to despatch 

* Trade Regulations between J^psai and China, arts, xxi and xxv. 

* Infra, p. 160. 

« Le Gendre to Mr. Burlingame, American minister at Peking, Dip. 
Cor. (1868), part i, p. 508. 

* Black, Young lapan, vol. ii, p. 403. 


an eiivx)y to ascertain the views of the Chinese government 
as to its responsibilities in the premises. There were pend- 
ing at this time the questions of opening up Korea, of the 
ratification of the Qiino- Japanese treaty of 1871, and of an 
audience of the foreign representatives with the Cdestial 
emperor. Mr. Soyejima was therefore commissioned, in 
1873, ^ ^^^ ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary 
to China, and was accompanied by General Le Gendre. He 
also bore an imperial letter to the Chinese emperor, con- 
gratulating him on his recent marriage. The ratifications 
of the treaty were exchanged at Tientsin on April 3; and 
Mr. Soyejima then proceeded to Peking, where he persis- 
tently demanded an audience on the ground tfiat the im- 
perial letter addressed to the Chinese emperor must be 
delivered in person, as had been done by Harris in Japan. 
The Chinese government finally yielded, and the Celestial 
emperor gave his first audience to the Japanese ambassador 
on June 29, 1873. A similar concession was immediately 
made to the other foreign representatives.* As to the 
Formosan question, the Chinese government took the ground 
that the Loochooans were "Chinese subjects," and that the 
outrages upon them therefore did not concern any other 
government. The Japanese ambassador, on the other hand, 
affirmed that the Loochooan sovereignty had belonged to 
Japan since 1609, and demanded specific redress for the 
acts of the Formosan savages. In order to evade respon- 
sibility, the Chinese commissioners incautiously declared 
that their government had nothing to do with the inhabit- 
ants of southern Formosa, who were out of its control and 
jurisdiction.' As to the Korean question, the Chinese com- 
missioners, after long discussion, declared that China would, 

1 For an account of the audience question, see For. ReL, 1873, PP- 
195 et seq. 
* Black, Young Japan, vol. ii, p. 404. See also For. Rei, 1873, p. 188. 


while maintaining the old tributary relation of Korea, re- 
cognize her right to make peace and war with other states.* 
The Japanese ambassador left Peking in July, announcing 
that Japan, being axi independent state, would take the neces- 
sary steps to chastise the savages of Formosa who were 
" out of the jurisdiction " of the Chinese government, and 
would also independently open Korea. 

On receiving the rq)ort of Mr. Soyejima, a majority of 
the cabinet recommended that an expedition be undertaken 
first to Korea. Shortly afterwards Coimt Iwakura, envoy 
to America and Europe, returned to Japan and condemned 
the warlike policy, especially attacking the proposed Korean 
expedition. The cabinet was then reorganized by the 
Heiwato, or peace party, but it was unable to stem the cur- 
rent of popular feeling. The late minister of war. General 
Saigo, and the ex-minister of justice, Yeto, retired to their 
own provinces and plotted the overthrow of the new cabinet ; 
Prime Minister Iwakura barely escaped assassination at 
Kuichigai. The imperial government finally determined to 
send an expedition to Formosa, in order to appease the 
warlike spirit and maintain peace at home. The expedi- 
tion was officially announced on April 17, 1874, and Major 
Saigo, younger brother of General Saigo, was appointed 
to command it.^ American transports and officers were to 
take part. Ex-Lieutenant-Commander Cassell, United 
States navy, was offered the rank of lieutenant-commander 
in the Japanese navy, Lieutenant Wasson was engaged as 
a military engineer, and General Le Gendre was attached 
to the '' Banchir-Jimu-Kioku" (staff of the expedition 
against the savages). These Americans, however, were 
discharged before the arrival of the expedition at Formosa, 

* Ogawa, Meiji-GaikO'Yoroku (Digest of Diplomacy of the Meiji 
Era), p. 86. 

» For. Rel.y 1874, p. 680. 


because of the protest of Mr. Bingham, American minister 
at T(Jcyo, who maintained the strict neutrality of his coun- 
try.* By May 22, 1874, all the " Boutans " had surren- 
dered and the southern part of Formosa was occupied by 
the Japanese forces. 

Meanwhile, Mr. Yanagiwara had been sent as Japanese 
ambassador to Qiina, in order to prevent any misunder- 
standing as to the objects of the expedition. A few days 
after his departure, the Chinese government lodged a pro- 
test with the Japanese foreign office, alleging that China 
had been assured by Mr. Soyejima that Japan would limit 
her action to an official remonstrance to the guilty tribe, 
and insisting on the immediate evacuation of Formosa by 
the Japanese forces.* Mr. Yanagiwara held several con- 
ferences, but, as he obtained no practical result, Okubo 
Toshimitsu, a leading member of the Japanese cabinet, was 
on October i sent to Peking as plenipotentiary, armed with 
full power to do whatever was necessary to the success of 
his mission. In his negotiations at Pdcing, he maintained 
the righteousness of the expedition and defended die occu- 
pation of southern Formosa, pointing out the right of 
civilized states under internaticmal law to occupy savage 
lands " out of the jurisdiction " of any independent power.* 
The commissioners of the Tsung-li Yamen replied that the 
Chinese government had little to do with the " law of na- 
tions," declaring that such law regulated the affairs of 
Europe but not those of the Orient, and firmly asserted 
China's sovereignty over Formosa, on the strength of nu- 
merous proofs from historical records and official docu- 

* For. ReL, 1874, pp. 677 and 681. 

^Ogawa, Meiji-Gaiko-Yoroku, p. 42. 

^ GaikO'jiho {Revue Diplomatique), no. 50, p. 20. Count Okubo re- 
ferred to Vattcl, vol. i, chap. 18, par. 208; G. F. de Martens, vol. ii, 
chap, i, par. 37-38; HefFter, par. 70, and Bluntschli, par. 777- 


ments.* The discussion continued until the Chinese gov- 
ernment had recognized the justice of Japan's action and 
had offered to pay an indemnity on the withdrawal of the 
Japanese forces. The Japanese plenipotentiary then de- 
manded 3,000,000 taels as the actual cost of the expedition, 
and in addition an indemnity for the families of the slain 
Loochooans and a treaty pledge for the future redress of 
savage outrages. Upon the refusal of the Qiinese to agree 
to these demands, the Japanese plenipotentiary on October 
25 sent to the Tsung-li^Yamen an ultimatum,* in which he 
declared "that, as the present case cannot be decided by 
argument, each country must go its own way and exercise 
its own right of sovereignty." While the Japanese repre- 
sentatives were preparing for their departure, Mr. Wade, the 
British minister at Peking, offered his mediation,* with the 
result that a convention was signed at Peking on October 
31, 1874, by which China agreed to pay to Japan 100,000 
taels for the families of the men killed in 1871, and 400,000 
taels on the complete withdrawal of her forces from For- 
mosa. Although Japan did not recover a fifth of her ex- 
penses, yet, by her expedition, she made herself and other 
commercial nations secure from further attack by savages 
in oriental waters. 

The Loochoo Complication, — After the Formosan affair, 
another complication arose between Japan and China, con- 
cerning the Looohoo Islands. The political status of the 
islands had, like that of Korea, been very obscure. These 
petty kingdoms in Asia, though they maintained de facto 
independence, had feebly preserved their existence from ah- 
sorption by neighboring empires through their tributary re- 

* GoikO'jiko (Revue Diplomatique), no. 51, pp. 80 and 86. 
2 Black, Young Japan^ vol. ii, p. 442. 

• Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. v, p. 4857 ; British and For- 
eign State Papers, vol. 66, p. 422, an<l For. Rel, 1875, P- 222. 


lation to Japan and China. It is said that, in the middle of 
the twelfth century, the Minamoto general, Tanetomo, ex- 
iled to the island of Idzu, made his way thence to Loochoo 
and, having quelled a civil war then raging in the islands, 
placed his son Shunten on the throne. Loochoo b^an 
to pay tribute to China as early as the first year of Hung-wa 
of the Ming dynasty (1372). She entered into a similar 
relation with Japan during the period of the Ashikago reign 
( 145 1 ) . When the Loochoo government, in the beginning 
of the seventeenth century, neglected its tributary duties to 
Japan, Shimazu, the lord of Satsuma, in the fourteenth year 
of the Keicho era (1609 a. d.), sent an expedition to the 
island, and brought its king to Satsuma.^ Since this event, 
Japan has claimed sovereignty over Loochoo. When Com- 
modore Perry came to Japan, he asked the Japanese com- 
missioner to open Napa-Keang, the capital of Loochoo, for 
American ships. The reply was that " Loochoo is a very 
distant place, and a definite answer cannot be given." * 
From this answer the Commodore, inferring that he could 
freely enter into treaty negotiations with Loochoo, as if it 
were an independent kingdom, concluded a treaty of amity 
on his way home, on July 11, 1854.* This example was 
followed by France and by the Netherlands. 

After the Restoration in 1868, the imperial government, 
being busily occupied with the Korean question did not conr 
cem itself with Loochoo until June, 1872, when the Loochoo 
government reported to Governor Oyama, of Satsuma, the 
massacre of the shipwrecked Loochooans at Formosa. The 
government, availing itself of this opportunity, ordered 

^ See Satow's note on Loochoo, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of 
Japan, vol. i, pp. 1-2. 

> Senate Doc, 2d Session, 3^ Cong., no. 34, pp. 130 and 139. 

• Ibid,, p. 174. 


Sho-tai, king of Locxrhoo, to proceed to Tokyo in order to 
offer congratulations to the Mikado upon the Restoration.^ 
The king excused himself on tbe ground of illness, but sent 
the young prince, who arrived at Tokyo on September 13. 
The prince being respected more than the ordinary daimio, 
or nobility, he was received, with his suite, by the depart- 
ment of foreign affairs. In September, by successive im- 
perial ordinances, Sho-tai, king of Loochoo, was privileged 
to join the KazokUy or noble class, with gifts of a residence 
in Tokyo and 30,000 yen ; the originals of his treaties with 
the United States, France and the Netherlands he was 
ordered to hand over to Japan; and all diplomatic affairs 
were directed to be in the future administered by the 
Japanese foreign office.* When Mr. De Long, the Ameri- 
can minister at Tokyo, inquired as to the effect of these 
measures on the treaty relations of Loochoo with the United 
States, the reply was made that the provisions of the treaty 
would be observed by Japan.* In September, 1873, J^ipan, 
at the request of the Italian government, granted most- 
favored-nation treatment to its subjects in Loochoo.* By 
the settlement of the Formosan trouble in 1874, China 
tacitly recognized the sovereign rights of Japan over the 
Loochoo Islands. 

Although these facts confirmed the political dependence 
of the Loochoo Islands on Japan, de facto and de jure^ Japan 
had not interfered with their tributary relation to China. 
After the Formosan affair, however, the Japanese govern- 
ment decided to annul this relation. By ordinances in 1875 

^ Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 64. 
^ Horei'Zensho (1872), pp. 200 and 505. 

•Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 66; For, ReL, 1873, part i, 
p. 555. 
* British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 65, p. 740. 


and 1876, a governor was installed, protected by military 
guards; the king was required to renounce his Chinese in- 
vestiture as well as the payment of tribute to China, and 
to substitute the Japanese calendar for the Chinese ; and the 
Japanese courts were ordered to administer justice in the 
islands. The pro-Chinese officials were unwilling to re- 
nounce their Chinese allegiance, and envoys were sent to 
China and Japan to solicit the privilege of bearing a joint 
allegiance. The appeal was rejected by the Japanese gov- 
ernment, and the young prince, the Loochoo envoy, applied 
in vain, in 1876, to the ministers of the United States, 
Netherlands, France and China at Tokyo, to exercise their 
good offices.^ In 1878 the Chinese government, which did 
not desire to act alone, solicited the good offices of the 
United States.* In the following year. General Grant, 
while on his journey around the world, offered his media- 
tion, but it brought no practical result* Japan declined 
to make even the slightest concession. By a proclamation 
in March, 1879, she incorporated the islands into the gen- 
eral administraticMi,^ and, by a proclamation in 1880, she 
asstuned liability for the public debt of the islands contracted 
since 1844.' The efforts of General Grant, however, 
brought Japan and China into negotiation, and in October, 
1880, a treaty was drawn up, but the Chinese representa- 
tives afterwards refused to sign it.' Eventually, China 
seems to have acquiesced in the Japanese claim/ 

^ Ogaira, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 69. 
« For, ReL of U, S,, 1879* P. 607. 

* Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. y, p. 5047. 

* For, ReL, 1879, p. 637. Sec also Horei-Zensho, 1879^ no. 4pi 
» For. ReL, 1880, p. 686. 

* For, ReL, 1881, p. 230. 

f Moore, International ArbiiraHons, vpl n^ p, 504& 


Japan's Policy to open Korea to the World. — ^Korea, 
though she had long held a vassal relation to Japan and 
China, gradually neglected her duty to Japan after the in- 
vasion of Taidsoong, of the Manchu dynasty in 1634, and 
her tribute to Japan finally ceased after the eighth year of 
the Bunka era (1811).* Yet, the Lord-Governor So, of 
Tsushima, maintained undisturbed the usage of Saikatsen 
— the custom of sending a certain number of Japanese junks 
to Fusan, a southern port of Korea, for the barter of the 
national products of the two nations. After the revolu- 
tion of 1868, Lord So was sent to Korea, as an envoy, 
formally to announce the resumption by the Mikado of the 
imperial sovereignty and to invite the Koreans to re-estab- 
lish the old relations.* As the So mission obtained no 
satisfaction, the Japanese government in the following year 
sent three commissioners to investigate the internal con- 
dition and foreign relations of Korea. It was represented 
that the secret designs of Russia, coupled with Chinese 
ccmtrol in the peninsula, would endanger the existence of the 
Hermit Nation, and that it was of vital importance to 
Japan to take measures for its preservation.' The envoy 
Hanabusa was sent, with two men-of-war, in 1872, to open 
the peninsula, but he returned disappointed. Previously at- 
tempts of France and the United States, in 1866 and 1871, 
had likewise failed.* The obstinacy of the Koreans so 
incensed General Saigo that he insisted upon an immediate 
expedition for their chastisement, but a majority of the 
cabinet voted to try " the subtle movement of diplomatic 
finesse." As soon as the Formosan question was settled. 
General Kuroda and Count Inouye, escorted by several 

» Gaiko-Shiko, p. 65. * Horn-Zensho (1868). 

« Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 83. 

* Dip. Cor,, 1867, part i, p. 426. For. Rel., 1871, pp. 142 et seq. 


men-of-war, were despatched, in December, 1875, to Korea, 
and, after many patient struggles, making the tactics of 
Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris their own, they 
finally succeeded in concluding a treaty of amity and com- 
merce on February 26, 1876.^ 

By this treaty, which has much political significance, it 
was declared that " Chosen [the Japanese name of Korea] 
being an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign 
rights as Japan," and the Chinese claim of suzerainty was 
formally ignored. The right of permanent embassy at 
Seoul and Tokyo was recognized. A promise was made to 
open two ports to Japanese trade. The consuls of Japan 
were permitted to reside at the open ports and administer 
justice to Japanese. The treaty also provided that the 
" official establishment of Japan " at Sorio, in Fusan, which 
was originally opened to commercial intercourse by Lord 
So, and the " practice of Saikensen,'* should be abolished, 
and that the Japanese trade at Fusan should be conducted in 
accordance with treaty regulations. Korea, by her trade 
regulations with Japan,^ prohibited the importation of 
opium, as Japan had done under the advice of Townsend 

It was the policy of the imperial government, whose ob- 
jects were commercial and not territorial, to secure the 
perfect independence of the Hermit Nation and to lead it 
into the light of modern civilization. This policy Japan 
made every effort to carry out. As soon as Fusan, Wong- 
san and Chemulpo were opened, Japanese merchants 
swarmed to the ports to trade. For purposes of adminis- 
trative improvement and military training, numerous Japan- 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 67, pp. 530 et seq, 

' A supplementary treaty and trade regulations were concluded on 
August 27, 1876. Ibid,y pp. 1269 ct scq. 


ese advisers and instructors were employed by the Korean 
court. Youths were sent to Japan to be educated. The 
Japanese minister, seconding the efforts of the progressive 
party, advised the Korean king to grant the request of 
other nations for treaty relations. These innovations 
aroused the intense opposition of the conservative or anti- 
foreign party, in which Taiwon-Kun (father of the king), 
and the Min family (from which the queen came), were 
the chief figures; and on July 23, 1882, a mob, directed 
by a " scholar " of the orthodox school, named Pe Lo-kuan, 
attempted to seize the king and his ministers and frantically 
attacked the Japanese legation. Mr. Hanabusa, the 
Japanese minister, escorting the women and children of the 
legation, made his way with difficulty through the dark- 
ness to Chemulpo, whence, escaping by boat, he was taken 
to Nagasaki by the " Flying Fish," an English man-of-war. 
The Japanese government promptly despatched three cruis- 
ers, as an escort to Minister Hanabusa, to demand repara- 
tion. At the same time, China sent several warships, and 
sought to arbitrate the difference, in the capacity of pro- 
tector of Korea. ^ Japan, however, disregarding the pre- 
tensions of China, immediately entered into negotiations 
with the Korean government, and on July 2y, 1882, con- 
cluded the famous " Convention of Chemulpo." * By this 
convention, the Korean government was to punish the per- 
petrators of the recent outrage, to pay 550,000 yen as an 
indemnity, and to send an apology to Japan by a special em- 
bassy. More important still was the following clause: 

Some Japanese soldiers may be kept in the Japanese l^ation 

* Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 108. 

* The text of the Chemulpo convention is given in Ogawa, Diplomacy 
of the Meiji Era, p. 117; a general account is given in the New York 
Tribune, Oct. 2, 1882. 


as a guard, their station being built at the expense of the 
Korean government, but they are to be removed one year here- 
after, if the Korean people shall preserve order, and the Japa- 
nese minister finds it unnecessary to keep the guard.^ 

China, however, still asserted her claim as protector of 
Korea. In the commercial regulations concluded between 
the two countries in September, 1882, it was declared that, 
" Korea having been, from ancient times, a tributary state, 
the canons of her intercourse in all matters with the govern- 
ment of China are fixed and need not be changed." * Yet 
the United States in 1882, Great Britain and Germany in 
1883, and Italy and Russia in 1884, established commercial 
and diplomatic relations with Korea by treaty, as with an 
independent state.* 

After the outrage of 1882, the Korean cabinet was once 
more organized by the progressive or pro- Japanese party 
and the Japanese troops were stationed at Seoul for the 
protection of their legation. China lost no time in counter- 
balancing the Japanese influence. Yen Shih-Kai, the most 
efficient colleague of Li Hung Chang, and a man of shrewd 
intellect, was appointed Chinese commissioner to Korea; 
Mr. Mollendorff, a German gentleman, who had once been 
personal secretary to Li Hung Chang, -was recommended 
as adviser in foreign affairs; and 3000 Chinese soldiers 
were stationed at Seoul.* These measures caused great 
anxiety at Tokyo. Steps were gradually taken to check 

1 For, ReL, 1885, p. 343- 

* For. ReL, 1883, p. 173, contains text of treaty. 

« The American treaty with Korea may be found in British and For- 
eign State Papers, vol. 73, p. 586 ; the British and German treaties, ibid., 
vol. 74, pp. 86 and 633; the Italian and Russian, ibid., vol. 75, pp. 195 
and 308. 

* Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 116. 


the growth of Chinese influence, and to overthrow the 
Chinese claim of suzerainty. When the Korean envoys, 
Kim-ok-ki and Pok-Eiko, came to Japan to make the apology 
required by the Chemulpo convention, they were cordially 
welcomed by the people and the government, and were 
strongly advised, by prominent statesmen of Japan, to 
adopt western civilization in order to form a stable and in- 
dependent nation. The envoys took home with them sev- 
eral Japanese civil and military advisers; and the Japanese 
gfovernment, with a view to encourage the Koreans to adopt 
modern institutions, returned on November 11, 1883, for 
the purpose of establishing an educational fund, a part of 
the indemnity paid by Korea for the outrage of 1882;^ 
just as the United States had contributed a part of the 
Shimonoseki indemnity to education in Japan. 

In the course of administration, collisions between the 
progressive and conservative parties (the pro- Japanese and 
pro-Chinese) at the Korean court became inevitable. The 
reform policy of the progressive party was so radical that 
the reaction toward the conservatives brought on, on De- 
cember 5, 1884, a coup d* itat. The Japanese legation was 
again attacked by a Korean mob and Chinese soldiers. 
Thirty Japanese were killed and the legation was burned. 
Mr. Takezoye, the Japanese charge d'affaires, barely escaped 
to Chemulpo. Count Inouye was immediately despatched to 
demand an explanation. The Chinese commissioner at 
Seoul claimed the right to arbitrate, by virtue of China's 

^ Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 119. 

'Taking advantage of the embroilment of China with France, the 
progressiver party took a step towards sweeping reforms ; they tried to 
kill Min Yong Ik, the prime minister, and to seize the government and 
control the person of the king. See Watanabe, Tobo-Kankei {Rela- 
tions of the Eastern Nations), p. 132. For a detailed account of the 
coup d'itat see For. ReL, 1885, pp. 332-342. 


suzerainty ; * but the representatives of Japan, declaring that 
the matter between Japan and Korea should be settled as 
between "two sovereign states, without any co-operation 
of a third power," concluded on January 9, 1885, a con- 
vention * by which Japan obtained substantially the con- 
ditions secured in 1882. 

Not only was the Chinese claim of suzerainty thus dis- 
regarded, but Count Ito was sent to Tientsin to demand 
satisfaction from China for the part taken by Chinese sol- 
diers in the attack on the Japanese legation at Seoul, and 
to provide, by diplomatic arrangement, against future ag- 
gressions by the Chinese in Korea. Negotiations between 
Count Ito and Earl Li were opened at Tientsin on April 3, 
1885, but were prolonged upon the question of the equal 
right of Japan and China to. send troops to Korea in the 
event of a disturbance.* Li Hung Chang insisted upon 
China's special privilege by virtue of her alleged suzerain 
power, but Count Ito threatened to break off negotiations 
unless the equal rights of Japan were recognized. Troubled 
by the English occupation of Port Hamilton and the Franco- 
Chinese complication, the Chinese commissioner finally came 
to an understanding, and a convention was signed in April, 
1885.* The contracting parties mutually agreed to with- 
draw their troops from Korea and not to send any armed 
force to the peninsula in the future without previously giv- 
ing notice each to the other. Li also handed to the Japan- 
ese embassy a note of apology for the Chinese attack on 

^ Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 122. 

« British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76, p. 574 ; For, Rel., 1885, 
p. 343. 
* Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 145. 

^British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76, p. 297; For, Rel., 1885, 
pp. 563 et seq. 


the Japanese in Seoul/ This was a diplomatic triumph for 
Japan, since she compelled China to recognize her equal 
right as to armed intereference in Korea and thus again 
Ignored China's claims of suzerainty. 

Nevertheless, after the coup d'itat of 1884, the Korean 
government was organized by the conservative party and 
Kim-ok-ki and Pok-Eiko sought refuge in Japan. Yen- 
Shih-kai, the Chinese commissioner, became th6 most in- 
fluential figure in Seoul, and the foreigners regarded him as 
" Mayor of the Palace." In spite of the Korean- Japanese 
agreement in regard to telegraphic construction, China, in 
1885, secured a concession to erect a telegraph line to Seoul 
and to control all telegraphs in the peninsula; and against 
this Japan vainly protested to the Korean government.* In 
1888, the Chinese government more openly pressed its claim 
of suzerainty and tried to interfere with the sending of a 
Korean minister to the United States. President Cleve- 
land, however, treated the Korean minister as the " repre- 
sentative of an independent state." ' In 1889 the Korean 
government, without previous notice, issued a decree pro- 
hibiting the exportation of beans to Japan. This act re- 
sulted in a loss of 140,000 yen to Japanese merchants, who 
had made advances to the Korean producers. Japan imme- 
diately demanded damages,* but the claim was not dis- 
charged until 1893, owing to the interference of the 
Chinese commissioner at Seoul, who controlled the custom- 
houses in Korea. In April, 1894, Kim-ok-ki, the Korean 

* Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 149. The English text is 
given in For. ReL, 1885, p. 564. 

* For. Rely 1885, pp. 354 et seq. See also Watanabe, Tobokankei, pp. 
269 et seq., for an account of telegraph concessions to Japan. 

* For. Rel, 1888, part i, pp. 222, 381, 443. 

* For a detailed account of the rice exporting question, see Watanabe, 
op. cit., pp. 265 et seq. 


refugee in Japan, who was looked upon by the Japanese as 
the only man to reform the corrupt administration erf 
Korea, was induced by the treacherous Koreans to proceed 
to China to consult Li Hung Chang concerning reform 
measures, and was assassinated by a Korean at Shang-hai.* 
This sensational crime was believed by the Japanese to have 
been effected by the connivance or with the aid of the 
Chinese, and it greatly stimulated the national indignation 
at the repeated acts of interference by China in the affairs 
of the peninsula. 

The Chinese- Japanese War. — In the summer of 1894, the 
Tonghak rebels * rose in the province of Zenra, and, march- 
ing toward Seoul, got beyond the control of the government 
forces. On June 2 the government asked China to despatch 
troops to suppress the insurrection, whereupon Mr. Suki- 
mura, the Japanese charge at Seoul, learning what had been 
done, requested his government also to send troops, so as to 
be prepared for possible emergencies.* Five dsLys later the 
Chinese government, in accordance with the Tientsin con- 
vention of 1884, informed Japan that it had despatched 
troops to the revolted district, but added : "It is in harmony 
with our constant practice to protect our tributary states by 
sending our troops." * Viscount Mutsu, who was then 
minister of foreign affairs, protested against the phrase 
" tributary states," and declared that the imperial govern- 
ment had " never recognized Korea as a tributary state of 
China." ' Nor did Japan on this occasion wait for the ex- 

1 Tobokankei, p. 238. 

^ The Tonghak was an anti-foreign association, especially hostile to 
the Roman Catholics. Full information as to the revolt is given in 
For. Rei, 1894, volume relating to the Chinese-Japanese war, pp. 5-17. 

« Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 158. 

* Mr. Wang, Chinese minister at Tokyo, to Viscount Mutsu, minister 
of foreign affairs, Vladimcr, The China- Japanese War, App. B, no. i. 

> Ihid., no. 2. 



■esentative, or the burning of 
inese soldiers, as in 1882 and 
[Nomura, her charge at Peking, 
his government, in view of 
; of a grave nature in Korea," 
f troops to the peninsula." ^ 
iocx> men and a warship, the 
Otori, the Japanese minister 
and arrangements were made 
more troops. Alarmed by 
t 9, submitted the following 

•oops to Korea in compliance 
untry, for the purpose of assist- 
gents, and the measure is in 
therto pursued by our country 

Besides, the sole object being 
, the interior, the troops are to 
t)ject is attained. 
y in sending troops is evidently 
ites and commercial people in 
' not be necessary, on the part 
:reat number of troops, and be- 

has been made by Korea, it is 
•oceed to the interior of Korea, 
m to her people.* 

hus ignored the equal treaty 
to Korea, Mr. Komura was, 
swer the Tsung-li-Yamen as 

never recognized Korea as a 
yar, App. B, no. 3. 


tributary state of China. Japan dispatched her troops in virtue 
of the Chemulpo convention, and in so doing she has followed 
the procedure laid down in the treaty of Tientsin. As to the 
number of troops, the Japanese government is compelled to ex- 
ercise its own judgment. Although no restriction is placed 
upon the movement of the Japanese troops in Korea, they will 
not be sent where their presence is not deemed necessary.^ 

Meanwhile, the Tonghak rebellion was nearly over, but 
neither the Japanese nor the Chinese troops were with- 
drawn from Korea.* Japan was in reality unwilling to 
withdraw her forces until she had secured such a measure 
of administrative reform as would enable Korea to preserve 
peace and order and to discharge her responsibility toward 
the treaty powers. With this end in view, Japan invited 
China, on June 17, to take joint action to restore the peace 
of the peninsula, first, by suppressing the Tonghak rebels, 
and secondly, after the disturbance was over, by appoint- 
ing commissioners who were to be charged with the fol- 
lowing duties: "(a) The examination of the financial 
administration, (b) The selection of the central and local 
officials, (c) The establishment of an army necessary for 
national defence, in order to preserve the peace of the 
land." * China declined the proposal, and, insisting upon 
non-interference with the internal administration of Korea, 
suggested, on the strength of the Tientsin convention, the 
immediate withdrawal of the troops from Korea,* Japan, 
however, on June 22, once more declared that it was im- 
possible to withdraw her forces without securing the reforms 

* Vladimer, The China- Japanese War, App. B, no. 5. 

« For. ReL, 1894, p. 21. " The king [of Korea] has begged the Chi- 
nese to leave, but they refuse to do so as long as the Japanese remain, 
and the latter positively refuse to leave until the Chinese go/' 

■ Vladimer, op. cit., App. B. no. 6. * Ibid., no. 7. 


which she considered to be vital not only to the independ- 
ence of Korea but also to her own commercial and political 

In this dilemma, Japan gradually determined to assume the 
responsibility of her policy at any cost, and to solve the Kor- 
ean question, which had so long- been at stake, if necessary, 
without consulting the Chinese government. Mr. Otori, the 
Japanese minister at Seoul, was therefore authorized to do 
whatever he deemed requisite for the attainment of measures 
of reform. As a first step, he demanded of the Korean gov- 
ernment a definite answer to the question whether Korea 
was "tributary to China" or an independent state.* On 
June 30 he received an answer to the effect that Korea was 
an independent state, and he then immediately entered in- 
to negotiations. He advised the Korean government to 
reform its corrupt administration, both in respect of the 
org^ization of the government and the method of ap- 
pointing officials; to regulate the tax system and exploit the 
national resources; to readjust the old system of courts of 
justice; to re-organize the military and police force on a 
national basis; and to adopt universal education and send 
abroad a certain number of young men for higher educa- 
tion.' His advice was formally accepted, but he was re- 
quested to withdraw the Japanese troops. He declared this 
to be impossible till the reform measures had been carried 
out; and on July 19 he further demanded, (i) that the 
Korean government on the strength of the Chemulpo con- 
vention furnish an adequate building for the accommoda- 
tion of the Japanese soldiers; (2) that it drive out the 
Chinese soldiers who were unreasonably despatched to 
Ansan; (3) that it allow Japan to guard with her troops 

1 Vladimcr, op, ciL, App. B, no. 8. » For. ReL, 1B94, P. 28. 

» For. ReL, 1894, P- 35- 


the military telegraph between Seoul and Fusan; (4) and 
that it abrogate all agreements with China which conflicted 
with the sovereign rights of Korea,* The Korean govern- 
ment, which was still dominated by the conservative party 
at first refused to comply, but, in the presence of Japan's 
determined attitude, was practically helpless. Kim-Yun- 
Sik and his colleagues of the progressive party were sum- 
moned to re-organize the king's cabinet ; and Tai-Om-Kun, 
the father of the king, who was originally a conservative, 
but now favored reform, was invited to conduct the ad- 
ministration of the kingdom. Japanese troops were asked 
to guard the royal palace. On July 24 Korea finally abro- 
gated her treaty with China and entrusted to the Japanese 
troops the expulsion of the Chinese forces occupying 

The course of Japan tended to provoke China to imme- 
diate hostilities, but the Chinese government on July 3 re- 
quested Great Britain and Russia to use their influence to 
reconcile the existing differences.' Li Hung Chang also 
specially asked, on July 8, the Washington government to 
take the initiative in urging the powers to unite in a request 
to Japan to withdraw her troops from Korea.* At the 
same time the British ambassador at Washington inquired 
" whether the United Spates would unite with Great Britain 
in an intervention to avert war between China and Japan." 
The United States replied that it " could not intervene other- 
wise than as a friendly neutral" and "could not join another 
power even in a friendly intervention," • A similar answer 
was made to the Korean and Chinese ministers at Wash- 

^ Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 175. 

» Ibid,, p. 177. Sec also For, Rel., 1894, p. 56. 

» For, Rel, 1894, p. 30. 

* Ibid. « Ibid., p. 3& 


ington. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dun, the American min- 
ister at Tokyo, " made a strong but friendly representa- 
tion to Japan in the interest of peace." ^ The United 
States, however, soon perceived that Japan could not be 
diverted from her purpose. It is said that from time to 
time the ministers of Great Britain and Russia at Tokyo 
separately requested the withdrawal of the Japanese troops 
from Korea,* but their interposition did not go beyond 
diplomatic remonstrance. 

Meanwhile, the relations between Japan and China be- 
came more and more strained. On the morning of July 
25, three Japanese men-of-war had an engagement with 
several warships of China near the island of Sho-pai-oul. 
Two hours later the steamer " Kowshing," under the British 
flag, carrying Chinese reinforcements to Ansan, was fired 
upon by the " Naniwa," a Japanese man-of-war. The war 
thus began de facto, on July 25, without a declaration on 
either side, but declarations were formally issued by Japan 
and China on August i and 2, respectively.* On August 
20, Japan concluded a treaty of alliance with Korea in 
order " to expel the Chinese forces from the Korean king- 
dom, and to establish the independence of Korea." By 
this treaty, the Japanese forces were " to attack the Chinese" 
and the Koreans were " to exert the utmost efforts in all 
possible ways to facilitate the movement of the Japanese 
troops, and to prepare provisions for these troops." * This 
treaty was to expire as soon as j£q)an had concluded peace 
with China. 

» For. ReL, 1894, p. 39. 

« Ogawa, The Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, pp. 165 et seq. and 171 
et seq. 

•Vladimcr, The China-Japanese War, App. D. 

* For. Rel, 1894, p. 94; Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, p. 3:;7' 


The Peace of Shimonoseki and the New Commercial 
Treaty with China. — ^The Japanese were successively vic- 
torious at the battles of Ansan, Ping- Yang, and the Yellow 
Sea, and, while they were planning the invasion of Man- 
churia, China asked the great powers of Europe to intervene 
for the purpose of compelling Japan to conclude peace. On 
October 6, 1894, Great Britain invited the United States 
" to join with England, Germany, France and Russia in 
intervening between China and Japan," the basis of such in- 
tervention to be " that the independence of Korea should 
be guaranteed by the powers and that Japan should receive 
an indemnity for the expense of the war." * The United 
States replied that, " while the president earnestly desires 
that China and Japan shall speedily agree upon terms of 
peace alike honorable to both, and not humiliating to 
Korea, he cannot join [the powers] in an intervention, as 
requested." Meanwhile, Port Arthur was besi^ed by the 
Japanese, and China again appealed, on November 3, to 
England, France, Germany, Russia and the United States 
for their assistance in establishing peace.* The United 
States, acting independently, tendered its good offices to both 
belligerents. England also sounded Japan as to mediation. 
But the Japanese government, while appreciating these 
friendly overtures, declined to accept them, for the reason 
that the war had " not made sufficient progress to insure a 
satisfactory result of negotiation," since China had not yet 
foimd herself " in a position to approach Japan directly on 
the subject of peace" • 

Several days after the fall of Port Arthur, the Chinese 
government took the initiative in making overtures for 

1 For, ReL, 1894, p. 70. 

« For ReL, 1894, pp. 73 and 74-75. 

* For. ReL, 1894, p. 79. 


peace. Mr. Detring, commissioner of customs at Tientsin, 
came to Kobe, on November 26, as a special commissioner 
with a letter from the viceroy, Li Hung Chang, to Count Ito, 
the premier, and requested the governor of the Hyogo pre- 
fecture to obtain for him a conference with Count Ito as to 
the preliminaries of peace. After some delay, Mr. De- 
tring was informed that his mission was not recognized, 
as he " was not properly accredited by the government of 
China." * While Japan was planning the assaults on Wai- 
hai-wei, Newchwang and Mukden, China informed the 
Japanese government, on December 23, through the Ameri- 
can minister at Tokyo, that she had appointed Messrs. Chang 
In Hoon and Shao Yu Lien as plenipotentiaries to negotiate 
a peace. The Japanese government promised to appoint 
plenipotentiaries to meet them at Hiroshima, where the im- 
perial general staff and the cabinet were then established. 
The Chinese plenipotentiaries arrived on January 31, 1895, 
accompanied by Messrs. Wu-Ting-Fang and John W. Fos- 
ter, and on the next day held their first conference with the 
Japanese plenipotentiaries. Count Ito, the premier, and Vis- 
count Mutsu, minister of foreign affairs, at the prefectural 
building. Upon the exchange of powers, those of the 
Chinese plenipotentiaries were found to be inadequate, since 
they authorized them to conclude nothing, but merely to 
act ad referendum to Peking.* At the next conference, 
therefore. Count Ito declined to proceed further,* but inti- 
mated that, in case China should send representatives duly 
clothed with full powers, negotiations would be re-opened. 
The Chinese plenipotentiaries then returned home, having 
accomplished nothing. 

At this stage of the war, Japan having been completely 

* For, Rel, 18^ pp. 83, 92, 93. 

* Ihid., p. loi. » Ihid,, p. loa. 


victorious, it was not to be expected that China could ob- 
tain peace without substantial sacrifices ; and it was natural 
that Japan should wish her to appoint a plenipotentiary who 
would not only be invested with full power, but who would 
also be so influential as to be able to assume the responsibility 
of the negotiations. It is said that Count Ito hinted to the 
Chinese representatives, in private conversation, on the eve 
of their departure, that the presence of the viceroy Li Hung 
Chang was desirable/ The strong fortress of Wei-hai-wei 
had fallen and Japan was concentrating her army and navy 
at the mouth of the Gulf of Pechili for a direct assault on 
Peking. Under these circumstances, the viceroy Li Hung 
Chang was sent out as ambassador plenipotentiary by China, 
with a suite of a hundred and thirty persons accompanied 
by Lord Li Ching Fang, an adopted son, and Messrs. Wu 
and Foster. On March 20 the first conference was held at 
Shimonoseki, and credentials were formally exchanged. 
Earl Li asked for an armistice as a preliminary to peace 
negotiations, but the conditions imposed by Japan were so 
onerous * that, at the second conference, he abandoned the 
subject and requested Count Ito to enter upon peace nego- 
tiations immediately. Unfortunately, while Earl Li was 
leaving the conference on March 24, he was fired upon 
and wounded by a Japanese fanatic named Koyama, who in 
his madness imagined he would benefit his country by 
assasinating " the strongest statesman of China." The 
imperial government and the people did their utmost to 

^ Count Ito became acquainted with Mr. Wu nvhen he concluded the 
Tientsin convention with Earl Li in 1885. 

* Ariga, La Guerre Sino-'Japonaise, p. 250. The conditions were to 
surrender the fortresses of Tarlc, Tientsin, Shan-hai-kwan, with their 
munitions and provisions, to the Japanese troops, to put the Tientsin- 
Shan-hai-kwan railway under control of military officers of Japan, and 
to bear all expenses of the Japanese force during the armistice. 


atone for this disgraceful act; the emperor sent his own 
physician, and the empress prepared with her own hands 
the bandages for the distinguished invalid; the governor 
and the chief of police of the prefecture were dismissed; 
and more than ten thousand letters of sympathy were sent 
in the course of a week from all parts of the empire to the 
stricken ambassador. Soon after the accident, the emperor 
ordered his plenipotentiaries to grant an armistice without 
the previous heavy conditions, and on March 30 an armis- 
tice to last twenty-one days was concluded for the provinces 
of Mukden, Pechili and Shan Tung.^ Meanwhile, the 
condition of Viceroy Li had so much improved that he in- 
formed Count Ito that he would resume negotiations with 
the aid of Lord Li Ching Fang, his adopted son. 

Japan's first draft of a treaty of peace was submitted on 
April I.* China was asked to recognize the absolute in- 
dependence of Korea; to cede that portion of the south- 
ern province of Shengking (Liao-Tung peninsula) lying 
between the rivers Yalu and Liao up to 41** north latitude, 
as well as Formosa and the Pescadores Islands ; to pay an 
indemnity of three hundred million taels ; to conclude a new 
commercial treaty based upon existing treaties of China with 
European nations; to grant to the Japanese in China the 
rights and privileges accorded to the most-favored nation 
until the new commercial treaty should come into force; to 
open seven new ports and four waterways to foreign trade; 
to modify the customs regulations and especially the *Hikin 
system;" and to grant to the Japanese the right freely to 
engage in " all kinds of manufacturing industries in China." 
As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the treaty, 
Mukden and Wei-hai-wei were to be temporarily occupied 

* Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, p. 251. 

* Vladimcr, The China-Japanese War, pp. 405-411- 


by Japanese troops. Five days later, the Chinese plenipo- 
tentiary presented an elaborate memorandum, in which he 
stated his objections especially to the large indemnity, to the 
territorial cessions, and to the customs revision.^ The 
Japanese plenipotentiaries demanded a reply in a more " con- 
crete form," and on April 9 the Chinese plenipotentiary sub- 
mitted a counter-proposal by which Korean independence 
was to be guaranteed by both countries, the territorial ces- 
sions were to be limited to the Pescadores Islands and sev- 
eral districts in Shengking, the indemnity was to be re- 
duced to a hundred million taels without interest, the Japan- 
ese troops were to be temporarily stationed only at Wei- 
hai-wei, and China and Japan were to agree to submit any 
subsequent disputes to the arbitration of a friendly power 
"in order to avoid future conflict or war." * In view of this 
counter-proposal, Japan next day modified her original draft 
in certain particulars.* The cession of territory in Shengking 
was to be decreased by drawing a line through Fenghuang, 
Haichang and Yingkou; the indemnity was to be reduced 
to two hundred million kuping taels; the ports and water- 
ways to be opened to foreign trade were to be reduced to 
four and two, respectively. Japan also agreed to occupy 
only Wei-hai-wei as a guarantee, but refused to admit into 
the treaty any clause concerning arbitration. On the follow- 
ing day an ultimatum was sent by Japan.* Earl Li ap- 
pealed to the Japanese for further modifications, but on 
April 13 Count Ito answered: "It only seems necessary 
for me to say in response to your Excellency's note, that 

1 Vladimir, The China- Japanese War, pp. 411 et seq. 

* For the text of China's counter-draft of treaty of peace, see ibid,, 
pp. 424 et seq. 

* Ibid., pp. 429-431* 

* Vladimer, The China- Japanese War, p. 432. 


the demands which I handed to your Excellency on the 
loth inst, being final, are no longer open to discussion." * 
Only a few days of the armistice remained, and the Japan- 
ese forces were concentrated, under the command of Prince 
Komatsu, at the mouth of the Gulf of Pechili, ready for the 
attack on Peking. Under such circumstances, Viceroy Li 
could do no more for his emperor and his country than ac- 
cept the Japanese ultimatum, and the treaty of peace was 
signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895.* The ratifica- 
tions were to be exchanged at Chi-fu; but, on April 22, 
Russia, France and Germany, acting in alliance, advised 
Japan to restore the whole territory of the Liao Tung pen- 
insula, as " the Japanese occupation of that territory not only 
endangered the existence of the Chinese capital and of 
Korean independence, but would upset the peace of the 
Orient" * The formidable squadrons of the three great 
powers were concentrated in the north of China, and pre- 
pared for an emergency. EJxcited Japanese officers in- 
sisted on forcibly resisting the interference of the triple alli- 
ance, while idealistic diplomatists proposed to submit the 
territorial question to an international conference of the 
great powers of Europe and America. But the naval forces 
of Japan, after hard wrestling with China, were unable to 
cope with the fresh squadron of the three powers, and an 
international conference would create another complication. 
The only practical answer was to accept the advice of the 
allies, and on May 3 Japan assured them that she was ready 
to renounce the permanent possession of the Liao-Tung 

1 Vladimer, The Chine- Japanese War, p. 436. 

« British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 87, pp. 799 et seq. 

« Note of the Russian minister at Tokyo to the Japanese minister of 
foreign affairs, on April 23. Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 
213. See also Leroy-Beaulieu, The Awakening of the East, p. 247. 


peninsula.* By a sq)arate convention, China gave to Japan 
an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels in consideration 
of the restoration.* In the light of subsequent events it is 
matter for regret that Japan did not take advantage of the 
situation to exact from China a pledge that the Liao-Tung 
peninsula should not be occupied by any other power, especi- 
ally as excellent precedent for such a course was provided 
by the pledge exacted from China by Great Britain upon the 
occasion of the evacuation by the latter of Port Hamilton.' 
Had such a pledge been exacted one of the principal causes 
of the Russo-Japanese conflict would have been removed. 

In accordance with the terms of the Peace of Shimon- 
oseki, a new commercial treaty between Japan and China 
was signed at Peking on July 21, 1896.* Its most signi- 
ficant feature was that the reciprocal form of the old treaty 
was replaced with the unilateral form. The new treaty re- 
cognized the consular jurisdiction of Japan in China and 
guaranteed to Japan most-favored-nation treatment in all 
that concerns consular jurisdiction, commerce, industry and 
navigation, but did not guarantee similar treatment to 
Chinese in Japan, except as to diplomatic agents. 

Although the legitimate fruits of the war were snatched 
from Japan by the interference of the continental powers of 
Europe, the conflict produced important results. China was 
compelled to recognize Korean independence,' which had 

* Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 227. See also Imperial Re- 
script of May 10, concerning the restoration of the peninsula, British 
and Foreign State Papers, vol. 87, p. 805. 

*Ibid., p. 1195. * Infra, p. 186. 

* Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, vol. 88, pp. 473 et seq. 

" China recognizes Korean independence by the first article of the 
Shimonoseki treaty. Korea also concluded a treaty of amity and com- 
merce with China on an equal footing on September 11, 1899. For. ReL, 
1899^ p. 493. 


been at stake for two decades. Significant steps were also 
taken towards opening China to the world's commerce, especi- 
ally by securing access to new ports and to waterways ex- 
tending into the interior. The privilege was obtained of 
hiring or renting warehouses for the storage of articles 
purchased in the interior, and of transporting imported 
merchandise into the interior " without the payment of any 
taxes or exactions whatever." Foreigners were also per- 
mitted to " engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries 
in all the open cities, towns and ports of China," and it was 
stipulated that all these manufactured articles should '' en- 
joy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise im- 
ported by foreigners into China." 

Treaty Relations with Spain. — Treaty relations between 
Japan and Siam were first established in 1887 when Prince 
Devawongse visited Tokyo and concluded a declaration with 
Mr. Aoki, vice-minister of foreign affairs.^ By this declara- 
tion, provision was made for the exchange of ministers and 
the establishment of consulates, and for the encouragement 
of commerce and navigation. As both contracting coun- 
tries then strongly aspired to judicial autonomy, and to the 
development of civilization on western lines, their treaty re- 
lations were somewhat different from those formed with 
China and Korea. The declaration did not recognize con- 
sular jurisdiction, but provided that, until a " complete con- 
vention " should be made, the subjects of each power should 
have in the dominions of the other full security of person 
and of property, and the right to "be treated in a fair 
and equitable manner." 

A new treaty was concluded in 1899; ^^^ notwithstand- 
ing the fact that, while Japan had abolished foreign con- 
sular jurisdiction, Siam still retained it, the new treaty re- 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 79, p. 319. 


cognized the territorial law of both countries.* By a separ- 
ate agreement, however, Japan secured consular jurisdic- 
tion in Siam., except as to the laws of succession and marri- 
age, until the codification of the laws of that country should 
be completed.* While Japan does not concede most-fav- 
ored-nation treatment in the case of the Chinese and Kor- 
eans, the new treaty with Siam stipulates for reciprocal 
most-favored-nation treatment in commerce and navigation. 
A striking feature of the treaty is a provision for arbitration, 
in case the contracting parties cannot agree as to the inter- 
pretation of the treaty provisions. 

Japan's readiness to recognize the judicial autonomy of 
Siam may serve to encourage the Siamese in their desire 
to enter into the " comity of nations." 

^ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 90, pp. 66 et seq. 
* Ibid^ pp. 70 et seq. 

The Far Eastern Question, 1895-1900 

Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Korea, — As soon as the war 
with China was over, Japan entered into international poli- 
tics in association with western powers; and she at once 
began to play, especially with Russia in Korea, a significant 
part in the drama. 

After the Crimean War, Russia, checked in her designs 
upon the Ottoman Empire and thus prevented from ob- 
taining an outlet to the Mediterranean, determined to push 
her way to the Pacific. She secured, by the treaty of Peking 
in i860, the possession of the Pacific coast of Manchuria 
from the Amur River to Vladivostock and the Korean fron- 
tier;* and in 1875 she finally acquired Saghalien Island 
from Japan in exchange for the Kurile Islands.* After 
her approach to the Mediterranean through the Balkan 
peninsula had been definitely blocked by the treaties of 
Paris, London and Berlin, for the reason that the great 
powers considered her advance in that direction dangerous 
to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to the balance 
of power in Europe as well, and after her route to the 
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean through Persia or Central 
Asia had been closed by England, Russia decided to con- 

* British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 53, pp. 970 et seq. 

* Dip, Cor., 1867, part 2, pp. 61 et seq. For. Rel, 1875, p. 1065. Sec 
also Martens, Traitis, vol. ii, p. 582. Russia laid claim to the island of 
Sas^halien in 1867, and secured possession of it by the treaty of 1875. 

417I i8s 


centrate all her energies upon establishing her foothold on 
the Pacific Ocean. The Russian ministers at Peking and 
Seoul therefore moved hand in glove with Li Hung Chang, 
Yen-shi-gai, and Mollendorff ; and this was true prior to the 
British occupation of Port Hamilton, a Korean Island, 
which had been, in 1885, occupied by the English govern- 
ment " in order to anticipate the Russian seizure " of Port 
Lazareff/ But Great Britain evacuated the island in 1887 
on the strength of an assurance from China that " the Rus- 
sian government would not occupy Korean territory under 
any circumstances." * In 1891, Russia commenced her 
gigantic undertaking for the construction of a trans-Siber- 
ian railway east to Vladivostock. She was not, however, 
satisfied with Vladivostock as her outlet on the Pacific, for 
the port is ice-bound more than half the year. Seeking a 
better terminal in the extreme Orient which might be free 
from this natural restriction, Russia cast longing eyes upon 
Korea and Manchuria. She secured from the Korean gov- 
ernment, in 1893, an overland telegraphic connection be- 
tween Korea and Siberia.' Had Japan, as the result of the 
Shimonoseki treaty, obtained the Liao-Tung peninsula, 
fortified Port Arthur and Talienwan, and secured a free 
hand for the preservation of Korean independence, it would 
have been next to impossible for Russia to obtain a satis- 
factory outlet on the Pacific coast. It was therefore in- 
evitable that Russia should come more and more to inter- 
fere in the Korean as well as in the Manchurian question. . 

Japan fought with China mainly for the reform of the 
corrupt administration of Korea, which was endangering 
Korean independence and menacing the interests of the 

1 Cordicr, Histoire des relations de la Chine, vol. iii, p. 3. 

^Parliamentary Papers, China no. i {1B87), 

« Curzon, Problems of the Far East (edition of 1896), p. 21a. 


world; and for the carrying out of her policy Japan had 
of course expected to assume the unavoidable responsibility. 
After the Chino- Japanese war broke out in July, 1894, nu- 
merous laws were introduced in Korea, and a " council of 
state '' was instituted for the preparation of reform meas- 
ures. On New Year's day of 1895, Li-Hsi, king of Korea, 
promulgated at the Ancestral Temple the fundamental law 
of the country,* which was regarded as a brief summary of 
its constitutional system, just as the Mikado had proclaimed 
the " imperial oath of five items " on the eve of the Restora- 
tion of 1868. By this law, Korean independence was again 
declared; the ruling power was affirmed to belong to the 
king alone, with the advice of his ministers and council; 
all administrative measures were to be executed according 
to law ; the old feudalism and social classes were to be abol- 
ished; a new educational system was to be introduced. 
Hitherto, the queen and her relatives, the Min family (the 
old pro-Chinese party), had often interfered with the king 
and prevented reforms by their reactionary influence. The 
constitution, therefore, specially provided that " the queen 
and her relatives must not oppose these." Count Inouye, 
one of the founders of modern Japan, was sent to Korea as 
advisory commissioner. Pok-Eiko, a Korean refugee who 
had been in Japan since the insurrection of 1884, was now 
recalled and appointed to the post of minister of the in- 
terior. Numerous laws and ordinances regulating the de- 
tails of every branch of the administration, including edu- 
cation, taxation and courts of justice, were issued, but the 
execution of this " busy legislation " was poorly performed. 
The reform party, led by Pok-Eiko, soon came into conflict 
with the Min party and the queen, and after plots and 

» An English translation is given in Curzon, Problems of the Far 
East, p. 375. 


counter-plots, Pok finally fled to Japan for safety. Mean- 
while Count Inouye was replaced by Baron Miura, a man 
of decision and executive ability, but who lacked diplomatic 
tact, and Tai-Om-Kun, the father of the king, was once 
more called to the regency. The reform party, backed by 
new and active advisers and a strong regency, now undertook 
sweeping reforms, and, as the result of a plot led by Boku- 
Sen, the queen and her colleagues, who obstinately opposed 
all reform measures, were killed. 

Russia, who had been watching for an opportunity to in- 
terfere in Korean affairs, professed to regard the recent 
plot as the treacherous work of the Japanese Soshi,^ and 
exaggerated the insecurity of the Korean royal family. 
The conservative party, backed by Russian influence, again 
became active and now persuaded the king to shake off the 
Japanese influence and to depend upon Russian support. A 
secret attempt to remove the throne to the Russian legation 
had been prevented in December, 1895, ^7 ^^e national 
guard. Subsequently, the guard was sent to the revolted 
district in northern Korea. Taking advantage of its ab- 
sence, the conservative party, on February 11, 1896, per- 
petrated a riot at the palace. Tai-Won-Kun was killed, 
the king and the heir-apparent were taken from the palace 
and were received in asylum at the Russian legation, which 
was guarded by Russian marines who had landed the day 
before at Chemulpo. The cabinet ministers were declared 
guilty of treason and a new cabinet was organized exclu- 
sively of the pro-Russian party led by Min-Chong-Mok.* 
The result of the recent entente was that all reform meas- 
ures and improvements, undertaken by Japanese advice, were 
utterly annulled. To prevent the further encroachment of 
Russian influence in Korea, there was no other course left 

^ A sort of Japanese outlaws. > Annual Register, i8g6, p. 351. 


open to Japan than that of negotiation with her rival The 
Komura-Waeber memorandum was therefore concluded at 
Seoul in May, 1896, and the Yamagata-Lobanow protocol at 
St. Petersburg, in July, when Marquis Yamagata attended 
the Czar's coronation/ By these agreements the contract- 
ing parties engaged that their representatives should give 
" friendly advice " to the Korean king to return to his 
palace from the Russian legation, while the Japanese rep- 
resentative was to give an assurance that the most com- 
plete and effective measures would be taken for the control 
of the Japanese Soshi at Seoul. Japan was also required to 
limit the number of her troops in Korea to a thousand, for 
the protection of her telegraph line between Fusan and 
Seoul and of her settlements in the capital and in the open 
ports of Fusan, Wongsan and Chemulpo. On the other 
hand, Japan recognized the right of Russia to keep troops 
in Korea as well as her concession to construct a telegraph 
line between Seoul and Siberia. Russia also obtained the 
right to advise Korea concerning financial and military mat- 
ters as freely as Japan. 

It must be frankly admitted that the Japanese advisers, 
in their reforming zeal, made a gross error in introducing 
into Korea radically new institutions for which there was 
no desire and which conflicted with established customs and 
traditions. Not only are the Koreans less adaptable than 
the Japanese, but they are, on the contrary, peculiarly imper- 
vious to new ideas. Even the Japanese assimilation of mod- 
ern institutions was the work of several decades. It is 
no wonder then that the radical reforms attempted in Korea 
provoked antagonism to Japan among the conservatives and 
finally opened the way to the active interference of Russia 
in Korean affairs. 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 88, pp. 471-47^- 


King Li-Hsi, after receiving many petitions from the 
people, left the Russian legation for his palace in February, 
1897, but the progress of Russian influence was not checked. 
M. Speyer, the new Russian minister at Seoul, is said to 
have obtained a promise from the Korean government that 
the Korean army should be trained by Russian instructors, 
in spite of the objections of the king, who feared that inter- 
national complications might result.* Not only did Russia 
seek military control, but she also sought to take charge 
of the finances of Korea. A secret agreement is said to 
have been concluded on November 5, 1897, under which M. 
Alexieff, the secretary of the Russian legation, was to be 
appointed financial adviser to the Korean government, and 
Mr. Brown,' a British subject, was to be dismissed from his 
office in the custom house.* At the same time, the so-called 
Russo-Korean Bank, a branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank, 
was established at Seoul. So pervasive indeed had Russian 
influence become that Korean independence seemed to be 
little more than a name. 

Meanwhile, Japan, though she had failed in her attempted 
reforms, was quietly and patiently preparing to oppose the 
Russian domination. In 1897 an extraordinary increase 
was made in her budget for the army and navy.' On the 
other hand, her subjects, in order to gain a firm footing in 
the peninsula, were developing the commercial and indus- 
trial privileges which had been granted by the various treat- 
ies. At the same time Great Britain immensely increased 
her fleet in the Orient, as a counter-check to Russian activ- 
ity in north China, and, when Mr. Brown was dismissed 

^ Thg Far East (a Japanese periodical published in English), voL ii, 
p. 533. 

* Ibid,, p. 725. See also Annual Register, 1897, p. 362. 

• Annual Register, 1897, p. 363. 

423] ^^^ P^R EASTERN QUESTION 191 

from the customs service, a part of the British squadron 
appeared at Chemulpo. There was also much speculation 
in the Japanese as well as in the English press as to the 
possibilities of an Anglo- Japanese alliance, while the Russian 
navy was concentrating in the Gulf of Pechili prior to the 
occupation of Port Arthur. No sooner, however, had 
Russia obtained a lease of the Kwan-Tung peninsula, in- 
cluding Port Arthur and Tai-Lien-Wan, from China, in 
March, 1898, than she prudently determined to abandon 
her intervention in Korea " in order not to add the power- 
ful support [of Japan] to that of England." * The re- 
quest of the Korean government for the withdrawal of the 
Russian financial adviser and the Russian military instruc- 
tor was heeded, and even the Russo-Korean Bank was 
closed; * and on April 25, 1898, a very satisfactory proto- 
col between Japan and Russia was signed at Tokyo." The 
contracting parties, definitely recognizing " the sovereignty 
and entire independence of Korea," agreed not to interfere 
in the aflfairs of that country, nor to take any steps to nom- 
inate military instructors or financial advisers without a 
previous mutual understanding. Russia especially pledged 
herself not to interfere with the peculiar development of the 
commercial and industrial relations between Japan and 
Korea, thus giving Japan a free hand, so far as her economic 
interests in Korea were concerned. As a result of this fav- 
orable agreement, Japanese syndicates were enabled to ob- 
tain from the Korean government a definite grant of the 
concession of the Fusan-Seoul railroad, a first claim to 

» Leroy-Beaulku, The Awakening of the East, p. 272. 
« The Far East, 1898, vol. iii, p. 332. 

» Gaiko-Jiho {Revue Diplomatique), Tokyo, vol. i, no. 5, p. 27. For. 
Rel, 1898, p. 473. 


which they had previously obtained in 1894.* They also 
bought up the Seoul-Chemulpo concession which had ori- 
ginally been granted to Mr. Morse, an American citizen.* 

The coincidence of the Russian recession from Korea with 
the Russian occupation of Port Arthur would seem to indi- 
cate that Russia then thought that she could secure freedom 
of action in the Pacific by the fortification of Port Arthur 
and the building of the Manchurian railway. From a 
strategic point of view, however, her line of water commun- 
ication between Vladivostock and Port Arthur was obvi- 
ously unsafe without a naval station or a coal depot on the 
Korean coast, since it could at any moment be cut by Japan, 
who was energetically increasing her naval force and who 
had fortified the strait of Tsushima as a wedge in the Rus- 
sian waterway. Russia therefore renewed her activities in 
Korea, but under the guise of private transactions in order 
to avoid the protest of Japan. On May i, 1899, the Korean 
government opened the harbor of Masanpho, thirty miles 
from Fusan. Masanpho is one of the finest harbors in Korea, 
and is protected by Koje Island, facing Tsushima Strait. 
Five days after the opening of the harbor, M. Pavloff, the 
Russian representative at Seoul, while on his way to Russia 
on leave, met at Masanpho Admiral Makaroff, the famous 
strategist, and after a thorough survey of the coast and 
harbor they selected a large tract on the shore — ^a most 
available strategic site — which M. Pavloff informed the 
local authorities would soon be purchased by the Russian 
Steamship Company for a dock and coaling station. Be- 
fore the legal formalities were completed, the owner of the 
land sold it for a higher price to Japanese. The Russian 

^ Rockhill, Treaties and Conventions with, or concerning, China and 
Korea (1894-1904), pp. 453 et seq. 

^ Ibid,, pp. 450 et seq. The text of the original contract between Mr. 
Morse and the Korean government is given. 

425] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 193 

government demanded of the governments of Japan and 
Korea that the land be restored to the original contractor/ 
but they replied that they had no right to interfere in legiti- 
mate transactions between Japanese and Korean subjects." 
The resulting irritation gave rise to persistent rumors of 
war in the European press as well as in the Japanese. For- 
tunately, however, the year 1899 passed away without a 

M. Pavloff returned to Seoul on March 19, 1900, and 
presently demanded from the Korean government the ces- 
sion to the Russian Steamship Company of "Atkinson's 
Point," commanding the entrance of Masanpo harbor. At 
the same time he required that Korea should hold on to 
Koje Island, so as to keep it out of the counter-occupation 
of the Japanese. Meanwhile the Russian Rear Admiral 
Hildebrand, came to Chemulpo with several men-of-war. 
His appearance was regarded by the Japanese as a repeti- 
tion of what preceded the Russian occupation of Port 
Arthur, and again there arose a wild rumor of war ; but, as 
the Korean government, acting on Japan's advice, remained 
firm, Russia somewhat modified her terms, and agreed to 
take a lease within the foreign settlement of Masanpho, 
Korea giving her pledge not to alienate Koje Island.* 
Russia is said further to have obtained the right to use her 
leased lot for a coaling station and a naval hospital for her 
Pacific squadron,* but this did not necessarily impair the 
sovereign rights of Korea, nor the interests of Japan or of 
any other treaty power, since similar concessions might be 
obtained by the other powers within the foreign settlement. 

1 Rev%^ fran^aise de Fitranger et des colonies, 1900, vol. 25, p. 396. 
« Gaiko-Jiho {Revue Diplomatique), Tokyo, 1900, no. 26, p. 45. 
« International Year Book, vol. of 1900, p. 255. 
* London Times, May 5, 1900, p. 5, Peking correspondence. 


The other powers, however, would not have kq>t silence, 
had Russia fortified the leased territory or stationed her 
forces therein. 

The Struggle of the Great Powers m China — Spheres of 
Interest. — ^The Liao-Tung peninsula, being barren land, is 
economically valueless, but it is of vital importance to Japan 
for the preservation of Korean independence against the 
possible encroachments of China or Russia, because it in- 
cludes the magnificent naval station of Port Arthur, and the 
fine port of Tailien-Wan, which is situated in a dominant 
position in the Yellow Sea between China and Korea. For 
this reason, Japan had sought to obtain the Liao-Tung pen- 
insula by the treaty of Shimonosdci ; but she was forced by 
Russia, France and Germany to restore it on the ground 
that her possession of it " would be detrimental to the last- 
ing peace of the Orient." Russian interference would be 
theoretically justified so long as it respected this principle, 
but in reality its aim was to obtain the peninsula for Russia 
herself. France and Germany supported her against Japan 
on account of political relations in Europe, and, wishing 
" to gain the good graces of the czar," " they both answered 
all proposals which came from St. Petersburg favourably." * 
Besides, they seem also to have expected handsome conces- 
sions from China as a reward for tiieir attitude Their 
action produced a great change in the situation in the Far 
East. The preponderant influence previously held by Great 
Britain in China was superseded by that of Russia, France 
and Germany; and, while the antagonism between Russia 
and Japan became more pronounced the relations between 
Great Britain and Japan b^an to grow closer. 

After the war with Japan, when the Chinese govern- 
ment was confronted with the question of how to pay the 

> Leroy-Beaulieu, The Awakening of the East^ p. 248. 


heavy indemnity imposed by the treaty of Shimonoseki, 
Russia seized the opportunity to strengthen her position in 
China by doing a favor to the " sick man." Herself heavily 
burdened with a foreign debt of more than £240,000,000, 
she could not directly make an adequate loan to China; but, 
under the able management of the "financial diplomat," 
M. de Witte, then minister of finance, the Russian govern- 
ment, on June 24, 1895, gave its guarantee to a S3mdicate, 
mainly composed of French financiers, to furnish- China a 
four per cent loan of 400,000,000 francs.^ The services re- 
peatedly rendered by Russia to China could not fail to be 
appreciated by the latter. Count Cassini, the foremost di- 
plomat of the czar, is said to have succeeded, while Russian 
minister at Peking, in concluding a secret arrangement, 
known as the " Cassini convention," between the Russo- 
Chinesc Bank and China, for the construction of a railway 
in eastern China. According to this agreement, which is 
said to have been confirmed when Li Hung Chang attended 
the czar's coronation in 1896,* Russia was to prolong the 
trans-Siberian railway into the " three Eastern Provinces " 
of Manchuria (art. i), and to provide the funds in case 
China built a branch line from Kirin to Newchwang via 
Mukden (art. 3),* China was to " follow the Russian rail- 

^ The <l«tails of the loan and the text of the contract are given in 
Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occiden- 
taUs, vol. iii, pp. 305-308. 

* Krausse, Russia in Asia, p. 183. 

* The French text is given in Cordier's work, pp. 343 et seq.; the 
English text in Drace, Russian Affairs, pp. 663 et seq. According to 
Professpor Cornier, the alleged convention consisted of two documents, 
one rekvting to the railway in Manchuria, negotiated between the Russo- 
Qiinese Bank and Giina, the other to Kiao-Chou Bay, between Li 
Hung Chang and Prince Lobanoff at St. Petersburg. These two be- 
came confused- and were generally known to the public as the " Cas- 
sini convention." See Cordier, ibid., pp. 347-348. 


way regulations " in case she built the line from Shan-hai- 
kwan to Port Arthur through Newchwang and Chindiou 
(art. 4). The railways to be built by Russia in China, and 
the Russian subjects engaged in building them, were to be 
protected by the local civil and military officials; although 
in the barren and sparsely inhabited territory where the 
Chinese authorities were not able to afford proper protection, 
Russia was to ''be allowed to place special battalions of 
horse and foot soldiers at the various stations," (art. 5). 
The Russians, with the co-operation of the Chinese, were 
to be permitted " to exploit and open any mines " in the 
three provinces (art. 7) ; and Russian officers were to be 
engaged to instruct the Chinese forces in the " Eastern Pro- 
vinces " (art. 8). The port of Kiao-Chou, in the Shan- 
Tung province, was to be leased to Russia for fifteen years, 
should Russia enter into hostilities with any power on the 
Asiatic continent (art. 9). China was to rebuild the forts 
at Port Arthur and Talien-Wan, while Russia was to help 
protect them against encroachment by other powers ; China, 
besides, was not " to cede them to any power," but was to 
grant to Russia the right "to concentrate her land and 
naval force within the said ports," in case she became in- 
volved in war (art. 10). As the result of this agreement, 
the Chinese Eastern Railway Company ^ was formed by 
the Russo-Chinese Bank, and was authorized to construct 
a line across Manchuria, connecting the branch of the Trans- 
Siberian Railway from the Baikal region directly with 
Vladivostock, and thus reducing the originally estimated 
length of the railway by 568 miles.* Most significant of all, 
however, was the provision that all Russian imports by the 

^ The statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company are given 
in Britisk and Foreign State Papers, vol. 88, p. 773. 

* Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, The Awakening of the East, p. 72. 

429] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION jgy 

railway should be admitted at a rate of duty one-third less 
than that imposed at Chinese seaport custom-houses. 

For her services in the triple intervention of 1895, France 
obtained from China, by the conventions signed at Peking 
on June 20 of the same year, the extension of her com- 
mercial concessions on the frontier of Cochin-China and cer- 
tain concessions as to the boundary in that quarter/ 

Germany for a time kept quiet. She apparently thought 
that her services could not be requited within the ordinary 
bounds of diplomacy, and awaited an opportunity to de- 
mand a liberal reward. On the first of November, 1897, 
a Chinese mob attacked the German church at Yenchow, 
in the Shan-Tung province, and murdered two missionaries. 
This event furnished an occasion for the disclosure of Ger- 
many's commercial and naval ambitions in the Far East. 
In due time a German squadron commanded by Prince 
Henry, a brother of the Emperor William, entered the Kiao- 
Chau bay and occupied the place. The German example 
was quickly followed by other powers. Russia, in Decem- 
ber, 1897, occupied Port Arthur and Tailien-Wan. Ger- 
many, on March 6, 1898, concluded a convention for the 
occupation of Kiao-Chau, and on March 27 a similar con- 
vention was made by Russia as to Port Arthur and Tailien- 
Wan. Kiao-Chau bay and the adjacent tefritories were, 
by the first convention, leased to Germany for a term of 
ninety-nine years with the right to construct fortifications, 
to establish a naval and coaling station, and to build a dock- 
yard. Germany further obtained the concession of a pre- 
ferential right to construct railways and to exploit mines 
throughout the Shan-Tung province.^ Russia obtained a 

1 Leroy-Beaulieu, op, cit, p. 259. For the text of the convention, sec 
Cordicr, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 163 et seq,; Rockhill's edition, pp. 21 et seq, 

« The full German text is given in Das Staatsarchiv, vol. 61, pp. i 
4t seq. See also Pari. Papers, China no. i (1899), pp. 69 et seq. 


lease of Port Arthur, Tailien-Wan and the adjacent waters 
for twenty-five years, with the right to erect fortifications 
and to establish naval and military stations. Moreover, 
the Russo-Chinese Bank was authorized to construct a 
branch line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad tfirough Man- 
churia to TailienrWan and to Port Arthur/ Following 
the example of Russia and of Germany, France, on April 
10, 1898, secured a lease of Kwang-chow-Wang, a bay on 
the south coast of China, for ninety-nine years as a naval 
station ; the right to construct a railway connecting Tonquin 
with Yannan-fu by the Red River; a pledge of the non- 
alienation of the three southern provinces and the appoint- 
ment of a French subject as the director general of the 
Chinese post office.* 

Toward these transactions, Great Britain assumed a self- 
defensive attitude, although, in her opposition to Russia and 
France, she co-operated to a certain extent with Germany 
and Italy. To counterbalance die loan policy of Russia of 
1895, Great Britain, in 1896, gave her guarantee to the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank to enable them to float another Chinese loan of 
£16,000,000.* She also obtained by a convention of Febru- 
ary 4, 1897, certain important modifications of the boun- 
daries of Burma and Thibet* Great Britain, though she 
has ever sought to maintain the balance of power against 
Russian encroachments in the Far East, never more openly 
displayed her traditional policy than in the case of the 

1 Pari. Papers, China no. i (1899), pp. 128 et seq. 

* /Wrf., p. 12. The full French text is given in Cordier, op. ciL, vol. 
iii, pp. 370 et seq.; its English translation in Rockhill's edition, p. 55. 

» Consular Reports of the United States, October, 1899, p. 328; Cor- 
dier, op. cit^ voL iii, p. 303. 

* Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, no. 7, 1897 ; Rockhill's edition, 
pp. 40 et seq. 


Russian occupation of Port Arthur. Recognizing the fact 
that Russia, in possession of a station like Port Arthur, in 
the Gulf of Pechili, near the Qiinese capital, could easily 
overawe the Peking government and menace the interests 
of the other treaty powers in Manchuria, she immediately 
protested against the proposed acquisition. Russia pleaded 
that Port Arthur had been " temporarily lent " to her as a 
" winter anchorage for Russian vessels," * but meanwhile, 
as the London Times reported, demanded from China the 
same rights over Port Arthur and Tailien-Wan as Germany 
had secured over Kiao-Chau, and threatened that, if an 
agreement was not signed within five days, to move her 
troops into Manchuria.' Alarmed by this report, the 
British foreign office demanded information as to what was 
going on. Count Mouravieff answered that Russia was 
negotiating for the lease of Port Arthur and Tailien-Wan, 
as " the possession of a port on an ice-free coast was a 
matter of vital importance to Russia," and that a part of 
Tailien-Wan would be open to foreign trade.* The British 
government of course did not object to Russia's acquiring 
an ice-free harbor on the Pacific, so long as it remained a 
free commercial port like Hongkong; but the " military oc- 
cupation or fortification of Port Artfiur or any other harbors 
in the Gulf of Pechili " by Russia was another matter. Sir 
Claude Macdonald, British minister at Peking, warned 
China not to make such a concession, while Sir Nicholas 
O'Connor lodged a protest at St. Petersburg. But it was 
all in vain. Russia insisted and China yielded.* The 
"balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili," declared the 

1 Parliamentary Papers, China no. i (1898), pp. 9, 10 and 12. 
« London Times, March 7. 1898. 

* Parliamentary Papers, China no. i (1898), p. 43. 

* Ibid., p. 53. 


Marquis of Salisbury, " is materially altered by the sur- 
render of Port Arthur by the Y(mten to Russia;" * but, 
being unwilling to go to war, the British government, with 
a view to counteract die new Russian advantage, demanded 
of China a similar concession, and, by advancing tfie money 
to pay off the Japanese war indemnity, secured on April 3, 
1898, a lease of Wei-hai-wei, which was then occupied by 
Japanese troops as a guarantee.^ Meanwhile, the French 
squadron had been manoeuvering near the harbor of 
Shanghai ; but England had quietly secured from China on 
February 9, 1898, a promise not to alienate the ridi valley 
of the Yai^-tsze-Kiang,' thus anticipating the demands of 
other powers. English influence, however, was also en- 
dangered in the south of China, where the fortification of 
Kwang-Chow Bay by France was likely to endanger Hong- 
Kong. To meet this danger, Great Britain on June 9, 1898, 
concluded the so-called " Hong-Kong Extension Agree- 
ment," by which China granted a lease for ninety-nine years 
of 400 square miles of territory in the peninsula of Kow- 
loon, immediately opposite to Hong-Kong, on the same 
terms as the French lease of Kwang-Chow Bay.* What 
Great Britain desired in China was to preserve the Celestial 
Empire as an open market for the world's commerce, in 
which all nations might have fair play; and if this policy 
was put in jeopardy or hampered by exclusive concessions, 
or by the predominant influences of particular powers, the 
only thing remaining for England to do was either to fight 
or to make counter-demands for similar concessions or for 
the exercise of a like influence. During the early part of 

^Parliamentary Papers, China no. j (1898), p. 54. 
» 5**0*^ Papers, vol. 90, p. 16. 

* Parliamentary Papers, China no. 2 (1898). 

* British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 90, p. 16. 

433] ^^^ P^R EASTERN QUESTION 201 

1898, when the continental powers of Europe were pur- 
suing exclusive aims in China, the " integrity of the empire," 
an " open door to the world commerce," and " equality of 
opportunity " were the watchwords in the House of Com- 
mons,^ while demands for counter-concessions and for the 
maintenance of the balance of power in Pechili were advo- 
cated by Lords Salisbury and Kimberley, and by Messrs. 
Balfour and Curzon. 

The policy of Japan, up to the Chino-Japanese war, 
seems to have been to keep aloof from European entangle- 
ments in the Far East. In 1884, when China was involved 
in the Korean complications with Japan and in the Tonking 
dispute with France, France offered to form an alliance with 
Japan against China,' but Japan politely declined. China, 
however, pursued a different course, and, during the war with 
Japan, introduced European political intervention into the 
Orient. As the result of the triple intervention of 1895, 
Japan^s policy of aloofness became utterly untenable. The 
European powers having acquired important footholds in the 
Orient, it became impossible to maintain the principle of 
"Asia for the Asiatics," and the only course left open to 
Japan was to co-operate with the powers having views 
similar to her own, in order to preserve the balance of 
power against disturbers. Japan thus naturally became de- 
sirous of co-operating with Great Britain, and welcomed 
the request for the evacuation of Wei-hai-wei when England 
obtained the lease of it* At the same time there was 
much discussion of the possibility of an Anglo- Japanese alli- 
ance in the native press.* 

1 See speech of Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, London 
Times, April 6, 1898, pp. 8-9. 

* Ogawa, Diplomacy of the Meiji Era, p. 123 ; Curzon, The Far East, 
p. 210. 

*Parl. Papers, ChirM no. i (1899), p. 86. 

* Annwil Register, 1898, p. 341- 


Germany, Russia, France and England having obtained 
** leases " on the seaboard of China and thus strengthened 
their position in the Far East, the Taigairdoshi-Kwaiy or 
Association on Foreign Policy, was formed in Japan, in 
April, 1898, by proniinent statesmen of the different poli- 
tical parties, with a view to induce the government to take 
measures to meet the new order of things. When its rep- 
resentative called upon Marquis Ito on April 7, the premier 
" assured them that the government would not neglect to 
promote the interests of the nation," and is said to have 
intimated " that the attitude of Great Britain was very fav- 
orable " to Japan. ^ And in April, 1898, the Japanese gov- 
ernment, in order to forestall the lease or occupation of the 
province of Fokien opposite Formosa, by a European power, 
so as to menace Japan's possession of Formosa and the 
Pascadores Islands, demanded and obtained from China a 
promise not to alienate the province just as Ekigland had 
done in respect of the Yang-tsze valley.* 

The last country to be considered with reference to the 
Far Eastern question, is Italy. On February 28, 1899, 
Sgr. Martino, the Italian minister, demanded of the Chinese 

the lease of Sammtun Bay on the coast of Che-Iciang as a 
coaling station and naval base, including the concession of three 
islands off the coast, with the right to construct a railway from 
Sammum Bay to Poyang Lake within a sphere of influence 
comprising the southern two-thirds of Che-?kiang province.* 

Great Britain apparently r^^arded the Italian co-operation 

1 The Far East, 1898, vol. iii, pp. 333-334- 

« Annual Register, 1898, p. 34o; China no. i (1899), p. 112. Sec tbo 
Rockhill's edition, p. 181. 
* Annual Register, 1899, p. 358. 

435] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 203 

as necessary to the preservation of the balance of power in 
the Far East, and the British minister supported the Italian 
demands ; but the Tsung-li^Yamin would not listen to them ; 
and the Italian government, limiting its activity to com- 
mercial matters, obtained a mining concession in northern 
Che-kiang in August.^ 

The weakness displayed by the Chinese government in 
the Japanese war, and in the subsequent concessions to 
European powers, was, by the patriotic party in South 
China and by the progressive Chinese in Peking, ascribed 
to the corruption of the governmental system and to the 
mandarins' ignorance of western ideas. Prince Chun, the 
emperor's personal adviser, had already called attention to 
tile superiority of the military methods of the western peo- 
ples. Meanwhile, certain scholars, professing a renaissance 
of Confucianism, but imbued with enthusiasm for western 
civilization, had started at Canton and Shanghai an agita- 
tion for reform. Kang-Yu-Wei," a leader of the new 
school, had tendered, from time to time, since the German 
occupation of Kiao-Chau, petitions to the Emperor Kwang- 
Su for the adoption of reform measures. The emperor, be- 
ing rather a student of politics than a ruler, adopted the 
artificial measures of the new school and appointed Kang- 
Yu-Wd to the important office of secretary of the board of 
works. By an edict issued on June 11, 1898, all mandarins, 
central or local, from princes to " literati " (petty officials), 
were instructed to do their " utmost to discover which for- 
eign country has the best system in any branch of learning ;" 
and the establishment of a " metropolitan university " was 

^ Annual Register, 1899, p. 358. 

* His article on " The Reform of China," in the Contemporary Re- 
view for August, 1899, shows the motive an<l attitude of the reform 


suggested as a necessary institution of the reform r^me,* 
Another edict was issued to replace the old system of ap- 
pointment of mandarins by the more modem competitive 
system. By an edict of June 12, a "special minister of 
commerce " was to be appointed, and a number of the im- 
perial princes were to be sent abroad to investigate modem 
aflfairs and ideas.* Besides these, reformatory edicts re- 
garding military organization, the judicial system and rail- 
ways and mines were successively issued. The reform 
party naturally obtained the sympathy of the Japanese and 
the English, who were very jealous of the predominant in- 
fluence of Russia at Peking. The reformation went on. 
Weng-Tung-Ho, a member of the Privy Council, and Li 
Hung Chang, a leading member of Tsung-li-Yamen, both 
most conservative figures among the mandarins, were dis- 
missed from office.* 

The proceedings of the reformers were so radical that 
Marquis Ito, during his stay at Peking, sought to discour- 
age Kang-Yu-Wei, the leader of the reform party, by 
intimating that they were attempting " to carry out in a 
week reforms which it had taken more than a quarter of a 
century to accomplish in Japan." * It is no wonder that they 
brought about a reaction, which on September 2 1 produced a 
coup d'etaty since their radical measures not only violated 
Chinese prejudices, but also destroyed mandarinism, the 
fundamental fabric of the Manchu govemmentt The em- 
press dowager resumed her controlling power and all reform 
measures were suspended by an edict. The emperor be- 
came only the nominal ruler; the mandarins of the con- 
servative party were restored to their offices; most of the 

^Parliamentary Papers, China no. i (1899)* P- I79- 

« Ibid,, p. 180. » Ibid,, pp. 181 and 240. 

* Pierre Lcroy-Beaulieu, The Awakening of the East, p. 278. 

437] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 205 

refortn party were beheaded or sent into exile, and its 
leader, Kang-Yu-Wei, secretly took refuge on board an 
English ship/ Thus the reform measures brought no cure 
to " the Sick Man of the Far East." 

After obtaining leases of territory on the Chinese coast, 
the powers entered into a scramble for further concessions, 
relating to railway construction, the exploitation of mines, 
and the extension of the foreign settlements; but the con- 
test as to railways was the most active. As Russia desired to 
obtain exclusive control of railway matters in Manchuria 
and Pechili, her charge d'affaires, M. Pavloff, in March, 
1898, pressed the Yamen for the removal of Mr. Kinder, a 
British subject, from his position as superintendent of the 
Tientsin-Shan-hai-kwan Railway, and demanded that the 
*' line north of Shan-hai-kwan should be constructed by 
Russian engineers and with Russian capital." ^ Had Russia 
been permitted to connect Pdcing and the Manchurian 
branch of her railway by the proposed line, she would have 
obtained direct control of Peking; New-Chwang, the only 
treaty port in North China, would have been doomed ; and 
in the end the commerce of Japan, Great Britain and other 
powers would have been excluded from North China. In- 
stead of awaiting the ruin of the British interests in that 
quarter, the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank entered into a 
preHminary agreement to furnish the capital to construct 
a railway* between Peking and New-Chwang, taking a 
mortgage on the line.* This caused much irritation in 
Russia, where the English concession was r^arded as an 
invasion of the Russian sphere of interest. 

1 Parliamtntary Papers, China no. i (1899), PP- 25^, 257, 258 and 265; 
For. ReL, i8g8, pp. 218-223, 

^Parliamentary Papers, China no. 2 (1899), p. i. 
* Ibid., pp. 2 axxl 4. 


On the other hand, Great Britain became involved in an- 
other contest over the trunk line between Peking and Han- 
kow, projected by Belgium, backed by France and Russia. 
As such a highway would pass through the Yang-tze valley, 
the proposal was sure to provoke the opposition both of 
England and of China. Belgium, a '' neutral country," was 
therefore introduced as the builder of the line, and a Bel- 
gian syndicate, termed La Societe d'Etude des Chemins de 
fer en Chine, acting under the patronage of the Russian and 
French ministers at Peking, entered in May, 1898, into 
negotiations with China for the construction of a trunk 
line between Pdcing and Hankow.* This railway was to 
connect with the Manchurian line in the north and the 
French line in the south. England lost no time in endeav- 
oring to check this scheme of Russia and France. She pro- 
tested to China, Lord Salisbury declaring that " a con- 
cession of this nature is no longer a commercial or indus- 
trial enterprise and becomes a political movement against 
the British interests in the region of Yang-tsze." * China, 
however, granted the concession to the Belgian S3mdicate, 
and England then demanded a corresponding concession. 
English and German syndicates obtained a concession to 
construct a line between Tientsin and Ching-kiang, near 
Nanking; the American-China Development Company, an 
American s)aidicate, secured a concession for a trunk line 
between Hankow and Canton, in which British capital is 
largely invested; and a trunk line from Canton to Hong- 
Kong was to be constructed by the Jardine Syndicate, an 
English association. As an offset to the concession to the 
Russo-Chinese Bank in Honan and Shanse, Anglo-Italian 
capitalists, called the " Pdcing Syndicate," obtained a cor- 

1 China no. i (1899), pp. 96-97; London Times, May 23, 1898. 
« China no. i (1899), p. 117. 

439] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 207 

responding concession in the same provinces; while, as 
against the French concession for the Tonking railway, an 
English firm secured the right to extend the Indo-Burmese 
line to the head of the navigable waters of the Yang-tze.* 

Amid these railway struggles and mutual encroachments, 
M. Lesser, the Russian charge d'affaires ' in London, on 
August 12, proposed to Mr. Balfour that the spheres of in- 
terest of the powers should be definitely settled.* After 
numerous diplomatic discussions, England and Russia, in 
April, 1899, entered into a solemn agreement to respect each 
other's spheres of interest in Manchuria and in Yang-tze re- 
spectively, excepting as to the New-Ch'wang-Shan-hai-kwan 
line, which had already been mortgaged to the English.* 
Although Germany and Great Britain co-operated in ob- 
taining the concession for the Tientsin-Nanking railroad, 
their financiers agreed to respect their particular spheres, 
so that Germany is to guarantee the line in Shantung and 
England in the Yang^se valley.* 

In this way the powers have, from the political and 
economic points of view, established their so-called " spheres 
of interest," thus dividing up the Chinese Empire, and leav- 
ing it only in name a sovereigfn state. Such a condition of 
things necessarily suggests the possibility that the various 
powers may, by an extension of their acquired jurisdictional 
and administrative rights, seek to annul the treaty rela- 

1 See "Summary of Rail-way Concessions,'' China no. i (1899), pp. 
344-347; t!he texts of contracts of these railway concessions are found 
in Rockhiirs edition. But as to the Canton-Hankow Railroad conces- 
sion, the American-China Development Co., on Aug. 29, 1905, decided 
to sell (the concession back to the Chinese government The price to be 
paid is $6,750,000. The Now York Times^ Aug. 30, 1905. 

> China no. 2 (1899), P- ^• 

» Ibid., p. 85. 

* Annual Register, 1899^ P* 3^ 


tions of the mercantile nations with China by imposing 
discriminating taxes, duties and charges in the ports and 
rivers and on the railways in their respective spheres, and 
thus practically exclude their competitors from the Chinese 
market. Nevertheless, although the commercial interests 
of the United States in China are among the first in extent 
and importance. Uncle Sam, in 1898, being occupied in the 
annexation of Hawaii and the war with Spain, exhibited 
little concern over the Far Eastern complications. But, 
after the war with Spain was over, the government even- 
tually came to exert itself to protect its commercial interests, 
which were threatened by the " special concessions," the 
" preferential rights " and the " spheres of interest *' of the 
European nations. Mr. Hay, as secretary of state, on Sep- 
tember 8, 1899, submitted a circular note to the powers 
for the purpose of securing a declaration in favor of equal 
commercial opportunities for all treaty nations.* This cir- 
cular sounded the keynote of the " open door " policy. It 
requested the powers to pledge themselves not to " inter- 
fere with any treaty port or any vested interests" within 
any so-called " sphere of interest " in China, and to engage 
that the customs tariff upon goods imported by any na- 
tionality into any port within any " sphere of interest " 
should be collected by the Chinese government, and that 
no higher harbor duties on vessels, and no higher railway 
charges on merchandise, belonging to any other nation 
should be levied than on those belonging to the nation which 
maintained such " sphere of interest." France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy and Japan gave the United States a 
satisfactory pledge of the formal recognition of the " open 
door " policy ; but Russia's answer was less satisfactory, as 
she reserved the right to levy customs duties on foreign im- 

1 For. ReL, 1899^ pp. ia8 tt seq. 


ports in her sphere, and only promised not to make any 
discrimination between foreign nations. Furthermore, the 
Russian answer is silent upon harbor duties and railway 

^ For, ReL, 1899, pp. 141 et seq. Count Mouravieff to Mr. Tower. 


The Far Eastern Question, 1900-1905 

The Boxer Troubles of 1900. — European activities and 
enterprises within their "spheres of interest" in China, 
especially those of Germany in the Shantung province, 
aroused the anti-foreign or anti-Christian feelings of the 
Chinese in the spring of 1900. A secret society, known as 
the Boxers, first appearing in the Shantung and Chili pro- 
vinces, marched thence toward Tientsin and Peking with 
overwhelming force, destroying and burning churches, 
stations and railways. The Chinese government despatched 
troops to subdue the insurgents, but so strong were the 
rebels that the imperial forces were repelled. The foreign 
representatives in Peking, on May 28, 1900, felt obliged to 
summon marines from their respective fleets in order to 
meet a possible emergency.* Prince Tuan, commander-in- 
chief of the Chinese army, however, combined with the 
Boxers instead of suppressing them, when they approached 
the capital. On June 12, the Peking telegraph line was cut 
and the legations were besieged. From this time, the for- 
eign representatives were absolutely isolated from the out- 
side world. The " international relief expedition," 2000 
strong, consisting of the marines of Great Britain, Germany, 
France, Austria, Japan, Italy, the United States and Russia, 
under the command of Admiral Seymour, was unable even 
to reach Tientsin. Meanwhile, Mr. Sukiyama, the chan- 

^Parl Papers, China no, $ (1900), p. 3a 
210 [442 


cellor of the Japanese legation, and Baron Von Ketteler, the 
German minister, were murdered, and some of the legations 
at Peking were burned or otherwise destroyed. 

At this critical juncture, Lord Salisbury, as " consider- 
able time [would] elapse before the relief from India or 
Europe could arrive," made an earnest appeal, on June 25, 
to the powers concerned in Chinese affairs to approve the 
immediate despatch of a Japanese force of 20,000 to 30,000 
men/ Japan agreed to send 13,000 men and mobilized 
2,500, in addition to those already despatched; but, fear- 
ing lest complications might arise among the powers them- 
selves, she hesitated to do more. The British government 
became impatient and urged Japan to complete the expedi- 
tion, Lord Salisbury declaring: 

Japan is the only power which can act with any hope of success 
for the urgent purpose of saving the legations, and, if they de- 
lay, heavy responsibility must rest with them. We are pre- 
pared to furnish any financial assistance which is necessary, in 
addition to our forces already on the spot. 

In spite of this strong exhortation, Japan held back. The 
United States approved the British proposal, in case Japan 
should send an expedition " with the assent of the other 
powers," * but continental Europe, especially Germany and 
Russia, openly dissented.* To give to Japan "a special 
mandate," Russia intimated, might " entitle that country 
to claim an independent solution of the difficulty and any 
other privilege," and " might, to a certain extent, encroach 
on the fundamental principle — ^the maintenance of the union 
between the powers ; the maintenance of the existing system 

1 Pari Papers, China no, $ (1900), p. 75. 

* China no. i (1901), p. 3. 

* China no, 3 (1900), p. 92, and China no. i (1901), pp. 37-40. 


of government in China; the exclusion of anything whiqh 
might lead to the partition of the empire; finally, the re- 
establishment by common effort of a legitimate central 
power, itself capable of assuring order and security to the 
country." * The English proposal involved nothing politi- 
cal, but was intended only to meet without delay a grave 
emergency. As between Japan and Russia, however, the 
urgent purpose of the proposal was subordinated to politi- 
cal jealousy. Owing to the Russian objection and the con- 
sequent Japanese hesitation, the relief expedition did not 
set out from Tientsin until August 6, when all the powers 
had joined their forces and agreed to act together. Had 
the legations succumbed to the Boxers before the relief 
forces reached Peking, Japan and Russia doubtless would 
have been blamed. 

As the action of the powers, apart from the immediate 
object of saving their legations, was not governed by any 
definite understanding, there was danger that the opportun- 
ity might be seized by ambitious governments to carry out 
schemes for the partition of the Chinese empire. The 
United States, therefore, sent a circular note, on July 3, 1900, 
to Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg and other 
European courts, and to Tokyo, inviting the powers to ad- 
here to the principles maintained by the United States on 
the Chinese question.* Secretary Hay's former circular of 
September, 1899, was designed to preserve equal privileges 
in China for all commercial nations. By the new circular, 
the United States not only re-affirmed the open-door policy 
but also strongly declared itself in favor of maintaining the 
integrity of the Chinese Empire. Great Britain announced 

^ China no, i (1901), pp. 12 and 25. 

' Report of Mr. Rockhill, Sen. Ex. Doc. 67, 57th G)ng., ist Sess., 
printed also as an Appendix to For. ReL, igoi, p. 12. 

445] ^^^ P^R EASTERN QUESTION 213 

a similar policy in the House of Commons on August 4, 
and communicated it to the powers/ 

After numerous skirmishes and battles, the allied forces 
entered Peking ; the legations were relieved on August 1 5 ; 
the emperor and the empress dowager fled to Taiyuan, the 
capital of Shanshi; the Boxers were scattered; the palaces 
and main buildings in Peking were occupied by the inter- 
national forces.* In the joint expedition the Japanese sol- 
diers won marked distinction by their excellent behavior 
and ability. Lord Salisbury instructed the British minister 
at Tokyo to express to the government his earnest admira- 
tion of their " gallantry and efficiency," which had, as he 
declared, " contributed to the success of the expedition so 
very largely." 

Li Hung Chang soon appealed to Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Japan and the United States for the cessation of 
hostilities, the immediate commencement of peace negotia- 
tions and the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Peking.* 
Russia deferred action on the appeal, and submitted to the 
powers on August 28 a proposal for the evacuation of Pek- 
ing by the allied troops and their legations, and their retire- 
ment to Tientsin, where peace negotiations should be 
opened.* It was practically impossible to adopt this pro- 
posal, as the Boxers were still infesting the provinces adja- 
cent to Peking, so that the evacuation of the city would 
tend to a renewal of hostilities, and would throw away the 
best opportunity to bring China to satisfactory terms. It is 
therefore not strange that most of the powers rejected 
the Russian proposal. 

After the question of evacuating Peking was disposed 

» China no, l (1901), p. 49. ^ China no, 3 (1901). 

» China no, i (1901), pp. 99 and lOl. 

^Ihid., pp. 113 and 122; For. ReL, 1900, p. 379- 


of, the German government, on September 18, sent a 
circular note to the governments of Great Britain, France, 
Austro-Hungary, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United 
States, proposing that China should surrender to the allies 
for punishment the chief instigators of the outrages and 
offenders against international law, who were to be desig- 
nated by the foreign representatives, before entering on 
peace negotiations.* The suggestion that punishment 
should be made a preliminary condition to negotiation pro- 
voked disagreement among the powers. The United States 
frankly declined the German proposal, pointing out that 
preliminary punitive measures would tend to endanger the 
negotiations.* As some of the ring-leaders were princes 
or royal personages, the Chinese court took alarm at the 
German proposal, and in an edict of September 25, pub- 
lished a list of offenders together with a statement of 
the accusations against them.' Germany then proposed, 
on October 2 that the powers should instruct their repre- 
sentatives in Peking " to examine and give their opinion on 
the following points: (i) whether the lists of the names 
contained in the edicts are correct;" (2) "whether the 
punishments proposed [by China] meet the case;" (3) "in 
what way the powers can control the carrying out of the 
penalties proposed." * 

On October 4, 1900, the French government submitted to 
the powers a summary basis of peace negotiations, as 
follows : ■ 

(i) Punishment of the principal culprits, to be designated by 

1 China no. i (1901), p. 175. 

« Appendix to For, Rel, (1901), pp. 24-25. 

■ China no. 5 (1901), p. 6. 

* Ibid., p. 4. • Ibid,, p. s 

447] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 215 

the representatives of the powers at Peking; (2) maintenance 
of the prohibition of imports of arms; (3) equitable indem- 
nities for states, societies and individuals; (4) establishment 
of a permanent legation guard at Peking; (5) dismantlement 
of the ports at Taku; military occupation of two or three 
points on the road from Tientsin to Taku 

in order to keep the way open to the sea. The French pro- 
posal is said to have been suggested by Russia.* However 
this may be, it was eventually approved by all the powers, 
and the draft of a joint note consisting of eleven articles 
was completed on November 24, the representatives of the 
powers waiting at Peking for the approval of their gov- 
ernments.* As to the punishment of the ring-leaders, the 
execution of eleven, including Prince Tuan and General 
Tang-fuh-siang, was demanded by the joint note, under the 
championship of Germany, whose policy was that of 
" severity and vengeance." Japan, on the other hand, did 
not agree to capital punishment, pointing out the impossi- 
bility of enforcing so severe a measure upon persons of 
royal rank who were still dominating the Chinese court at 
Singan-fu, its place of refuge.* The United States par- 
ticularly insisted on moderation, and intimated an intention 
to withdraw from the conference unless the stipulation as 
to capital punishment should be adjusted. Finally, the 
" death penalty " was replaced with the " severest punish- 
ment," under the leadership of the United States, supported 
by Japan, Russia and Great Britain.* Although the draft 

1 Dunncll's paper, " The Settlement with China," The Forum, vol. 3a, 
p. 649. 

* China no. 5 (1901), pp. iii et seq. 
» Ibid,, p. 107. 

* Appendix to For. ReL, 1901, p. 54. The death penalty was insisted 
on by the German, Italian and Austro-Hungarian representatives. 


of the protocol provided for the sending to Berlin of an 
extraordinary mission to express the regret of the Chinese 
government for the murder of the German minister, it con- 
tained no clause of apology for the murder of the chancellor 
of the Japanese legation. The Japanese government there- 
fore proposed to insert a stipulation for suitable reparation 
for that crime, and this was approved by the other powers.* 
As regards the prohibition of imports of ammunition, the 
draft of the joint note used the words, " material neces- 
sary for the manufacture of arms and ammunition." As 
this clause might include materials which, though neces- 
sary for warlike objects, were still required for other pur- 
poses, and might thus prohibit the importation of things 
essential to trade and industry, Japan suggested that the 
words " material used exclusively for " be substituted for 
the words " material necessary for." * After these several 
modifications, the joint note, embodying the irrevocable 
conditions of peace, was signed by eleven powers on De- 
cember 22, 1900.' The note demanded (i) that China 
should despatch envoys to Germany and to Japan to apolo- 
gize for the murder of their diplomatic agents; (2) that the 
severest punishment should be inflicted on the persons de- 
signated in the imperial decree of September 25, 1900; (3) 
that, to prevent the recurrence of anti-foreign movements, 
legation guards should be stationed at Peking, the importa- 
tion of arms prohibited, the Taku forts dismantled, and the 
Tientsin-Peking route placed in military occupation; (4) 
that '' an equitable indemnity " should be paid to the allies ; 
(5) that treaties should be n^otiated, in order to improve 

^ China no. 5 (1901), pp. 107, 118. 
*Ibid., pp. 107, 118, 12a 

* China no, 6 (1901), pp. 60 et seq,; Appendix to For, Rel., 1901, ppi 
59 '* '*« . 

449] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 217 

commercial facilities; (6) and that the procedure of the 
foreign office should be reformed. It may here be observed 
that by an imperial edict of July 24, 1901, the Tsung-li 
Yamen was transformed into the Wai-wa Pu, or ministry 
of foreign affairs, which has precedence of the other six 
ministries of state. 

The protocol, embod)nng the definitive terms of settle- 
ment, was not signed until September 7, 1901.* The con- 
ferences in the early part of 1901 were greatly hindered 
by the question of a " secret treaty " between Russia and 
China concerning Manchuria, which arrested the serious 
attention of the other powers, and by the question of in- 
demnity. From the beginning the United States advocated 
a " lump sum," which should not exceed China's ability to 
pay.* A heavy indemnity would also necessitate an in- 
crease of tariff duties, which would operate as a hindrance to 
foreign importations. Commercial nations, like Great 
Britain and Japan, supported the moderate American plan, 
but they were out-voted by France, Germany, Russia and 
other continental powers.' China finally agreed to pay an 
indemnity of 450,000,000 taels, of which Russia was to re- 
ceive 130 millions, Germany 90, France 70, Great Britain 
50, Japan 34, the United States 32, and so on. It is a strik- 
ing fact that, although the claims of indemnity of each 
power were ostensibly based on actual cost and damage, 
those of the continental powers were comparatively greater 
in amount than were those of the powers specially identified 
with the open-door policy. 

The Manchurian Question. — ^After the Boxer uprising, 
Russia mobilized a considerable number of soldiers on the 

1 Appendix to For, Rel, 1901, p. 312; China no, i (1902). 
« Appendix to For. Rel, 1901, pp. 359, 361, 366, 369, 372, 373. 
■ See Dunnell, loc, cit 


Mongolian frontier and in Manchuria under the pretense of 
railway protection ; Newchwang, a treaty port, was captured 
on August 4, 1900, and on the same evening the Russian 
flag was hoisted on the Chinese customs flag-post/ The 
city of Mukden was occupied on October i ; and a military 
occupation was regularly instituted along the Russian rail- 
ways in North China. In the meantime, Russia was sup- 
porting the wishes of the Chinese court, while the other 
powers were eagerly opposing the evacuation of Peking by 
the allied troops. Russian influence, which was dominant 
at Peking, and Russian activities in Manchuria, induced a 
rumor in Europe, as well as in Japan, of a possible Russian 
annexation of Manchuria and Mongolia. Russia, from time 
to time, issued an " official communique," or a semi-official 
note, to set at rest the rumor, by pretending that her occu- 
pation of Manchuria was of a purely " provisional and tem- 
porary nature." * 

Under the circumstances, England and Germany con- 
cluded, on October 15, 1900, an agreement regarding 
Chinese affairs and embodied it in a circular to Austria- 
Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States 
for their acceptance.' Its main object was to restrain any 
power which might be disposed to violate the principle of 
commercial equality in China or her territorial integrity. 
As the aim of the Anglo-German convention was identical 
with that of Mr. Hay's circulars of September, 1899, and 
July, 1900, the United States expressed full sympathy.* 

1 Pari Papers, China no, i (1901), p. 190. Sec the report of Mr. 
Fulford, the British consul al Newchwang. 
*/Wrf., pp. 102, 113, 154. 

* For the text of agreement and diplomatic correspondence among 
the powers, see China no. 5 (1900). 

* Appendix to For. ReL, 1901, p. 31. Mr. Hay to Lord Pauncefote. 


All the other powers professed to assent to the principle 
of the agreement. Japan, being especially interested, in- 
quired of Great Britain as to the status of adherents to the 
agreement. Being assured that they would be " in exactly 
the same position as if they had concluded with her Ma- 
jesty's government a like agreement," Japan made a solemn 
declaration of adhesion.^ 

Notwithstanding the fact that Russia professed to ac- 
cept the principles of the Anglo-German agreement, she was 
secretly preparing to conclude a separate treaty with China 
in regard to the occupation of Manchuria. The Peking 
correspondent of the London Times, Dr. Morrison reported, 
in the issue of January 3, 1901, a " Manchurian conven- 
tion," consisting of nine articles, concluded between dele- 
gates of Tseng Chi, the Tartar general, and Admiral 
Alexieff, commander of the Russian Pacific squadron, un- 
der which, as he pointed out, Manchuria would be " a 
de facto Russian protectorate." The Times further sug- 
gested, in its editorial column, that the principle of the 
Anglo-German agreement should be applied to the alleged 
convention. The report alarmed the powers, especially 
Japan and England. The British government immediately 
instructed its representatives at St. Petersburg and Peking 
to ascertain whether the convention really existed. Sir 
Earnest Satow, English minister at Peking, replied that 
the Times' report was believed to be authentic; that the 
convention had been signed on the 22d of the preceding 
November, and was then in Peking awaiting confirmation.* 
Japan directly inquired of the Russian and Chinese govern- 
ments as to the existence of the alleged convention, but 
both governments kept it a strict secret. On February 15, 

1 China no, 5 (1900). * China no. 6 (1901), p. 3. 


Japan warned the Chinese government of the danger to 
which it exposed its territorial rights by entering into a 
separate agreement with one power, while it was negotiat- 
ing for peace with all the powers collectively.* The same 
warning was given by Great Britain, Germany and the 
United States.* Thus pressed, the Chinese finally allowed 
the viceroy of Hankow to communicate to Mr. Fraser, the 
British consul-general at that port, a summary of the con- 
vention.* The viceroy at the same time asked how far the 
British government would support China, if she refused to 
sign. The full text of the convention was obtained by 
Sir E. Satow on March 6.* By its terms, Manchuria was to 
be restored to China, but Russia was to retain a body of 
troops in Manchuria, in addition to those designed for rail- 
way protection, until China should have fulfilled " the last 
four provisions " of the convention. In case of disturb- 
ance, the Russian soldiers were to afford every assistance 
to China (art. 3) ; China was to agree not to establish an 
army, nor to import munitions into Manchuria (art. 4). 
China was to dismiss those governors and high officials who 
were antagonistic to friendly relations with Russia ; a police 
force was to be org^anized by China, but she was not to em- 
ploy in it the subjects of any other power (art. 5) ; nor 
were the " subjects of any other power " to be employed 
" in training Chinese soldiers and sailors in North China " 
(art 6). "China's autonomous rights in the city of Chin- 
Chou " were to be abrogated (art. 7). Mining and rail- 
way concessions or leases of land to other powers, in Man- 
churia, Mongolia and other domains of Hi, Kashgar, Yar- 

^ China no, 6 (1901), p. 41. 
» Ihid., pp. 78, 107, 108. 
• Ibid,, p. 90. 
*/Wrf., p. 110. 

453] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 22 1 

kand, excq)t Newchwang, were forbidden, nor were the 
Chinese themselves to build railways without Russian con- 
sent (art. 8). Russia was to construct a railway from the 
Trans-Manchurian line in " the direction of Peking up to 
the Great Wall." 

By an imperial edict dated February 28, 1901, the Chinese 
government instructed its ministers at Berlin, London, 
Tokyo and Washington to ask the governments to which 
they were accredited to join in a mediation between Russia 
and China.^ Germany suggested, in reply, that China 
should " apply to the conference of [foreign] ministers at 
Peking in this matter." * Meanwhile, on March 20 Russia 
modified her demands, by striking out the provisions regard- 
ing the abrogation of China's autonomous rights in the 
city of Chin-Chou and the non-employment of subjects of 
other powers for purposes of military instruction in North 
China, and by limiting to Manchuria the prohibition to 
alienate railway and mining concessions to other powers,* 
but threatened to break off the negotiation if the convention 
as thus amended was not signed by March 26. China, 
however, appealed on March 21 to Great Britain, Japan and 
the United States to influence Russia to extend the time for 
negotiation, since even the amended agreement would ^' not 
only prove injurious to China, but to the other countries 
who have treaty rights in that region" (Manchuria).* The 
United States again admonished China and Russia not to 
enter into a " separate agreement with an individual power 
while negotiations were going on at Peking with the con- 
cert of the allied powers," while the British government de- 

^ China no, 6 (1901}, p. 93. 

* Ibid., p. 109. 

* China no, 2 (1904), pp. 13, 14, 1$. 

* China no, 6 (1901), p. 137. 


dared that " no good purpose could be served by applying 
for an extension of time/' but suggested that the draft be 
submitted to the conference of representatives at Peking, in 
which his Majesty's minister would be instructed to act in 
conjunction with his colleagues on the subject.^ 

Japan, on her part, saw that a crisis had come. Per- 
ceiving that the intentions of Russia in Manchuria menaced 
not only the integrity of China but also the independence 
of Korea, she decided to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to check the high-handed Muscovite policy. Ac- 
cordingly, she at first asked the powers jointly to demand 
that the Anglo-German convention of 1900 should be ap- 
plied to Manchuria;^ but, after learning that Germany, 
because of her desire to be on good terms with Russia in 
Europe, did not consider the convention to be applicable to 
Manchuria ; ' that England, by reason of the Boer War, 
was unable to control an adequate force in case of emer- 
gency, and that the United States, owing to her traditional 
policy, would probably be unwilling to combine with one 
power against others, Japan made known her purpose to 
stand alone against the Russian policy in Manchuria. 
Hence, on March 25 the day before the date fixed by Russia 
for the signature, Japan made a direct friendly request to 
the St. Petersburg government that the Manchurian agree- 
ment be submitted to the conference of the powers at Pek- 
ing for examination ; * at the same time, she was preparing 
for any possible emergency, a meeting of the commanders 
of the imperial army and navy being held in Tokyo. Russia 

^ China no. 6 (1901), pp. 139, 142 and 144. 
2 Annual Register, 1901, p. 367. 

* London Times, speeches by the Chancellor Count von Bulow, in the 
Reichstag, on March 15, 1901. 

* Gaiko-Jiho, no. 39, p. 31. 

455] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 223 

replied that, " in regard to the matter which is still in the 
course of negotiation between China and Russia, the lat- 
ter is not inclined to discuss it with any third power." * 
The convention, however, was not signed on the 26th, and 
Russia extended the time till April i.^ But, backed by the 
moral support of the powers, China again failed to sign, 
and Russia announced in the Messager OKciel of April 6, 
that the agreement had been temporarily withdrawn.* 

The Anglo- Japanese Alliance. — Russia secretly resumed 
her negotiations concerning the occupation of Manchuria 
in August, 1901. Her new proposal was substantially iden- 
tical with the amended draft of March 20; no date was 
fixed for evacuation.* Her demands were still incompatible 
with the open-door policy and with Chinese sovereignty, 
but she does not appear at this time to have pressed China 
very hard, since the negotiations were without effect. After 
the conclusion, however, of the peace protocol between China 
and the allied powers, which was signed on September 7, 
the Russian charge d'affaires, M. Lessar, sought an oppor- 
tunity to resume negotiations with Prince Ching. The 
Russian demands were now greatly modified, and the date 
of evacuation was definitely fixed at three years.' Never- 
theless, Great Britain and Japan urged China not to sign, 
while Mr. Hay instructed Mr. Conger, the American min- 
ister at Peking 

to advise Prince Ching that the president trusts and expects 

1 Gaiko-Jiho, no. 39^ p. 32. * Ibid. 

• China no. 6 (1901), nos. 237 and 238, pp. 169, 170, et seq. 

*In Pari, Papers, China no. 2 (1904), pp. 25 ei seq., three draft- 
conventions are given : th« original text reported by Sir E. Satow on 
March 6, the text as modified on March 20, and the proposal made in 

» For. Rei, 1902, p. 271. 


that no arrangement which will permanently impair the terri- 
torial integrity of China, or injure the legitimate interests of 
the United States, or impair the ability of China to meet her 
international obligations, will be made with any single power.^ 

Nor did Russia abandon her designs in south Korea, 
with the failure of her strategic measures at Masampho in 
1900. M. Pavloff, the Russian minister at Seoul, in 1901, 
endeavored to obtain a lease of Ching-Kaiwan, an important 
bay in the extreme south, between Port Hamilton and 
Masampho, for naval purposes.' As on the previous occa- 
sion, Japan objected, because "only Russia would have 
access " to the bay, and its possession by her would con- 
stitute a menace to the Japan Sea. 

Under these circumstances, Great Britain and Japan, be- 
ing constantly disturbed by the Russian movements in Man- 
churia, entered into an alliance, which was signed in London 
on January 30, 1902, by Lord Lansdowne for England, 
and by Baron Hayashi for Japan.' Its fundamental aims 
are to maintain " the status quo and the general peace in the 
extreme East," to guarantee " the independence and terri- 
torial integrity of the Empire of China and Korea," and to 
secure " equal opportunities in those countries for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations." More particularly were 
the British interests, which are principally in China, and 
the Japanese interests in China and in a peculiar degree in 
Korea politically as well as commercially, to be guaranteed. 
The provisions of the alliance are exceptional in that, should 
Japan or Great Britain go to war with a single power for 
the defence of the interests above stated, the other contract- 
ing power is required only to maintain " strict neutrality " 

» For, Rci, 1902, p. 271. * Hamilton, Korea, p. aoa 

•Pari Papers, Japan «a. i (1902) ; For, Rei, 1902, pp. 513 ** *'«- 

457] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 225 

and to exercise " its efforts to prevent other [third] powers 
from joimng in hostilities against its ally," but if two or 
more powers should go to war with one of the contracting 
parties, then the " other high contracting party will come to 
its assistance." The contracting parties evidently felt able 
each to hold its own, singlehanded, against any other power, 
but deemed it best to provide for joint action against the 
possible coalition of Russia with France. The term of the 
treaty is comparatively short, being only five years. This 
is as it should be, for the diplomacy and foreign relations 
of a government are more dynamic than the national policy. 
" It would be unwise," observed Prince Bismarck upon the 
Triple Alliance, " to regard it as affording a permanently 
stable guarantee against all possible contingencies which in 
future may modify the political, material and moral condi- 
tions under which it was brought into being."* The Anglo- 
Japanese convention is obviously a defensive alliance. Lord 
Lansdowne declared that it was entered into " purely as a 
measure of precaution," and that it "in no way" threatened 
" the present position or legitimate interests of other pow- 
ers." It may become an offensive alliance only " where at- 
tack is the best mode of providing for the defence." * Evi- 
dently it is a connection which should not be abused, since 
" the casiis foederis of the defensive alliance does not apply" 
to an unjust war on the part of the power demanding the 
assistance of the coalition.' The Anglo Japanese alliance 
is nothing more than the formulation of those principles 
which the great powers have already declared or pledged 
liiemselves to observe in the Far East, such as the open- 
door policy of the United States, Great Britain and Japan, 

1 Memoirs of Prince Bismarck^ chap, xxix, p. 284. 
« Wiheatofi, Elem. of Int, Low, part 3, chap. 2, par. 15. 


the " fundamental principles '* of Russian policy as sup- 
ported by France, and the Anglo-German agreement of 
1900. It differs from those declarations only in providing 
a measure for their effective defense, in case they should 
in violation of assurances repeatedly given, be infringed. 

In America, though there was no official expression by 
the government, the Anglo- Japanese treaty was hailed by 
the press and the people as a measure that would secure the 
open door without involving the United States in political 
complications with European powers. Nevertheless, Sec- 
retary Hay, on Fd[>ruary 2, 1902, reminded the powers that 
exclusive measures in developing Manchuria would be 
detrimental to the open-door policy and to Chinese sover- 
eignty, and specially requested " the earnest consideration 
of the imperial governments of China and Russia in this 
matter." * 

Russia and France responded to the Anglo- Japanese 
agreement with a joint declaration, which was sent on 
March 16, 1902, to the signatories of the peace protocol of 
1901.* In this declaration "the allied governments of 
Russia and France " expressed approval of the principle of 
the Anglos Japanese treaty. The " two allied governments 
reserved to themselves, however, "the right to consult 
as to " the means to be adopted for securing those inter- 
ests," in case " either the aggressive action of third powers, 
or the recurrence of disturbances in China, jeopardizing the 
integrity and free development of that power, might be- 
ccttne a menace to their own interests." 

^ Memoran<liim on the grave conditions existing in Manchuria, ad- 
dressed to the signatories of the peace protocol of 1901, For. ReL, 1902, 

P- 375. 

^Parl. Papers, China no. 2 (1904). P- 35; Eor. ReL, 1902, p. 931; 
London Times, March 19, 1902. 

459] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 227 

The Russo-Japanese Difference. — Iiifluenced by the 
Anglo- Japanese alliance and by the American representa- 
tion of February 2, Russia further modified her demands 
in respect of Manchuria, and on April 8, 1902, concluded 
an agreement with China in the following terms : * ( i ) 
Manchuria was to be restored to the Chinese government; 

(2) but, in resuming the administration, China was to 
" observe strictly the stipulations of the contract concluded 
with the Russo-Chinese Bank on the 27th of August, 1896;" 

(3) the Russian troops were to be withdrawn from "the 
southwestern portion of the Province of Mukden up to the 
River Liao-Che " within six months, from " the remainder 
of the Province of Mukden and Province of Kirin " within 
a further six months, and from " the province of Heihimg- 
Chiang " within yet another six months; (4) the military 
and police administration in Manchuria was to be restored 
to the Chinese government without heavy restrictions; (5) 
Russia was " to restore to the owners the Railway Shan- 
hai-kwan-Newchwang-Sinminting," which had been held by 
Russian troops since the end of September, 1900. As the 
railway is mortgaged to the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank 
(an English institution), Russia, in consideration of re- 
storing the line, required China ( i ) not to " invite other 
powers to participate in its protection, construction, or 
working, nor allow other powers to occupy the territory 
evacuated by Russia," in case protection of the line should 
be necessary; (2) strictly to observe the agreement as to 
the Anglo-Russian sphere concluded in April, 1899, and not 
to allow the bank " to enter into possession of or in any 
way to administer" the line; (3) to consult Russia as to 
the extension of the line, the construction of the branch line, 

^ Pari Papers, China no. 2 (1904), pp. 36 eX seq.; For. Rel, 1902, 
pp. 280 et seq. 


the erection of a bridge on the Liao River at Newchwang, 
and the moving of the terminus thither; (4) to pay Russia 
all expenses of the " repair and working " of the line in- 
curred during the occupation. Russia promised China, by 
a separate note,* to restore the civil government of New- 
chwang as soon as the '' international administration at 
Tientsin " was surrendered to Chinese authority. The Rus- 
sian demands concerning Manchuria were thus made less 
exclusive than before, and the period of three years for 
evacuation was reduced to eighteen months. The minis- 
ters of Great Britain, Japan and the United States, at Pric- 
ing, therefore notified Prince Ching of their assent to the 
signing of the agreement.' 

Russia faithfully observed the first term of the evacuation ; 
by October 8 the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the 
r^on between the Great Wall and the Liao River was 
complete. But, when the second term expired on April 8, 
1903, no actual evacuation had taken place in the designated 
places, except the city of Mukden. Not only did the evacu- 
ation of Newchwang remain to be carried out, but in April 
Russia seized the customs and the municipal administration 
of the treaty ports, and in the beginning of May occupied 
the forts at the mouth of the Liao River.* Moreover, 
M. de Plangon, the Russian charge d'affaires at Peking, had, 
on April 18, submitted to Prince Ching a series of new de- 
mands as to the conditions of evacuation. They ran as 
follows : * 

I. No restored territory, particularly in Newchwang and 
on the Liao River, was to be transferred to any other power, 
" whether by way of cession, lease, concession, or in any 

1 China no, 2 (1904), p. 38. * For. Rel, 1902, p. 277. 

* China no. 2 (1904), p. 63. 

* For. Rel, 1903, pp. 57 et seq. 


Other form." Any such transfer to another power, Russia 
would regard as " a threat " to her interests. 

II. The existing system of Russian administration, as 
during the occupation, was to be preserved in Mongolia. 

III. Without consulting Russia, no port was to be opened 
to foreign trade, nor were consuls of the powers to be per- 
mitted to reside in Manchuria. 

IV. No foreign adviser engaged by China was to inter- 
fere in any branch of administration in northern China, 
" where Russian interest predominates." 

V. Russia was to control the entire telegraph line in 
north China. 

VI. "After the transfer of Newchwang to Chinese ad- 
ministration," the Russo-Chinese Bank was to continue " to 
fulfill the function of the customs bank." 

VII. All rights acquired in Manchuria by Russian sub- 
jects or established during the occupation " were to " re- 
main in full force after the departure of the troops." Russia 
further demanded the control of the sanitary administration 
at Newchwang. 

These Russian demands soon came to the knowledge of 
Great Britain, Japan and the United States, who lost no 
time in seeking to counteract them. Especially could they 
not keep silence as to the Russian measures at Newchwang, 
where " the trade is almost exclusively British, American 
and Japanese." The British government particularly called 
the serious attention of the Chinese and Russian govern- 
ments to the exclusive demands of Russia as violating 
the most-favored-nation clause in the Tientsin treaty of 
1858.* In n^otiating new commercial treaties with China, 
Japan and the United States demanded that certain ports 

1 China no. 2 (1904), pp. 55, 58. 


be opened and consulates established in Manchuria for the 
benefit of foreign trade, but the Chinese government each 
time declined to discuss the subject, owing to Russian ob- 
jections. Nor would China agree to open Mukden and Ta- 
tung-kou until Secretary Hay had obtained, on July 14, 
the assent of the Russian government after several confer- 
ences with Count Cassini at Washington/ 

Japan regarded the conditions demanded by Russia as 
not only destructive of the equal opportunities of the com- 
mercial nations, but as an infringement on Chinese sover- 
eignty. The Japanese were further provoked by the move- 
ments of Russian troops in Manchuria and Korea. The 
troops evacuated Mukden, but concentrated at Liao Yang 
and occupied Feng Hang Ching and, later, Antung, on the 
Korean frontier, opposite Wuji, on the Yalu river. While 
Russia often objected to the opening of Wuji, she estab- 
lished a settlement at Yungampo, and, on the pretext of pro- 
tecting her timber concession, sent her troops across the 
Yalu into Korea. These aggressive acts produced a strong 
war feeling in Japan; even the conservative papers Jiji 
and Asahi often calling for the decisive settlement of the 
Manchurian and Korean questions. A memorial on the 
Far Eastern question, by seven professors of the law school 
of the Imperial University at Tokyo, was submitted for 
serious consideration to Count Katsura, the prime minister.* 
It substantially suggested a resort to arms, if necessary to 

1 For. ReL, 1903, pp. 51 et seq., and 91 et seq. The United States 
originally demanded the opening of Ta-timg-kou, Mukden and Harbin. 
As the result of the Hay-Cassini conferences, Hai1)in was waived for 
future negotiation, and Ta-tung-kou was replaced by Antung in the 
treaty signed October 8, 1903. Japan also succeeded in getting her 
treaty signed on the same day on which Mukden and Ta-tung-kott 
were opened to foreign trade. The text of these treaties is given in 
Rockhill's edition, pp. 121-170. 

* The text of the petition is given in the Taiyo. 

463] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 23 1 

defeat the Russian movement. General Kuropatkin, then 
Russian minister of war, came to Japan in the summer of 
1903 in order to cultivate a more friendly feeling. He was 
politely and cordially welcomed by the emperor and his peo- 
ple, but his visit could effect no change in the Japanese 
attitude, so long as the Russian movement in Manchuria and 
Korea was not modified. Japan maintained that this move- 
ment not only was a constant menace to the tranquillity of 
the Orient, but would result in the Russian absorption of 
Manchuria and Korea, whereby the interests of Japan in 
tiiat important quarter would be destroyed and her power 
of self-preservation vitally endangered. The Japanese gov- 
ernment therefore calmly, but seriously, took up the ques- 
tion at issue. The Gosetu-Kaigi ^ met on June 26, in order 
to formulate a definite policy. 

It was decided to open direct negotiations with the Rus- 
sian government in order to secure a friendly adjustment of 
all conflicting questions pending between the two countries 
in the Far East ; and Mr. Kurina, the Japanese minister at 
St. Petersburg, was instructed, on June 27, to make known 
the wishes of his government. As Russia expressed her 
willingness to enter into n^otiations, the basis of a settle- 
ment was, on August 12, submitted by Japan, as follows: * 

I. A " mutual engagement to respect the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, 
and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity of com- 
merce and industry of all nations in those countries." 

^ An imperial oauncil composed of the cabinet members, and of die 
"Genrosy" or elder statesmen, and held before the -throne. 

* The diplomatic correspondence between Japan and Russia prior to 
the late war was laid before the imperial Diet by Baron Komura, 
minister of foreig:n affairs, on March 25, 1904. An English text is 
given in The Japan Weekly Mail, March 26, 1904 ; the Japanese text, in 
the Kwampo (Official Gazette) of March 24 and 27. 


II. The " reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderat- 
ing interest in Korea and of Russia's special interest in rail- 
way enterprises in Manchuria," and the mutual recognition 
of the right of Japan and Russia, respectively, to take meas- 
ures for the protection of the above mentioned interests so 
far as such measures do not violate the principles enun- 
ciated in the first provision, such as the open-door policy 
and the territorial integrity of the countries in question. 

III. A reciprocal pledge " not to impede the development 
of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of 
Japan in Korea, and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not 
inconsistent with the stipulations" of the first provision; 
and an '' additional engagement on the part of Russia not 
to impede the eventual extension of the Korean railway into 
southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China 
and Shan-hai-kwan-Nefwchwang lines." 

IV. A reciprocal engagement to send troops to the actual 
number required, by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Man- 
churia, in case their respective interests were menaced or 
insurrection threatened to create international complications, 
and to withdraw the troops " as soon as their mission is 

V. The " recognition on the part of Russia of the exclu- 
sive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the in- 
terest of reform and good government in Korea, including 
necessary military assistance." 

VI. This agreement was to supplant " all previous ar- 
rangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea," 
by which Russia had the right to give advice upon Korean 

It was Japan's original idea to make St. Petersburg the 
seat of the n^otiations in the hope that they might be 

465] '^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 233 

carried on as quickly and satisfactorily as possible.* On 
August 13, however, the day after the Japanese proposal 
was handed to Count Lamsdorff, the Russian minister of 
foreign affairs, the czar, " in view of the complex problems 
of administration on the eastern confines of the empire," 
issued an imperial ukase,* by which he erected the " terri- 
tories of the Amur and of Kwantung " into a special vice- 
royalty and appointed Admiral Alexieff as viceroy, investing 
him with supreme power in civil and military administra- 
tion, and with the control of the diplomatic relations of 
the designated territories with " neighbouring states." The 
viceroy was " released from the jurisdiction of the min- 
istries," but was made subject to " le comite special de 
TExtreme-Orient," • nominated by the czar and presided 
over by himself. As to the seat of the negotiations. Count 
Lamsdorff asked that it be transferred to Tokyo, which he 
regarded as more convenient, for the reason that there were 
" many details " concerning which it was necessary to con- 
sult Viceroy Alexieff at Port Arthur, and that the czar 
was to be absent from St. Petersburg for some time. Over 
this question some days were spent, when Japan, being un- 
willing to waste more time upon it, agreed to Count Lams- 
dorfFs request. 

The negotiations were transferred to Tokyo, but Russia's 
reply to Japan's proposal was not made until October 3. 
It embraced : ( i ) a " mutual engagement to respect the 
independence and territorial int^rity " of Korea; (2) the 
" recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests" 
in Korea and of her right to advise the civil administration 
therein without infringing the first provision; (3) a Russian 

1 Baron Komura's speech before the Diet, March 25, 1904. 

2 Pari Papers, China no, 2 (i904)» P- 85. 

^Ibid.f p. 92. By a ukase of September 30^ the organization and 
jtirisdiction of this special committee of the Far East were defined. 


pledge not to interfere with economic undertakings of Japan 
in Korea, " nor to oppose any measure taken for the pur- 
pose" of protecting such undertakings; (4) the recognition 
of Japan's right to send troops to Korea for the purpose of 
protecting her interests with the knowledge of Russia; 
(5) a mutual engagement not to use any part of the Korean 
territory " for strategical purposes nor to undertake on the 
Korean coast any military works capable of menacing the 
freedom of navigation in the straits of Korea;" (6) a mu- 
tual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the Korean 
territory, " lying to the north of the 39th parallel;" (7) the 
recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being 
" in all respects outside her sphere of interest." ^ Russia 
thus definitely refused either to enter into any engagement 
for the preservation of the .territorial integrity of China, or 
to commit herself to the maintenance of the principle of 
equal opportunity for all nations in commercial matters. 
Furthermore, by requiring Japan to recognize Manchuria 
as being entirely outside her sphere of influence, and by 
striking out the Japanese proposal concerning the connec- 
tion of the Korean railway with Newchwang through Man- 
churia, Russia virtually refused to make any engagement 
concerning Manchuria. On the other hand, she proposed 
to forbid Japan to send troops to Korea without the " know- 
ledge of Russia," or " to use any part of Korea for strat^c 
purposes," or " to undertake " fortifications on the Korean 
straits; and struck out the provision permitting Japan to 
render " military assistance " to Korea. 

Japan desired certain military facilities in Korea in order 
to safeguard Korean independence from foreign attack, to 
preserve the internal order of the country, and to protect her 
own interests there. Russia, on the other hand, pursuing 

1 Dip Cor. between Japan and Russia^ no. 17. 


her own strat^ical objects, wished to restrict Japanese 
miHtary measures, and to secure the defence of Manchuria 
against foreign invasion by establishing a neutral zone at 
the cost of Korea, as well as to assure, by forbiding forti- 
fications on the Korean strait, undisturbed communication 
between her two great naval ports. Port Arthur and Vladi- 
vostok. Although Japan might have accepted, to a cer- 
tain extent, the Russian proposal as to Korea, she could 
not abandon in silence the question of Manchuria, where 
she had vast commercial interests, as well as political inter- 
ests, essentially connected with her position in Korea. In 
conferences with Baron Rosen, the Russian minister at 
Tokyo, Viscount Komura, then minister of foreign affairs, 
therefore demanded that Russia should agree to respect the 
territorial integrity of China, and proposed, as to the neutral 
zone, that, if one should be created it should be established 
on both sides of the boundary between Korea and Man- 
churia, with a width on either side of, say, fifty kilometers.* 
This amended proposal was sent to St. Petersburg on Octo- 
ber 30, and Japan requested an early response. The Rus- 
sian answer was not received till December ii.*. It en- 
tirely rejected the Japanese amendments, and, apart from 
consenting to "the connection of the Korean and East China 
Railway," struck out all clauses relating to Manchuria and 
reaffirmed the original Russian counter-proposal. As the 
absolute exclusion of the Manchurian question was incom- 
patible with the professed object of the n^otiation, Japan, 
in a note of December 21, requested Russia to reconsider 
her position, and proposed the entire suppression of the 
neutral zone, in case Russia should be unwilling to admit one 

^ Dip. Cor. between Japan and Russia, nos. 19, 22. 
* Ibid., no. 34. 


in Manchuria/ Japan, besides, offered to make substantial 
concessions in Korea — to limit her right of advice to matters 
of civil administration, to strike out the words " military 
assistance," and to admit a mutual engagement not to under- 
take on the Korean coast any military work capable of 
menacing the freedom of navigation of the straits of Korea. 
In her reply, which was made on January 6, 1904, Russia 
modified her previous proposals by offering to recognize 
the rights and privilege of the treaty powers in Manchuria, 
on condition that the neutral zone should be established in 
northern Korea only, and that Japan should not use any 
Korean territory for strategic purposes ; but she still refused 
to agree to respect the territorial integrity of the Chinese 
Empire.' A few days later, on January 13, Japan sub- 
mitted another note, in which she insisted on the entire 
abolition of the neutral zone, as well as on the integrity of 
the Chinese territory, without which the treaty rights of 
other powers in Manchuria could not be secure, and, while 
proposing these important amendments " in a spirit of con- 
dliation " requested Russia to receive them in the same 
spirit.' To this conciliatory request Russia did not reply. Mr. 
Kurino repeatedly requested an answer, pointing out that 
" further prolongation " would be to the " serious disad- 
vantage of the two governments," but, in an interview as 
late as February i. Count Lamsdorff still failed to say when 
the Russian reply might be expected. 

Meanwhile the Russian troops were massing on the 
Korean frontier along the Yalu River, and the formidable 
squadron of Admiral Wirenius, in the Mediterranean Sea, 

^ Dip, Cor. between Japan and Russia, no. 35. 

• Ibid., no. 38. • Ibid,, no. 39. 

469] ^^^ ^'^^ EASTERN QUESTION 237 

was proceeding" to the Far East. On February i the Japa- 
nese commercial agent at Vladivostok was formally notified 
that the port might be put in a state of siege, and was re- 
quested to prepare for the withdrawal of the Japanese resi- 
dents. Japan, interpreting these actions to mean that the 
Rusian government had no faith in an amicable settlement 
and intended to dictate its own terms by force if necessary, 
came to the conclusion that further delay would be danger- 
ous to her interests. A Gosen-Kaigi was held on February 
3, and the Japanese government, on February 5, addressed 
to Russia a note terminating the pending " futile negotia- 
tions," and reserving " the right to take such independent 
action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend 
their menaced position, as well as to protect their established 
rights and legitimate interests." * At the same time Mr. 
Kurino was instructed to withdraw, with his staff and stu- 
dents, from St. Petersburg. Diplomatic relations were 
thus severed, but hostilities did not take place until the 
torpedo squadron of Admiral Togo attacked the Russian 
fleet in the mouth of Port Arthur harbor on February 9. 
Declarations of war were formally made, respectively, by 
Russia on the 9th and by Japan on the following day.* 

The Anglo- Japanese alliance operates more effectively 
than ever. It was concluded mainly as a guarantee of 
peace. " Should peace unfortunately be brdcen," declared 
Lord Lansdowne, at the time when the treaty was made, 
" it [the alliance] will have the effect of restricting the area 
of hostilities," * since England would use her efforts to 
prevent France from combining with her ally, Russia, If 
France should become entangled in the Russo-Japanese war, 

^ Dip, Car. between Japan and Russia, no. 48. 
« London Times, Feb. 11 and 12, 1904. 
» Pari Papers, Japan no. i (1902). 


England would come to the aid of Japan, and this might 
induce a universal conflict, spreading at least throughout 
the eastern hemisphere. In the course of an expedition to 
the Far East by the " Baltic fleet," or the " second Pacific 
fleet," under Vice- Admiral Rojestvensky, their prolonged 
stay at Madagascar, a French colony, in the winter of 
1904-5 constituted a grievance of the Japanese against 
France because of her indulgent attitude as a neutral. The 
Japanese government, however, paid little attention to it, 
the distance from Madagascar to the seat of war being 
great, and the benevolent assistance of France hardly affect- 
ing the hostile operations. But the long continuance of the 
Baltic fleet at Kamranh Bay and Hon-kohe harbor of French 
Indo-China in the spring of 1905 excited the indignation 
of the Japanese press, which characterized the French atti- 
tude as belligerent rather than neutral, and declared that it 
constituted " the casus foederis " of the Anglo- Japanese 
alliance. The formal representations to the French gov- 
ernment by Dr. Motono, the Japanese minister at Paris, 
the prompt answer by the French minister of foreign affairs, 
M. Delcasse, and the enforcement of the neutral rule at 
Indo-China by the French admiral, De Jonquieres, event- 
ually averted the possible entanglement.* It was highly 
desirable that the immediate parties to the war should be 
left to themselves, without any interference from allies or 
third powers, just as in the case of the Austro-Prussian and 
Franco-Prussian wars. On the other hand, mediation, in 
order to terminate the war in a manner honorable to both 
parties, at the earliest possible moment, was equally de- 

So far as the campaigns of the belligerents were con- 

^ London Times, April 21 an<i May 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and i8» 


cemed, Japan, for about a year and a half after the out- 
break of hostilities, maintained an unbroken series of vic- 
tories on land and sea. The strong fortress of Port Arthur, 
" the Gibraltar of the Far East," fell into Japanese hands 
and the " first Pacific fleet " in the harbor was destroyed. 
The great battle of Mukden, which Russia hoped might be 
the turning-point of the war, brought nothing but fresh dis- 
aster to the czar's army in Manchuria. The " invincible 
armada" of Admiral Rojestvensky, combined with the 
" third Pacific fleet " of Admiral Nebogatoff, which prom- 
ised to recover the czar's maritime prestige in the Pacific, 
was utterly annihilated by Admiral Togo, " the Nelson of 
Japan," on the Sea of Japan. The land communications 
of Vladivostok were at the mercy of Field Marshal Oyama 
and its harbor was indirectly blockaded by the Japanese 
fleets at the northern straits of Japan and the Korean 
straits. Furthermore, the war policy of the autocratic gov- 
ernment was threatened from time to time by internal dis- 
sensions. The successive defeats of Russia made it more 
difficult for her to raise war loans in foreign markets. On 
the contrary, Japan did not, in a year and a half's experi- 
ence in carrying on hostilities on a gigantic scale, receive 
any check, financial or military. 

The Peace of Portsmouth. — As the result of the exerciie 
of President Roosevelt's offices, the belligerents appointed 
peace commissioners to meet at Washington.* Baron Ju- 
tara Komura, minister of foreign affairs, and Mr. Kogoro 
Takahira, Japanese minister to the United States, were 
designated to represent Japan, while M. Sergius Witte, 
president of the imperial council, and Baron Romanovitch 

* On June 7, 1905, President Roosevelt addressed an identical mes- 
sage to the Japanese and Russian governments, suggesting the termina- 
tion of the nvar. Both belligerents accepted his overtures. 


Rosen, Russian ambassador to the United States, were 
designated to represent Russia. These plenipotentiaries 
held their first meeting on August 9, 1905, at the navy yard 
at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to which place the seat 
of the conference was transferred in order to avoid the 
summer heat of Washington. At the next meeting the 
plenipotentiaries exchanged their full powers, which were 
found to be in due form, and Baron Komura then presented 
in writing the Japanese demands.^ Although the victories 
of Japan might have justified her in assuming to dictate 
terms of peace, the Mikado and his advisers generously 
considered the interests of other powers which are con- 
cerned in the Far Eastern question, especially with regard 
to the open-door policy, by proposing that China's sover- 
eignty and civil administration should be effectively re- 
stored in Manchuria, while order and progress in Korea 
were to be assured under Japanese protection. Bearing in 
mind also the dignity of Russia as a great power, Japan 
asked for " reimbursement " for the cost of the war, in- 
stead of " indemnity," which might have seemed to convey 
a more exacting or punitive meaning. The new conditions 
which had arisen since the rupture of negotiations with 
Russia in February, 1904, were, however, to a certain ex- 
t€nt necessarily reflected in the Japanese demands for the 
cession of Sakhalin Island,* the surrender to Japan of the 
Russian lease of the Kwantung peninsula, including Port 
Arthur, Dalny and Elliot Island, the transfer to Japan of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway below Harbin to Port Arthur, 

^ An apparent synapsis of th«se demands may be found in the New 
York Times of Aug. 19, 1905. 

' Gen. Liapnoff, the governor of Sakhalin Island, formally surren- 
dered on July 31 to the commander of the Japanese army; and the 
whole island was immediately proclaimed to be under the Japanese 

473] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 241 

the surrender to Japan of the Russian warships interned in 
neutral ports, and the concession to Japanese subjects of 
fishing rights on the Russian littoral from Vladivostok 
north to Bering Sea, The strong desire of Japan for the 
" permanent peace of the Far East " also prompted a de- 
mand for certain restrictions upon Russian activity in Asia, 
by limiting the naval strength of Russia in the Pacific. M. 
Witte, on the morning of August 12, presented the counter- 
statement of Russia, and it was agreed to discuss the Japa- 
nese demands clause by clause. This discussion continued 
from day to day till August 18. 

Eight clauses were, after some modification, agreed on, 
but as to the four remaining clauses, relating to Sakhalin 
Island, the interned warships, the limitation of Russian 
naval power, and the payment of an indemnity, there was 
an absolute disagreement. At this critical juncture, when 
the public had become exceedingly pessimistic as to the 
outlook. President Roosevelt is said to have had interviews 
with Baron Kaneko, " unofficial agent of the Mikado,'* 
and Baron Rosen, on the i8th and 19th of August, respec- 
tively, with a view to avert a failure of the conference. 
Meanwhile the cables to Tokio and St. Petersburg were 
kept busy to learn the imperial wills. At the conference on 
August 23, Baron Komura announced that Japan would re- 
linquish her demands as to the interned warships and the 
limitation of naval force, and offered to restore a half of 
Sakhalin Island to Russia, on condition that she would 
pay to Japan 1,200,000,000 yen, not as "indemnity," nor 
yet as " reimbursement," for the cost of the war, but as 
the price of the territory to be restored.* This offer was 
peremptorily rejected by M. Witte, and the conference ad- 
journed until August 26. President Roosevelt is said again 

1 New York TimeSy Aug. 24, 1905. 


to have exerted himself to prevent a deadlock by instruct- 
ing Mr. Meyer, the American ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, to obtain an audience with the czar and urge, if pos- 
sible, some concession on the part of Russia. At the con- 
ference on Saturday, August 26, the Russian plenipoten- 
tiaries appear to have submitted a proposition in the nature 
of an imperial ultimatum to pay Japan 100,000,000 rubles 
on account of her expenses in caring for Russian prisoners 
of war and to cede half of Sakhalin Island.* This propo- 
sition was of course not acceptable, but so conciliatory were 
the Japanese plenipotentiaries that they suggested the hold- 
ing of another conference, at which they might submit 
modified terms, in order to satisfy Russian sensibilities, 
while preserving the principle of the Japanese demands. 
President Roosevelt is said to have made, on August 28, 
" a new appeal to the emperor of Japan on behalf of peace." 
On the same day the Gosen-Kaigi (council before the 
throne, consisting of the elder statesmen and the members 
of the cabinet) was held, in which the question of peace or 
war was discussed. By the supreme order of his govern- 
ment. Baron Komura, who is said to have insisted to the 
last upon reimbursement for the cost of the war, finally 
waived, on August 29, the three demands for reimburse- 
ment, the surrender of the interned warships, and the limi- 
tation of Russian naval force, and offered to restore to 
Russia the northern half of Sakhalin Island without any 
compensation. " Your modified terms of peace," exclaimed 
M. Witte, " are accepted." The negotiation at Portsmouth 
was thus concluded in the brief term of twenty days.* 

Japan's sacrifice, for the sake of peace, of her claim for 
reimbursement for the cost of the war, amounting to more 

* New York Times, Aug. 27, 1905. 

' For the text of the treaty of Portsmouth, see Appendix A. 

475] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 243 

than $600,000,000, called forth the applause of neutral 
nations, and even the Russians praised her "magnanimity in 
diplomacy" and her "moral victory," calling it as "worthy as 
her heroic victory in the war." For the most part, on the 
contrary, the Japanese press denounced the treaty, declaring 
that "the fruits of victory were again nullified by weak diplo- 
macy, and by ill-counsels of the cabinet ministers and the 
elder statesman who give advice to the emperor." A sudden 
popular commotion took place at Tokyo, which was placed 
under martial law. At Kobe the recently erected statue of 
Marquis Ito, one of the elder statesmen, was thrown down 
and dragged through the streets. But the fact should be 
borne in mind that, although Japan was victorious both on 
land and on sea, her military position was very different 
from that which she held ten years before in the war with 
China, when her ability and readiness to make a direct 
assault on Peking caused the sending of Li Hung Chang to 
Shimonoseki, or from that held by Germany when Prince 
Bismarck dictated terms at the gates of Paris, surrounded 
by the German army. It has been well observed that, as 
the distance from European Russia to Manchuria has been 
of great benefit to Japan in the matter of war, so it has 
been of great advantage to Russia in the matter of indem- 
nity. But as Japan waived three important demands, why, 
it may be asked, did she not then insist upon the retention 
of the whole of Sakhalin Island, which was proclaimed to 
be under Japanese administration? Besides, the occupa- 
tion by Japan and Russia of different parts of the island is 
likely to be a source of complications, just as it was prior 
to 1875. Nevertheless, it may be ungracious to criticize 
the " magnanimous concessions " of Japan until we are 
familiar with all the conditions that went to make up the 
"psychological moment" at which Japan yielded to the 
Russian ultimatum. After all, Japan gained by the treaty 


of peace more than she demanded prior to the war, while 
Russia not only abandoned to a great extent her material 
interests in Manchuria, but also lost much of her prestige 
in Asia by relinquishing Port Arthur, the Gibraltar of the 
East, and the branch line of her Manchurian railway. It 
is not improbable, however, that Russia's retention of the 
Trans-Manchurian line and of Vladivostok, which though 
icebound for half the year proved during the war to be a 
valuable arsenal, and her potential re-establishment of her 
Pacific squadron will powerfully contribute to preserve her 
prestige in the extreme Orient. It is certain that Russia 
has not been " wiped out," and that she will still weigh in 
the balance of power in the Far East as much as any 
eastern power or as any of the powers of the West. M. 
Witte ably reported the result of the peace negotiations to 
his imperial master thus : " Russia will remain in the Far 
East the great power which she hitherto has been and will 
be forever." In spite of the successive defeats of the czar's 
army and navy, his plenipotentiaries preserved the "dignity 
and honor " of Russia by their able manoeuvering in diplo- 

Finally, the fact should be emphasized that, while the 
" strenuous " but impartial efforts of President Roosevelt 
were from time to time exerted to avert the deadlock which 
often threatened to break up the negotiations, the concilia- 
tory and magnanimous attitude of Japan was the vital and 
dominant influence that brought about the peace of Ports- 

The Status of Manchuria and Korea. — ^During the war 
the status of Manchuria and Korea, whose territories 
formed the theatre of the war, was somewhat complicated. 
Had China and Korea not been made the scene of hostili- 
ties their entire territories would, at least theoretically, have 
been neutral. Although Russia held a lease of the 

477] ^^^ ^^^ EASTERN QUESTION 245 

Kwanttmg district, including Port Arthur and Dalny, and 
although she possessed railways in Manchuria, the titular 
sovereignty and l^al ownership belong to the Chinese gov- 
ernment* Nevertheless, so long as Russia's military forces 
occupied Manchuria, she assumed the role of de facto sov- 
ereignty and was liable to attack there by her foe.* Imme- 
diately on the breaking out of the war Japan, on February 
9, 1904, called the attention of the several neutral powers 
to the desirability of preserving China's neutrality, in order 
to restrict hostile operations in that country. She pointed 
out that China, if she should become entangled in the war, 
would be unable to make the stipulated payments on the in- 
demnity; that her foreign trade would be hampered; and 
that anti- foreign movements might again arise as in 1900.* 
On the following day Secretary Hay, following a sugges- 
tion from Germany, addressed a note to the governments 
of Russia, Japan and China, in which he asked that Japan 
and Russia should respect " the neutrality of China " and 
" her administrative entity," and that " the area of hostil- 
ities shall be localized " as far as possible, so as to prevent 
uprisings of the Chinese people and the undue disturbance 
of foreign trade.* At the same time a copy of the note 
was transmitted to " all the powers signatory to the protocol 
of Peking, requesting each of them to make similar repre- 
sentations to Russia and Japan." On February 13, China 
formally announced her neutrality, but observed that "in 

1 Art I of the convention, regarding the lease of Port Arthur, ex- 
pressly reserves China's sovereignty over the leased territories. 

* As to the position of Manchuria, see La'wrence, JVar and Neutrality 
in the Far East, pp. 219 et seq. Manchuria furnishes an analogy to 
what Hall terms "places under double or ambiguous sovereignty.'* 
Hall, Int, Law, 4tii ed., pp. 530, 532. 

« The Kwampo (OMcial Gasette), Feb. 19, 1904, p. 387. 

* MSS, Dept. of State ; also New York Times, Feb. id, 1904. 


Manchuria, however, there are localities still in occupation 
by foreign powers where the enforcement of such rules of 
neutrality, it is feared, will be impossible." * Japan, on 
February 13 and 17 gave assurances to the United States 
and China, respectively, that she would " respect the neu- 
trality of China so long as it is respected by Russia," ex- 
cepting the region occupied by Russia.* On February 19 
Russia accepted the American proposal, subject to the reser- 
vation that " neutralization in no case can be extended to 
Manchuria, the territory of which, by the force of events, 
will serve as the field of military operations." • Even 
within Manchuria, Japan further limited the war-zone to 
the territories actually occupied by Russia, t. e., to the terri- 
tory east of the Liao river. On the other hand, she en- 
gaged to respect the Chinese neutrality only so far as Russia 
respected it. The case of the " Ryeshitelni," a Russian 
torped6-boat destroyer, which took refuge at Chefu, com- 
pelled Japan temporarily to regard that harbor as bellig- 
erent.* After the fall of Port Arthur, Russia, early in Jan- 
uary, 1905, revived the question of the Chinese neutrality. 
Count Cassini, the Russian ambassador at Washington, 
made a representation to the department of state against 
the violation of Chinese neutrality by Japan and China, 

1 London Times (Weekly), Feb. 26, 1904, p. 133. 

* Ihid,; also MSS. Dept of Stote. 

* MSS, Dept. of State. 

* On August 10, 1904, two Japanese torpedo-boat destroyers en- 
tered the harbor of Chefii and cut out the Russian destroyer "Rye- 
shitelni/' twhich had taken refuge there, and which had, as the Russians 
alleged, assented to a Chinese demand for disarmament. The Russian 
government formally protested to the powers against the action of the 
Japanese as a gross violation of international law. Japan defended her 
action on the ground of the alleged violation of China's neutrality by 
Russia and the inability of China to enforce it. See London Times 
(Weekly), Aug. 19 and 22, 1904; and New York Times, Aug. 20, 1904. 

479] ^^^ P^R EASTERN QUESTION 247 

categorically pointing out: the Japanese capture of the 
" Rycshitelni ;" the allied enlistment of Chinese bandits 
by the Japanese officers; the use of Miao-Dao Island as a 
base for naval operation by the Japanese fleet; the expor- 
tation of contraband from Chefu into Dalny (occupied by 
the Japanese force since May, 1904) ; the furnishing of 
cast-iron to the Japanese army by the government shops of 
China at Hanyang.* The governments of China and Japan 
not only promptly defended their conduct, but respectively 
made their counter-complaints against the Russian viola- 
tion of the Chinese neutrality; submitting evidences of the 
sending of troops to Mongolia by Russia for the purposes 
of imposing military requisitions and of appropriating 
horses and provisions; of the Russian attempt in December 
last to smuggle ammunition at Kalgan for Port Arthur; 
of the establishment of wireless telegraphic apparatus at 
the Russian consulate at Chefu, which maintained com- 
munication with the fortress of Port Arthur; the military 
use of territory west of the Liao river by Russia; the forc- 
ing of the Chinese at Sinmintun to sell contraband to the 
Russian troops; and the escape of the Russian captain at 
Wasung while under escort from Chefu to Shanghai.* 

More complex is the position of Korea. Its independ- 
ence has been declared from time to time not only by Japan 
and Russia, but also by Great Britain, France and China. 
Prior to the Russo-Japanese war, Korea, on January 25, 
1904, declared her intention of maintaining neutrality in the 
event of war.* But as north Korea was occupied by Cos- 
sacks and several other places by the Japanese, it became 

» MSS. Dcpt. of State. « Jhid. 

■ The Korean government telegraphed to the foreign powers, through 
the French consul at Chefu, announcing its neutrality in the event of 
war 4>etween Japan and Russia. New York Herald, Jan. 2$, 1904. 


the scene of military operations. Count Lamsdorff, in a 
circular note of February 11, pointing out that, "before 
the opening of hostilities against Russia/' Japanese troops 
were landed in Korea, and that Admiral Uriu had attacked 
Russian men-of-war in " the neutral port of Chemulpo/' 
accused Japan of a flagrant breach of neutrality/ In reply, 
the Japanese government sent to the powers, on March 9, 
a circular note in which it defended its action on the ground 
that its troops were despatched, with " the distinct consent 
of the Korean government," to " the menaced territory," 
in order to maintain " the independence and territorial in- 
tegrity of Korea." * Japan further maintained that " a 
state of war " already existed when the Russian war vessels 
were attacked at Chemulpo, and that, Korea having con- 
sented to the landing of Japanese troc^s at Chemulpo, that 
harbor had already "ceased to be a neutral port, at least 
as between the belligerents." Professor Lawrence ably 
justifies the course of Japan, when he declares that " the 
power which struck the first blow within Korean borders 
violated no neutrality existing in actual fact, though a state- 
paper neutrality was rudely interfered with." * He ob- 
serves that, although " Korea enjoyed a state-paper neu- 
trality," she was in reality " prize of wan" * In view of 
the grant by Korea to Japan of the right to land troops, and 
her failure to protest against the Japanese attack on the 
Russian vessels at Chemulpo, Dr. Nakamura regards her as 
a de-facto ally of Japan." 

Japan, through the efforts of Mr. Gonsuke Hayashi, her 
minister at Seoul, concluded on February 23, 1904, with 

* Lon<lon Times (Weekly), Feb. 27, 1904, p. 132. 

* Ibid., March 11, 1904, p. 164. 

* Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 216. 

* Ibid,, p. 81. " GaikO'Jiho, 1904, no. 81, k). 545 et seq. 


the Korean government, a protocol defining her relations 
with that country.* By this instrument Japan once more 
"guaranteed the independence and the territorial integrity 
of the Korean empire," and further " insured the safety 
and repose of the imperial house of Korea." Korea agreed 
to accept faithfully Japanese advice concerning the improve- 
ment of the administration, to grant to Japan the right to 
take all necessary measures and to occupy any places neces- 
sary from a strategic point of view, " in case the welfare 
of the imperial house of Korea, or the territorial integrity 
of Korea is endangered by the aggression of a third power, 
or by internal disturbances." But, while Japan guarantees 
Korean independence, she has, by virtue of her interference 
in administrative and military measures in the peninsula, 
established a de-facto protectorate over Korea. Here, again, 
Professor Lawrence well defines the Japanese relation to 
Korea when he says, " Susceptibilities are soothed, and 
possibly diplomatic difficulties turned, by calling it inde- 
pendent, but in reality it is as much under Japanese pro- 
tection as Egypt is under ours [British], all state-paper de- 
scriptions to the contrary notwithstanding." * Japan fur- 
ther advanced her position as protector of Korea by the 
agreement made on August 22, 1904,* by which the Korean 
government cannot conclude treaties or conventions with 
foreign powers, or grant their subjects concessions, without 
previously having consulted the government of Japan. In 
April, 1905, the imperial government of Korea agreed to 
" transfer and assign the control and administration of the 
post, telegraph and telephone services in Korea (except the 

^ The text of the protocol is given in Rockhill, Treaties and Conven- 
tions with or concerning China and Korea, p. 441. 

■ Lawrence, op. cit., p. 219. 

* The text of agreement of August 22 is found in the London Times, 


telephone service exclusively pertaining to the department 
of the imperial household) to the imperial Japanese gov- 
ernment." * 

When Korea, however, in May, 1904, denounced all her 
treaties with Russia and all concessions granted to Russian 
subjects, the Russian government declared that it would 
" regard as null and void all acts of the Korean govern- 
ment while under Japanese tutelage." * So long as Korea 
and Manchuria remained in the war-zone their status and 
destiny must have continued to be uncertain and conjectural. 
But by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia has recognized 
the Japanese protectorate over Korea, the open-door prin- 
ciple and the administrative entity of the Chinese govern- 
ment in Manchuria with the exception of the Liao-tung 
peninsula, re-leased to the Japanese.* The renewed Anglo- 
Japanese alliance emphasizes that the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth recognized, but also further secures, the open-door 
policy in Korea, notwithstanding the Japanese protectorate. 

^ The Kwanpo, April 28, 1905, published the text of the agreement 

• Lawrence, op, cit, p. 217. 

* See arts, ii-iv of the treaty of Portsmouth. 



Resume. — From the foregoing chapters it may justly bo 
assumed that certain nations of eastern Asia, though their 
rulers each claimed to be the lineal descendent of God, and 
exercised supreme authority in their own dominions, formed 
nevertheless, from very ancient times, "a family of nations," 
or international society, whose members acknowledged and 
observed certain usages, customs or rules in their intercourse 
in peace and war. In the international politics of Asia, the 
islanders of Japan, prior to the first century of the Christian 
era, inaugurated the system of interference in Korean 
affairs. During the time when Korea was composed of 
several kingdoms, the Mikado, his ministers and generals 
often exerted themselves to help the friendly kingdoms of 
Korea against neighboring aggressors. Even the Empress 
Zhingo invaded the Korean peninsula in person when the 
peace of Japan was menaced in the beginning of the third 
century. But, after the defeat in the naval war with the 
Emperor Tang of China, which resulted in the union of the 
several kingdoms of Korea and by which the Liao Tung 
peninsula became a Qiinese possession, the Emperor Ten- 
chi, in the middle of the seventh century, renounced the 
traditional policy of interference, and wisely concluded to 
maintain peaceful intercourse with both China and Korea. 
This august sovereign also, when he was crown prince, ac- 
complished the Taika reformation, by which the imperial 
483] 351 


sovereignty, usurped by the vassal Soga, was restored. 
Under the new peaceful regime of the imperial administra- 
tion, Japan healthily assimilated the Indian, Chinese and 
Korean civilizations, which had been introduced during the 
previous centuries. Buddhism, Confucianism, the fine arts, 
literature, political and judicial institutions, reached the 
climax of their developments in the eighth century, a period 
known in Japanese history as " the enlightened eras of Nara 
and Haian." 

For several hundred years after the close of the ninth cen- 
tury foreign intercourse, especially diplomatic intercourse, 
hardly existed among Asiatic nations. Military anarchy 
and civil war prevailed in Japan as well as in China, and 
piracy reigned on the high seas. The military anarchy in 
China developed into the universal militarism of the Mon- 
gol Tartar, which threatened the national states of the East 
and the West. Japan successfully defended her national 
existence against the universalism of Ghingis Khan in the 
thirteenth century. Three centuries later, at the end of the 
sixteenth century, the Japanese hero, Taiko Hideyoshi, 
tried to subjugate the Asiatic continent after the fashion 
of the Mongol Tartar, much as the Teutonic Frank had 
tried to unify Europe after the Roman fashion. But the 
" Napoleon of Japan," encountering disasters at home and 
abroad, learned the impossibility of realizing the dream of 

As has heretofore been stated, the Japanese originally 
welcomed all European peoples. When the Portuguese 
and Spaniards, as the result of their discoveries of sea 
routes to the East, came to Japan in the sixteenth century, 
and when the English and Dutch followed them in the be- 
ginning of the next century, the government and people 
freely and cordially received them, giving these Europeans 
freedom of religion and of commerce and the privilege of 

485] CONCLUSION 253 

extraterritoriality. Under these auspicious cirounstances 
occidental and oriental nations should have been united into 
one international society. The Portuguese and Spanish 
missions to Asia, however, paid little or no respect to the 
sovereign rights of oriental nations. They undertook to 
divide all the world except the Christian countries between 
them, according to their construction of the Papal Bull. 
The abuses of the Catholic propaganda made it necessary 
for the Shogun government of Japan, in 1638, to exclude 
all foreigners except a few Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki. 
For two centuries and a quarter thereafter Japan held a 
position of international isolation. Differing from the Jap- 
anese, the Koreans and the Chinese hated the Europeans 
from the beginning. Even the faithful Dutch traders were 
not admitted to Korea.* The first Portuguese embassy to 
China was imprisoned at Nanking. The Chinese did not 
grant to Europeans the privilege of extraterritoriality, as the 
Japanese had done. It is true that China did not totally 
close her ports, as did Japan and Korea, but she limited her 
intercourse with foreigners to Canton. The smuggling of 
opium by the English, who enjoyed a monopoly of the 
trade in that article with China, caused the Celestial empire, 
in 1840, to declare foreign trade to be forever at. an end.* 
On the other hand, the nations of the East and the West, 
having widely different civilizations, could not be easily 
tmited unless one surrendered to the other. In the en- 
lightened days of commerce and navigation the non-inter- 
course policy of the Asiatic nations infringed human neces- 
sity, and it was, therefore, against the " law of nations." 
Beginning with the opium war. Great Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, Russia and the United States exhibited a de- 

1 Griffis, Corea, the Hermit Nation, pp. 166 et seq. 

* Doulger, History of China, vol. iii, p. 138. See also Douglas, Europe 
and the Far East, p. 67. 


termination to establish intercourse with Asia even by an 
appeal to arms. After the bloody contest of the English 
and French with China, and the milder efforts of the 
Americans in Japan, western powers finally established 
commercial and diplomatic relations with Asiatic nations in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Thus Japan and 
China were formally introduced into modem international 
society. They were not, however, members in the full sense 
of the word, as they had to recognize the extraterritorial 
privileges of the western nations, whose citizens did not 
feel safe under the local administration of justice.* 

If a state be not internally organized according to the 
principles of the national consciousness, civil war or anarchy 
will predominate at home, and the national activity towards 
other nations will be hindered, and vice versa. The key to 
the political and social psychology of the Japanese is the 
fact that all Japanese subjects, official or individual, have 
absolute reverence for the imperial power as displayed in 
an unbroken line of illustrious Mikados. So long as this 
national consciousness is preserved, the country enjoys 
" tranquillity " at home and maintains the national glory 
abroad. This is witnessed by the history of ancient and 
modem Japan. In the middle ages, when the imperial 
power declined, the Shogun and daimios sprang up, and 
military anarchy became prevalent throughout the empire. 
Although the Shogun controlled the feudal daimios and 
ruled the empire, one Shogun after another was overthrown 
by a rival and there was no permanent peace. Naturally, 
steady intercourse with foreign countries was not main- 
tained during the regime of the Shoguns. The best of the 

^ As to the inequality of members of the international society, owtng 
to the <lifferent grades of civilization, see Westlake, International Law, 
pp. loi et seq. 

487] CONCLUSION 255 

Shogun dynasties, that oi the Tokugawa family, maintained 
the peace of the country for two centuries and a half, but it 
avoided the difficulties and responsibilities of foreign inter- 
course by maintaining a policy of seclusion. By the revo- 
lution of 1868 the imperial sovereignty was restored, and 
the state and government were again established on the 
fundamental idea of the Japanese — the national reverence 
for the Mikado. Ever since a marked evolution has been 
and still is in progress in the internal and external history 
of the empire. The feudal system has been replaced by 
the national regime. The national institutions have been 
equipped and improved by contact with western civilization, 
which has been freely adopted by the imperial government 
and adapted to the national needs. The military despotism 
and political tyranny of feudal Japan have been replaced by 
a constitutional system with parliamentary legislation, local 
self-government and courts of justice. Provincial loyalty 
to the feudal daimios succumbed to national patriotism and 
universal devotion to the emperor. The activities of the 
Japanese, which hitherto had been dissipated in the civil 
struggles of the feudal lords, came to be, under the auspices 
of internal peace, national activities reaching out toward 
external politics. 

Japan's healthy assimilation of western civilization and 
her strenuous efforts for the revision of the old treaties in- 
duced the western powers to recognize her judicial auton- 
omy. In 1899 ^he was admitted into the comity of nations 
on an equal footing with western states. In her intercourse 
with Asiatic powers modern Japan led the way in bringing 
her sister states into treaty relations and in providing for 
trade regulations and resident ministers, both of which had 
been utterly unknown in the international society of old 
Asia. Japan, however, to-day enjoys consular jurisdiction 
in the territories of China, Korea and Siam, because her 


civilization is superior to theirs. In the domain of purely 
political questions among oriental nations, China and Japan 
were concerned in the solution of the Loochooan, the For- 
mosan (1874- 1875) ^i^d the Korean problems, in which 
Japan struggled to bring semi-civilized peoples to the light 
of modern civilization. The two empires of China and 
Japan had for twenty-five years, up to the Chinese- Japanese 
war, exercised a dominant influence upon oriental politics, 
just as the great powers of Europe maintained their suprem- 
acy in European diplomacy. 

After the Chinese war of 1894- 1895, Japan entered into 
world-politics with the great powers of Europe and 
America, China was not only excluded from the rank of 
the Asiatic great powers, but became the " sick man " of 
the East, a companion of the '^ Korean invalid." Since 
that time the Far East has become a centre of the ambitions 
chiefly of France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Russia 
and the United States, in their efforts to satisfy the wants 
of " imperial expansion," commercial and political. As the 
result of Russia's efforts to obtain an ice-free port on the 
Pacific, Japan was not only " advised " to renounce her 
possession of the Liao Tung peninsula, '* the legitimate 
fruit of victory," but was soon confronted with Russian 
rivalry in Korea. The continental powers of Europe 
claimed exclusive concessions in China, on the principle of 
"spheres of interest," while Great Britain, Japan and the 
United States maintained the principle of equality of oppor- 
tunity for all nations in the commerce of the Far East 
Among the continental powers, Germany, however, divides 
her preferences between the policy of " spheres of influ- 
ence " and that of the " open door," while England and 
Japan, though they stand for the open-door policy, claim 
certain spheres of interest as an unavoidable necessity, in 
order to counterbalance the continental exdusiveness and 

489] CONCLUSION 257 

secure the balance of power. But the United States, by 
reason of its detached position, was able freely, frankly 
and independently to espouse the open-door policy without 
claiming any sphere of interest, and to secure from the 
powers their pledge to maintain in China equality of com- 
mercial OH)ortunity, 

At the time of the Boxer complication in 1900 the powers 
sent forces to North China for the relief of their represen- 
tatives and citizens in Peking. But Russia afterwards 
failed to evacuate Manchuria and to restore to the Chinese 
government the temporarily assiuned administration of 
Newchwang, a treaty port. Russia repeatedly excused her 
occupation of Manchuria as a temporary measure for rail- 
way protection. Nevertheless, more than once Russia at- 
tempted to induce China to conclude a treaty tending to inih 
pair China's sovereignty and to destroy the treaty rights of 
other powers. Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the United 
States warned China, while Great Britain, Japan and the 
United States from time to time protested directly to Russia. 
And as the latter country did not modify her evident designs 
in Manchuria, the Anglo- Japanese alliance was, in the begin- 
ning of 1902, entered into as a precautionary measure. In- 
fluenced by this alliance and the independent representation 
of the United States, Russia concluded a convention with 
China, in April, 1902, by which Manchuria was to be re- 
stored to China. In accordance with the stipulations of 
this convention, Russia began, in October, 1902, to evac- 
uate Manchuria. But, in the spring of 1903, she suddenly 
changed her attitude, not only suspending the withdrawal 
of her troops, but also increasing her forces in Manchuria 
as well as on the Korean frontier. Then, as a condition of 
evacuation, she made demands on China, the granting of 
which would practically have brought Manchuria under a 
Russian protectorate and excluded the commercial interests 


of all other powers. Great Britain, Japan and the United 
States again hastened to protest against the execution of 
the Russian designs. 

Japan was far more directly concerned in the Far East- 
ern question than any other power, not only from the com- 
mercial point of view, but from the political as well. The 
permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia and her 
activities in North Korea would be followed by the absorp- 
tion of the whole of Korea, and this would menace the well- 
being of Japan. The imperial government of Japan, there- 
fore, invited Russia to come to a thorough understanding 
by diplomatic means for assuring the integrity of the two 
" sick " nations of the Far East, and equal commercial 
opportunities therein for all nations, while recognizing the 
"predominant interest" of Russia in Manchuria and of 
Japan in Korea, Unfortunately, owing to the insincere 
attitude of the Russian government toward Japan, the latter 
was compelled to abandon measures of diplomacy and to 
take up arms to safeguard her interests. Notwithstanding 
the successive victories of Japan over Russia, Russia has 
not been " wiped out," but still remains a great power in 
Asia. What will be the ultimate result of the late great 
struggle between these two nations is a question that belongs 
to the future. Time will show whether the Far Eastern 
question will be solved by the supremacy of Russia, with 
her " policy of exclusiveness " and her " tradition of irre- 
sponsible authority," or by the leadership of Japan, wfco 
has, on the one hand, consciously adopted the Anglo-Saxon 
principle of national freedom and equality of opportunity, 
but who has, on the other hand, kindred sympathies and 
traditional relations with the backward nations of Asia. 

The Mission of Japan. — It is the desire of Japan to pro- 
serve in the Orient the national status of those of her sister 
Asiatic nations i^hich are not yet subjugated by foreign 

491] CONCLUSION 259 

powers, and to lead them to that Hght of western civiliza- 
tion which she is now enjoying, without having abandoned 
her national individualism. It is often said that the terri- 
torial integrity of the Chinese Empire is maintained 
by western powers largely because of the commercial inter- 
ests involved. Japan not only has a dominant commercial 
interest, but she has also a political interest which far 
transcends that of any other power concerned in the Far 
Eastern question. As has often been observed, the Mikado 
and his statesmen have from time immemorial regarded 
the peace of the Korean peninsula as an object of vital im- 
portance to the welfare of Japan, and the preservation of 
Korean integrity has become the traditional policy of the 
Island Empire. For the attainment of this end Japan fought 
with China in 1894, with Russia in 1904, and will fight at 
any cost in the future with any power. From ancient times 
the Japanese have believed the extension of succor to weak 
Korea to be an " unshakable responsibility " of the empire. 
The recent protective measures adopted by Japan in Korea 
are, however, rather to be regarded as unavoidable aids to 
humanity and civilization. The YamatO'damaski, the 
" chivalrous spirit of the Japanese," which is derived from 
the Biishido (knighthood) — the readiness to help the weak 
victim as against the wicked aggressor — is particularly char- 
acteristic of the Japanese feeling toward Korea. 

Though Japan had often been at enmity with China prior 
to the war of 1894, yet, when the latter's territorial integ- 
rity was threatened by foreign powers, she at once mani- 
fested her interest in the preservation of the Celestial em- 
pire. Japan's classical relation to Chinese civilization and 
her commercial growth in China further strengthen her 
political sympathy with that country. The new conditions 
that arose in Manchuria, under Russian influence, having 
direct connection with Korea, added greatly to the respon- 


sibilities of Japan. So long as China is incapable of main- 
taining single-handed an independent existence and of with- 
standing the external pressure of aggressive powers, Japan 
will not shirk her responsibility, even if called upon for 
armed assistance, as was demonstrated by the recent war. 
Mr. Colquhoun several years ago suggested the im- 
portance of preserving Chinese independence "under 
the tutelage of Japan, by the concert of commercial 
powers of Europe and America." * The civilized nations 
of the West should have faith in Japan's leadership in help- 
ing China, because Japan has not only pledged herself to 
maintain Chinese territorial integrity and the open-door 
policy in public documents, but has also ever fulfilled this 
pledge in practice. 

Although Japan is politically not so much concerned with 
Siam as is either Great Britain or France, the modem 
Siamese cannot have forgotten the chivalrous assistance 
rendered them by the brave Yamad^a Masanaka on the eve 
of their national crisis in the seventeenth century.* Ever 
since the first treaty engagement of 1887, cordial relations 
between Japan and Siam have been maintained, and they 
have been more closely cemented by the recent visit of the 
Siamese crown prince to Tokio. Before any other power, 
Japan formally manifested her willingness to recognize 
Siam's entrance into the " comity of nations." The Japa- 
nese trade with Siam has developed to a significant degree 
during several years past, and there is also a marked pos- 
sibility of further expansion. In case of territorial danger 
to Siam, Japan would not keep silence. 

On the other hand, Japan would educate the backward 

* Colquhoun, The Mastery of the PaciAc, p. 426. 

* For an interesting account of Yamada in Siam, see a paper by Cap- 
tain James, Trdnsuctions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. vii, pp. 

493] CONCLUSION 261 

nations of Asia in western civilization. She has from time 
to time advised both Korea and China to reform their cor- 
rupt administration, which does not sufficiently guarantee 
the safety of person and property, and which tends to create 
foreign complications; but she has acquired, as the result 
of the failure of radical reforms in Korea in 1895, and in 
China in 1898, a preference for gradual measures. A num- 
ber of Japanese legal counselors, administrative advisers, 
military instructors and college professors have already 
been employed by the Chinese, Korean and Siamese gov- 
ernments. Young men of these nations are also flodcing to 
Tdcio for professional education. By reason of kindred 
ideas and a kindred literature, the Japanese, as Dr. Hirth 
has remarked, are more capable than Europeans and Amer- 
icans of so educating the Chinese as not to destroy " the 
old knowledge while familiarizing the students with the 
advantages of tfie new." * 

Meanwhile Japan's activity in the Far East, particularly 
with reference to the potential awakening of China, with 
its extensive territories and vast population, has aroused 
the jealousy of rival powers. An attempt is made to create 
antagonism to her mission in China by invoking the appa- 
rition of the " yellow peril,'* which is supposed to endanger 
western civilization. From the economic point of view, 
the " yellow peril " is interpreted to signify that all western 
trade would be excluded from China should the Chinese, 
awakened by Japan, develop their industrial resources with 
"cheap labor" and thus supply themselves. The argu- 
ment is superficial and erroneous. Many eminent econom- 
ists now hold that a low scale of wages and of living suc- 
cumbs in tiie long run to a higher scale of wages and of 

1 The Worlds s Work, May, 1903. 


living in modem industrial competition/ The introduc- 
tion of modem industries into Japan, moreover, made the 
Japanese " far better customers in European and American 
markets," because of their new wants. The commercial his- 
tory of Japan is instructive as to the future demands of the 
Chinese on western markets. "The richer the Chinese 
get, the more they will buy." * 

Then, from the military point of view, it is suggested 
that the Japanese will .drill the Chinese into efficiency by 
means of modem discipline, and that the combination of 
Japan with an empire of four hundred million people 
will endanger the western nations just as the Mongol 
hordes threatened Europe in the thirteenth century. 
Count Cassini, the Russian ambassador at Washington, 
openly deprecated the success of the Japanese in the late 
war, on the ground that it " would make the Japanese 
dominant in Asia and result in an Asiatic league," which 
" would imperil the interests not only of Europe, but of 
America also." ■ This argument Baron Kaneko has ably 
refuted.* " We are," he declares, " not fighting that we 
may be r^^rded as a ' peril ' to western civilization, but 
to maintain the progress and humanity of Asiatic peoples." 
The Japanese are teaching the Chinese nationalism, how to 
defend their empire and to win the respect of other nations, 
in opposition to the universal anarchy of the Mongol hordes. 
So long as China is unable to defend herself, Japan is dis- 

1 Schoenhof, The Economy of High Wages, chaps, iii, iv and y, 
Marshall says that " low-wage labor is generally dear, if working with 
expensive machinery." See his Principles of Economics, 4th ed, bk. 
vi, chap, iii, p. 631. 

« Leroy-Beaulieu, The Awakening of the East, p. 239. See also 
Reinsch, World Politics, p. 250. 

» New York World, March 20, 1904. 

* International Economist, May 21, 1904. 

495] CONCLUSION 263 

posed to sympathize with and encourage her, and, if neces- 
sary, to act in alliance with her. But, if the Chinese 
should pursue a course offensive to western civilization, 
the Japanese would co-operate with Christendom, hand in 
hand, against diem, just as they did in 1900, when the 
Boxers treacherously offended against civilization and in- 
ternational law. Living authorities on the Far Eastern 
question, like Colquhoun, Stevens and Reinsch, have clearly 
exposed the absurdity of the cry as to the " yellow peril," 
and have demonstrated the absence of any ground for ap- 
prehension in Japan's attitude towards China. ^ 

Western civilization may, on the contrary, have some- 
thing to fear from the " Slavic peril." Professor Burgess, 
an authority of world-wide reputation on public law and 
western history, has affirmed that the position of Russia 
constitutes " a perpetual and fearful menace to Germany, 
Austria and Sweden-Norway;" and he has further ven- 
tured to prophesy that " Russia will prove her§elf, in the 
next twenty-five years, almost as hostile to the United 
States as she is now to Great Britain." * Several years 
ago, when Russia occupied Port Arthur, and when the 
rumor of a Russo-Chinese alliance prevailed. Professor 
Giddings,* an eminent sociologist, declared that the Eng- 
lish-speaking nations would " lose commercial opportuni- 
ties," would " sink to a position of secondary influence," 
and would " presently find themselves obliged to conform 
in all their politics to a power that will dominate inter- 
national relations as remorselessly as did Caesar or Napo- 

1 Colquhoun in The Independent, April 14, ISX)4; Stevens in The 
Forum, vol. 30, pp. 76-85; Reinsoh in The North American Review 
(1905), no. I. 

^Political Science Quarterly, vol. xix, pp. 16-18. 

• Ibid., vol. xiii, p. 605. 


leon," unless Great Britain and the United States should 
abandon their " selfish and short-sighted " antagonism and 
act together against the Russo-Chinese combination, with 
its " policy of exclusiveness " and its " tradition of irre- 
sponsible authority." It is a historical fact that the com- 
merce of Japan, and of other commercial nations, in North 
China and in Korea has from time to time been menaced 
by Russian activities. The cry of " peril " is, however, 
often the utterance of a jealousy of the temporarily 
dominant influence of some particular power. The greater 
the surplus produced by the United States for export, the 
louder the outcry of the continental powers against the 
" Yankee peril." The great powers and their material 
forces are to-day widely distributed over the earth, and 
they are watching with keen jealousy to see that no high- 
handed measure of any particular power endangers the rest 
of the world. The peril may be Yellow, Slavic, or Yankee, 
but its realization is not in the near future. 

As to the attitude of Japan toward the western nations, 
it may be observed that she has welcomed and appreciated 
their appearance in the East, without which she recognizes 
the fact that Asia could not have been awakened. The 
political, commercial and religious agencies of the West, 
equipped with adequate capital, modem machinery and an 
organized church, are important factors in the exploitation 
of undeveloped Asia and its education in modem ideas. 
Japan therefore will co-operate with the western nations in 
the great work of civilization in Asia. Though opposed to 
the exclusive exploitation and permanent occupation of 
Manchuria by Russia, she was once ready to recognize 
Russia's dominant interest there, both commercial and polit- 
ical, especially in the matter of railways. Count Katsura, 
prime minister, declared, in the House of Representatives, 
in April, 1904, that it was " the policy of this empire to 

497] CONCLUSION 265 

cement dose relations with the treaty powers, to respect the 
rights due to other nations, and thus to promote the main- 
tenance of permanent peace in the Far East, as well as to 
strengthen the position of the country." * In these days, 
when the oriental and the occidental civilizations meet face 
to face, the function of Japan is indispensable, since she is 
familiar with the characteristics of both. During his tour 
of the world, in 1901, Marquis Ito gave an interesting ex- 
planation of Japan's mission in a speech at the Metropol- 
itan Club in New York City. " We are," said he, " the 
only people in the Orient who can fully understand the 
importance and significance of two civilizations, and I con- 
sider it a noble mission of our country to try to play the 
part of international broker in the further maintenance of 
the peace of the Orient." ' The national aspiration of the 
Japanese is, in a word, to maintain permanent international 
peace and peaceful intercourse, commercial and political, 
among all nations of the East and the West, preserving the 
territorial integrity of the weaker nations of Asia by co- 
operation with the great powers, while respecting the l^it- 
imate rights of other nations and defending its own proper 
rights and dignity. In the foreign affairs of the empire, the 
ruling emperor, the most gracious and august sovereign of 
Japan, has sedulously taught his people and government " to 
develop a cordial and amicable understanding with the 
treaty nations as the basis of enduring peace." During the 
deadlock at Portsmouth, which threatened to break up the 
negotiations for the termination of the great war, the em- 
peror, sacrificing the claim for a large indemnity, comr 
manded his plenipotentiaries to concede the Russian con- 
ditions simply " for the sake of humanity and civilization " 

^ The Japan Weekly Mail, March 26, 1904. 
> New York Times, October 25, 1901. 


and " in the interest of both countries [Japan and Russia] 
and the world." 

The peace of the world conceivably might be maintained 
by a universal sovereignty over all nations/ The institu- 
tion of universalism, like Roman imperialism, dominating 
all the nations, may theoretically solve international con- 
flicts. Universal authority would, however, necessarily de- 
stroy national peculiarity and ultimately bring about " stag- 
nation and despotism." * Modem nations really struggle 
against universalism in order to preserve their own con- 
sciousness. So long as nations have no world-language or 
world-literature and no universal consciousness of right and 
wrong, and so long as national patriotism is not converted 
into world cosmopolitanism, the world peace of universal- 
ism cannot come into existence. The present emperor of 
Russia, has, out of the benevolence of his disposition, pro- 
posed to maintain international peace as well as to lighten 
national burdens by limiting the military forces of nations.* 
But the history of the world does not justify the assumption 
that such a policy would necessarily have that practical re- 
sult. The national wealth — public and private — of the 
leading powers is steadily increasing, in spite of their pro- 
gressive armaments. No progressive nation desires to reduce 
her armament or her independent activities in days in which 
arms are still the best guarantee of peace and prosperity and 

^ Seligman, The Economic Interpretation of History, p. 129. 

* Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, vol 
i, p. 38. 

* See the rescript of Czar, dated August 24, 1898, and the circular 
note of Count MuraviefF, dated Jan. ii, 1899, in HoUs, The Peace Con- 
ference at the Hague, pp. 8-10, 24-27. For the objection to disarmed 
peace, see the speech of General von Schwarzhoff, the German delegate 
to the Peace Conference, ibid,, pp. 76-78. See also a paper of Capt 
Mafaan, the American delegate, North American Review, vol. 169. 

499] CONCLUSION 267 

of the maintenance of national dignity. The principle of 
"arms against arms" is still true and practical. Since Prince 
Bismarck established the condition of " armed peace," the 
progressive armaments of the powers composing the Triple 
Alliance and the Dual Alliance, the steady development of the 
powerful navy of Great Britain, and the increased prepara- 
tion of the Americans to help their sister republics with for- 
midable ironclads, are but the tokens of international peace 
in Europe and America. Prior to the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese war, the Anglo- Japanese alliance, con- 
cluded in 1902, was regarded as at least a precautionary 
measure in securing the open-door policy and the peace of 
tfie Far East. The renewed Anglo- Japanese alliance con- 
cluded on August 12, 1905, which has extended the terri- 
torial operation of the compact so as to cover eastern Asia 
and India, should insure the general peace of Asia as against 
attempts at revenge by the rival power.* 

Armed peace is particularly necessary in the case of in- 
ternational trade. Commerce is often described as a peace- 
maker, since it is mutually beneficial to all nations. This 
statement is but an exaggeration of the idea of free trade. 
Should the industries and the transportation of nations de- 
velop in an equal degree, should nations have equal pro- 
ductive power and international exchange take place on an 
equal footing, then mutual benefit would be enjoyed by all 
nations and there would be no colonial struggles and no 
commercial jealousies. But, until nations shall attain this 
ideal commercial peace as the result of freedom of exchange, 
they must heed historical precedents. Speaking histori- 
cally, commerce and war have a significant relation. "Even 
when the two are distinct," says Professor Cunningham, 
" they are closely connected ; for war may open up new 

* See AppeiMlix B. 


points for commerce, as was done by the Crusades, and a 
successful war may give securities for peaceful commerce; 
on the other hand, commercial rivalries have often occa- 
sioned the outbreak of hostilities between nations." ^ Dur- 
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the interna- 
tional trade of European nations was characterized by mer- 
cantilism, " the national economy of self-interest." Most 
of the wars were waged for economic objects; the alliances 
were often formed against the monopolistic measures of the 
dominant powers.* The victory of Great Britain over Na- 
poleonic France for a long time secured peaceful commerce: 
Meanwhile, the economic theories of Quesnay and Adam 
Smith, translating " natural law " into international trade, 
caused nations to modify the restrictions of selfish mer- 
cantilism. Their adherents advocated " free trade," and in 
the middle of the nineteenth century western nations were in- 
fluenced by cosmopolitanism in their foreign commercial 
policy. German economists, notably Friedrich List,* how- 
ever, clearly demonstrated, with characteristic thoroughness, 
that free trade might be favorable to countries where in- 
dustries were developed to a high degree, such as Great 
Britain, but not to such countries as Germany or the United 
States, which were in transition from the agricultural to the 
manufacturing stage, and that protective measures were pre- 
ferable for the latter in order to foster " infant industries." 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the United 
States, the German Empire, France, Austria-Hungary, 
Italy and Russia, established highly protective tariflfs.* 

* Cunning!iatn, Western Civilisation (Ancient Times), p. 3- 
» Schmollcr, The Mercantile System, pp. 50-68. 

* Bastable, The Commerce of Nations, pp. 123 et seq.; Ingram, A His- 
tory of Political Economy, pp. 193 et seq. 

* Bliss, The Encyclopedia of Social Reform. Sec also Seager, Intro- 
duction to Economics, pp. 370 et seq. Ashley, Modern Tariff History. 

50l] CONCLUSION 269 

Even in England, where the free-trade doctrine has re- 
mained dominant, the cry of "protection against protecfion" 
has grown louder in the banning of the twentieth century/ 
Although Japan was obliged to establish liberal rates in her 
conventional tariff, her statutory tariff is based upon the 
protective principle.^ Protective measures have in their 
progress come to embrace subsidies on shipping and railway 
transportation, bounties on exports, the federation of 
colonies, the expansion of " spheres of interest," and the 
acquisition of leases and concessions in the territories of in- 
ferior nations. The economic activity of the great powers 
has assumed the form of "imperialism," which signifies 
the ambition of the great powers to control, for economic or 
political purposes, " as large a portion of the earth's surface 
as their energy and opportunities may permit." The 
struggle of the great powers in China is strikingly imperial- 
istic* Should Russia maintain exclusive control in her 
imperial expansion in China and should the other great 
powers be indulgent toward her policy, their commercial 
opportunity in that quarter would be lost. The open-door 
policy in China can be maintained only by arms, so long as 
diplomacy fails to make Russia recognize the rights of 
other powers. The commercial and colonial policy of the 
Dutch in the eighteenth century is very instructive. Their 
avoidance of political responsibility in the pursuit of com- 
merce led to the downfall of their colonial empire.* It is 

^ See Mr. Chamberlain's speech, May 15, 1903, at Birmingham, Lon- 
don Times, May 16, 1903. 

2 The statutory tariff of 1899 was amended in 1901 and again in 1904, 
and the rates of duty were increased. See the Kwampo, March 30, 
1901, and January i, 1905. 

* Reinsch, World Politics, parts ii, iii. See also Hobson, Imperial- 
ism, chap. V, " Imperialism in Asia." 

* Cunningham, Western Ctvilisation, vol. ii, pp. 204 et seq. 


Still true that "the flag follows trade," and vice versa. 
Struggles of the nations will not cease until " economic 
equality " is secured among them/ Tlie armed protection 
of commerce is also indispensable for neutral countries in 
time of war. For the enforcement of the rule "free ships, 
free goods," Catherine II initiated the so-called armed neu- 
trality against the discriminative capture of neutral ships by 
belligerent powers.* In short, the peaceful and defensive 
measure of arms is based on experience and human neces- 
sity. In their contemporary speeches. Emperor William, 
King Edward, President Roosevelt, and Marquis Ito frankly 
admit the necessity of armaments in maintaining the peace 
of nations.' 

Armed peace is, however, likely to be misused or to be 
abused by passionate statesmen or by selfish nations. It is, 
therefore, much to be desired that, while nations maintain 
armaments as a safeguard, their differences should be settled, 
for the advancement of international peace, by " the subtler 

^ Scligman, The Economic Interpretation of History, p. 130. 

2 As to the armed neutrality, see Whcaton, History of the Law of 
Nations, par. 14. 

' During the imperial regatta at Kiel, on June 25, 1904, the German 
emperor, responding to a toast to King Edward, spoke as follows of 
the German navy : '' It is intended for the protection of trade and of 
territory, and it also serves, like the German army, for the maintenance 
of peace which the German Empire has kept more than thirty years, 
and which Europe has preserved with it." King Edward responded: 
" May our two flags float side by side to the remote ages, even as to-day, 
for the maintenance of peace and welfare not only of our own coun- 
tries, but also of all other nations." New York Herald, June 26, 1904. 

" We desire," President Roosevelt, referring to the navy, declared in 
his annual message of 1901, "the peace which comes as of right to the 
just man; not the peace granted on terms of ignominy to the craven 
and the weakling." 

Marquis Ito said two years ago: "We are arming ourselves only to 
insure the fulfilment of the mission of peace and the progress we liave 
made thus far." See his speech at the Metropolitan Qtib. 

503] CONCLUSION 271 

movement" of diplomacy. The Peace Conference at the 
Hague certainly marks a great step towards general peace, 
so far as civilized countries have pledged themselves to sub- 
mit their differences to impartial investigation, or to media- 
tion or arbitration. The English-speaking nations, which 
have an extensive commerce throughout the globe, have 
long since manifested their sincere disposition to settle their 
disputes by arbitration. The United States during the last 
century was a party to " fifty-three executed arbitral agree- 
ments ;" and its " president, or some one appointed or ap- 
proved by him," acted as " arbitrator or umpire " in " twelve 
cases," * Great Britain was a party to twenty arbitrations 
with the United States and to thirty-three with other coun- 
tries.^ The recent course of some of the great powers, par- 
ticularly Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, 
in agreeing to refer to the Hague tribunal differences which 
do not affect " the vital interests, the independence or the 
honor " of the state, has tended to rescue the tribunal from 
n^lect. If this course were generally followed, interna- 
tional friction would be diminished. Japan and Russia, 
now that the war is ended, should return to the support of 
this humane movement. 

In 1902 Japan consented to the submission to the Hague 
tribunal of the question of the application- of the house tax 
to buildings of foreign residents on land held under lease 
in perpetuity.* Even while the war was still in pro- 
gress the negotiation of an arbitration treaty between Japan 
and the United States was reported. Russia also concluded 
a similar treaty with Denmark. 

1 Moore, A Hundred Years of American Diplomacy, Rep. of Am. 
Bar Asso., vol. 27, pp. 347 et seq. 

* Ibid., p. 351- 

^Parl Papers, Japan no, i (1905) On May 22, 1905, the tribunal 
decided against the Japanese claim. 


It is no doubt true that the commercial and colonial 
jealousies attending the imperial expansion of the great 
powers would be softened by observing the spirit of cos- 
mopolitanism, as exhibited in the open-door policy.* The 
Anglo-French agreement of April 7, 1904,' which adjusted 
the differences of the two countries in respect of their 
colonies, and which liberally adopted the cosmopolitan policy, 
is suggestive and instructive in its bearing on the imperial- 
istic policy of the great powers. Reciprocity treaties, the 
liberal application of the " most-favored-nation " clause, and 
the extension of national treatment to foreigners, would 
go far towards averting tariff wars and retaliation. Finally 
it should be remembered that, although an imperialistic 
policy may be justified, where it is confined to the protec- 
tion of the legitimate rights of the nation abroad, or where 
it leads backward nations to the light of civilization, or 
even where it secures the necessary exercise of an " inter- 
national police," yet a selfish imperialism is likely to end, 
as it has so often done, only in failure. The measures of 
the Anglo- Japanese alliance in China and Korea such as the 
open-door policy are both humane and statesmanlike. 

The peace of the world, the progress of humanity, the 
prosperity of each individual nation, the reconciliation of the 
East and West, the union of the " Christian " and the 
*' Pagan," all the elements that go to make up the great 
conception of the world's civilization, would be advanced 
by the co-operation of all nations which are capable of such 

1 " In so £ar as any country finds that she is able, without detriment 
to herself, to modify or reconstruct iier commercial policy on cosmo- 
politan lines, the occasions for international dispute are likely to be 
considerably diminished." Cunningham, Western CwUixaHon, vol. ti, 
p. 266. 

« Pari, Papers, France no. i (1904). 


a mission. In this all-embracing world-movement, Japan 
will continue to play a significant part, as she has done here- 
tofore, in harmony with her own interests and with those 
of Christendom, and in the same chivalrous spirit in which 
she is now leading her sister nations of Asia to a higher plane 
of political, social,, and moral responsibility. 


The Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905 

The Emperor of Japan, on one part, and the Emperor 
of All the Russias, on the other part, animated by a desire 
to restore the blessings of peace to their countries, have re- 
solved to conclude a treaty of peace and have for this pur- 
pose named plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his 
Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro 
Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the 
Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Ex- 
cellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred 
Treasure, his Minister to the United States, and for his 
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, his Excellency 
Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his 
Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial 
Court of Russia, his Majesty's Ambassador to the United 
States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, which 
were found to be in good and due form, have concluded the 
following articles : 

Article One. — There shall henceforth be peace and amity 
between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Em- 
peror of All the Russias and between their respective States 
and subjects. 

274 [506 


Article Two. — ^Thc Imperial Russian Grovemment, ac- 
knowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount poli- 
tical, military, and economical interests, engage neither to 
obstruct nor interfere with measures for the guidance, pro- 
tection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan 
may find it necessary to take in Korea. 

It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be 
treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citi- 
zens of other foreign powers; that is to say, they shall be 
placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the 
most favored nation. 

It is also agreed that in order to avoid causes of mis- 
understanding the two high contracting parties will abstain 
on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military 
measures which may menace the security of Russian or 
Korean territory. 

Article Three. — Japan and Russia mutually engage : 

First — ^To evacuate completely and simultaneously Man- 
churia except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao- 
tung Peninsula in conformity with the provisions of the ad- 
ditional Article I annexed to this treaty, and 

Second — ^To restore entirely and completely to the ex- 
clusive administration of China all the porti<His of Man- 
churia now in occupation or under the control of the 
Japanese or Russian troops with the exception of the terri- 
tory above mentioned. 

The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they 
have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or pre- 
ferential or exclusive concessions in the impairment of 
Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of 
equal opportunity. 

Article Four. — ^Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not 
to obstruct any general measures common to all countries 


which China may take for the development of the commerce 
or industry of Manchuria. 

Article Five. — ^Tlie Imperial Russian Government transfer 
and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the 
consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port 
Arthur, Ta-Lien, and the adjacent territory and territorial 
waters and all rights, privileges, and concessions connected 
with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer 
and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public 
works and properties in the territory affected by the above- 
mentioned lease. 

The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the 
consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the fore- 
going stipulation. 

The Imperial Government of Japan on their part under- 
take that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the 
territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected. 

Article Six. — The Imperial Russian Government engage 
to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan 
without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese 
Government the railway between Chang-chun-fu and Kuan- 
chang-tsu and Port Arthur, and all the branches together 
with all the rights, privil^es, and properties appertaining 
thereto in that region, as well as all the coal mines in said 
region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. 
The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain 
the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the 
foregoing stipulation. 

Article Seven. — ^Japan and Russia engage to exploit their 
respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial 
and industrial purposes and nowise for strategic purposes. 
It is understood that this restriction does not apply to the 
railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liao- 
tung Peninsula. 


Article Eight. — The Imperial Governments of Japan and 
Russia, with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse 
and traffic, will so soon as possible conclude a separate con- 
vention for the regulation of their connecting railway ser- 
vices in Manchuria. 

Article Nine. — The Imperial Russian Government cede to 
the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full 
sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin 
and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and 
properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is 
adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. 
The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined 
in accordance with the provisions of the additional Article 
XI annexed to this treaty. 

Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their 
respective possessions on the island of Sakhalin or the ad- 
jacent islands any fortifications or other similar military 
works. They also respectively engage not to take any mili- 
tary measures which may impede the free navigation of the 
Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary. 

Article Ten. — It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabi- 
tants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real prop- 
erty and retire to their country, but if they prefer to remain 
in the ceded territory they will be maintained and protected 
in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property 
on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and juris- 
diction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right 
of residence in or to deport from such territory any inhabi- 
tants who labor under political or administrative disability. 
She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such 
inhabitants shall be fully respected. 

Article Eleven. — Russia engages to arrange with Japan 
for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the 


coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and 
Bering Seas. 

It is agreed that the forgoing engagement shall not af- 
fect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects 
in those regions. 

Article Twelve. — ^The treaty of commerce and navigation 
between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war, 
the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to 
adopt as a basis for their commercial relations, pending the 
conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation, the 
basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the pres- 
ent war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing 
of the most favored nation in which are included import and 
export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues, 
and the admission and treatment of agents, subjects, and 
vessels of one country in the territories of the other. 

Article Thirteen. — So soon as possible after the present 
treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be recipro- 
cally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and 
Russia shall each appoint a Special Commissioner to take 
charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one 
Government shall be delivered to and received by the Com- 
missioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized 
representative in such convenient numbers and such con- 
venient ports of the delivering State as such delivering 
State shall notify in advance to the Commissioner of the 
receiving State. 

The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each 
other so soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners 
is completed with a statement of the direct expenditures re- 
spectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of 
the "prisoners from the date of capture or surrender and 
up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to re- 
pay to Japan so soon as possible after the exchange of 


Statement as above provided the difference between the ac- 
tual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount 
similarly disbursed by Russia. 

Article Fourteen, — The present treaty shall be ratified by 
their Majesties, the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor 
of All the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as little 
delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days 
from the date of the signature of the treaty, to be announced 
to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respec- 
tively through the French Minister at Tokio and the Am- 
bassador of the United States at St. Petersburg, and from 
the date of the later of such announcements this treaty 
shall in all its parts come into full force. The formal ex- 
change of ratifications shall take place at Washington so 
soon as possible. 

Article Fifteen. — ^The present treaty shall be signed in 
duplicate in both the English and French languages. The 
texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a discrepancy 
in the interpretation the French text shall prevail. 

In conformity with the provisions of Articles 3 and 9 of 
the treaty of peace between Japan and Russia of this date 
the undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the fol- 
lowing additional articles: 

Sub-Article to Article Three. — The Imperial Govern- 
ments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence 
the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory 
of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the 
treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of 
eighteen months after that date the armies of the two coun- 
tries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria except 
from the leased territory of the Liao-tung Peninsula. Th« 
forces of the two countries occupying the front positions 
shall first be withdrawn. 


The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the 
right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway 
lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not 
exceed fifteen per kilometer, and within that maximum 
number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian 
Armies shall by common accord fix the number of such 
guards to be employed as small as possible while having 
in view the actual requirements. 

The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in 
Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in 
conformity with the above principles, and shall take by com- 
mon accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacua- 
tion so soon as possible, and in any case no later than the 
period of eighteen months. 

Sub-Article to Article Nine. — So socm as possible after 
the present treaty comes into force a commission of delimita- 
tion, composed of an equal number of members, is to be 
appointed, respectively, by the two high contracting parties, 
which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the 
exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian posses- 
sions on the island of Sakhalin. The commission shall be 
bound, so far as tc^ographical considerations permit, to fol- 
low the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary 
line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points 
are found to be necessary, compensation will be made by cor- 
relative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty 
of said commission to prepare a list and a description of the 
adjacent islands included in the cession, and, finally, the com- 
mission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries 
of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall 
be subject to the approval of the high contracting parties. 

The forgoing additional articles are to be considered rati- 
fied with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which 
they are annexed. 


Portsmouth, the fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty- 
eighth year of Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third of 
August, 1905, (Sept. s, 1905). 

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have 
signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of peace. 

Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of 
the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of the Meiji, 
corresponding to the twenty-third day of August, one 
thousand nine hundred and five. 


The Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 1905 

Preamble, — ^The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, 
being desirous of replacing the agreement concluded between 
them on January 30, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed 
upon the following articles, which have for their object: 

A. — Consolidation and the maintenance of general peace 
in the regions of eastern Asia and India. 

B. — ^The preservation of the common interests of all the 
Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity 
of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal oppor- 
tunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in 

C — ^The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high 
contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of 
India, and the defense of their special interests in the said 

Article /. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of 
either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights or interests 
referred to in the preamble are in jeopardy, the two Gov- 
ernments will communicate with one another fully and 
frankly, and consider in common the measures which should 
be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests. 

Article II. If, by reason of an unprovoked attack or ag- 
gressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other 
Power or Powers, either contractor be involved in war in 
defense of its territorial rights or special interests men- 
282 [514 


tioned in the preamble, the other contractor shall at once 
come to the assistance of its ally, and both parties will con^ 
duct war in common and make peace in mutual agreement 
with any Power or Powers involved in such war. 

Article III. Japan possessing paramount political, mili- 
tary, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recog- 
nizes the right of Japan to take such measures for the 
guidance, control, and protection of Korea as it may deem 
proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those in- 
terests, provided always that such measures are not con- 
trary to the principle of equal opportunities for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations. 

Article IV. Great Britain having special interests in all 
that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan re- 
cognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity 
of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding 
her Indian possessions. 

Article V. The high contracting parties agree that 
neither, without consulting the other, will enter into separ- 
ate agreements with another Power to the prejudice of the 
objects described in the preamble of this agreement. 

Article VL In the matter of the present war between 
Japan and Russia Great Britain will continue to maintain 
strict neutrality unless another Power or Powers join in 
hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will 
come to the assistance of Japan, will conduct war in com- 
mon, and will make peace in mutual agreement with Japan. 

Article VII. The conditions under which armed assist- 
ance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the 
circumstances mentioned in the present agreement, and the 
means by which such assistance shall be made available, will 
be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the 
contracting parties, who from time to time will consult one 
another fully* :nd freely on all questions of mutual interest. 

The Anglo- Jap 

Preamble. — The Cover' 
being desirous of replacii^ 
them on January 30, 190 
upon the following arti 
A. — Consolidation a- 
in the regions of eastc 
B. — The preservati 
Powers in China by 1 
of the Chinese Enr 
tunities for the co' 

C. — The maintc 
contracting parti( 
India, and the (\- 

Article I. I: 
either Great B 
referred to in 


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Article VIII. The present agreement shall, subject to 
the provisions of Article VII, come into effect immediately 
after the date of signature and remain in force for ten 
years from that date. In case neither of the high con- 
tracting parties shall have been notified twelve months be- 
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expiration of one year from the day on which either of the 
contracting parties shall have denounced it; but if, when the 
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engaged in war, the alliance, ipso facto , shall continue until 
peace shall have been concluded. 

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by 
their respective Governments, have signed this agreement 
and affixed their seals. Done in duplicate at London, 
August 12, 1905. Lansdowne. 



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NttD Sork 



London : P. S. King & Son 

1 90s 



I. The Place of Magic in the Intellectual History of 
Europe. By Lynn Thomdike, Fh. D i 

a. The Ecclesiastical Edicts of the Theodosun Code. By 

WWiam K.Boyd, Ph. D iii 

3. The International Position of Japan as a Great Power. 

By Seiji G. Bishida, Ph. D 233 



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Univenity Press (Macmillan), 1895, 2899. ^ 

MUNROE SMITH :- Bismarck, Colambta University Press (Macmillan), 1899. 

FRANK J. GOODNOW :— Comparative Administrative Law (a vols.). New York. G. P. 
Potmam's SoNSf 1893; one volume edition, looa. Municipal Home Rule, ColumbiA 
University Press (Macmiujoi), 1895. Municipal Problems, Columbia Univarsity Press 
(MACMnxAM), 1897. Politics and Administration, New York, Thk Machxllam Com- 
FANT, Z900. City Oovernment in the United States, Thb Ckntukv Co., 1904. 

SDWIN R. A. SELIGM AN: -Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Act. 
Boston, GiNN & CoMPAMY, 1S88. The Shifting and the Incidence of Taxation. Second 
Edidon, Columbia Univerxity Press (Macmillan), 1809. Progressive Taxation in 
Theory and Practice, New York, Thb Macmillah Company, 1894. Essays la Tax- 
ation, New York, Thb Macmtllan Company. 1895; Fourth Edidon, 1904. The Econ* 
omic Interpretation of History, Columbia University Press, (MACiaujUf), 1900. 

HERBERT L. OSGOOD :— Archives and Public Records of New York, published by 
Thb American Historicax. Association, Washington, 1901. The American Colonies 
in the Seventeenth Century, (a vols.) New York, Thb Macmillan Co., X904. 

WILLIAM A. DUNNING :— Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction, New York. 
Thb Macmiluih Company, 1898. A History of Political Theories, Ancient and 
Mediaeval, New York, Thb Macmillan Company, 1903. 

JOHN BASSETT MOORE :— Extraterritorial Crime, Washington, published by the 
Government, 1887. Extradition and Interstate Rendition (2 vols.), Boston, Tub Bos- 
ton Book Company, 1891. American Notes 00 Conflict of Laws (accompanying 
Dicey's " Confltct of Laws "), Boston, Thb Boston Book Company, 1895. History and 
Digest of International Arbitrations (6 vols.)> Washington, published by the dovem- 
ment, 1898. 

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS :— The Modern Distributive Process (in collaboration with 
J. B. Clark), Boston, Ginn & Company, 1888 The Theory of Sociology, PbiUuielphla. 
American Acadbhy of Political and Social Scibncb, 1894. The Principles of 
Sociology. New York, Thr Macmillan Company, i8q6; Seventh Edition. 1902. The 
Theory of Socialisation, New York, Thr Macmillan Company, 1897. ElemenU of 
Sociology, New York, Thr Macmillan Company, iSdB. Democracy and Empire, 
New York, Thb Macmillan Company. 1900; Secnnd Edition, 1901. Inductive Soci- 
ology, New York, Thb Macmillan Company. 1901. 

JOHN B. CLARK :-The Philosophy of Wealth, Boston, Ginn & Company, 1886 , 
Second Edition, 1887. The Modern Distributive Process (in collaboration with F. H. 
Glddings). Boston, Ginn & Company. x888. The Diatribution of Wealth, New York: 
Thb Macmillan Company, 1899. The Control of Trusts, New York, Th« Macmillan 
Company, 1901. The Problem of Monopoly, Columbia University Press (Macmillan), 

JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON :--Petrarch, the First Modern Scholar and Man of 
Letters (in collaboration with H. W. Rolfe), New York, G. P. Putnam s bows, 1898 
The History of Western Europe, Boston, Ginn & Company. 190a. 

WILLIAM M. SLOANE:-The French War and »»^j;J^«vo»"»*^'^^men«n H^^^ 
Series, New York . Charles Scribner's Sons. 1 553. The Life ©' Napoleon Bonaparte 
(3 vols.). New York^ Thb Cbntuby Company. 1806 The French Revolution and Re- 
Hgious Reform, New York, Charlbs Scribkbb^s Sons, 190X. 

HENRY ROGERS SEAGER :— Introduction to Economica. i^few ifork,HaMaY Holt& 
Co., X904. 



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